Firm value and risk management in credit agreements by Marami, Ali & Dubois, Michel
                                                                                             
Faculté des Sciences Economiques 
Avenue du 1er-Mars 26 
CH-2000 Neuchâtel 
www.unine.ch/seco 
 
 
                                                                                                        
 
 
 
 
 
    
           
 
 
 
 
 
PhD Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Economics and Business 
Institute of Financial Analysis 
University of Neuchâtel 
 
For the degree of PhD in Finance 
by 
 
Ali MARAMI 
 
Accepted by the dissertation committee:  
Prof. Michel Dubois, University of Neuchâtel, thesis director 
Prof. Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, EPFL 
Prof. Peter Fiechter, University of Neuchâtel 
Prof. Jérôme Taillard, Boston College, USA 
Prof. Philip Valta, HEC Paris, France 
 
Defended on 27 August 2014 
Firm Value and Risk Management in Credit Agreements 
                                                                                             
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                                                             
 
 
                                                                                             
 
 
 
                                                                                             
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
I dedicate this dissertation to my wife, Shadi and my son, Hirad. 
                                                                                             
 
 
 
 
                                                                                             
 
 
Acknowledgments 
 
First of all, I would express my gratitude to my advisor Professor Michel Dubois for guiding me 
during the entire PhD research. I appreciate his inspiration, encouragement and support through 
these valuable years at the University of Neuchatel. I would also like to thank Rüdiger 
Fahlenbrach, Peter Fiechter, Jérôme Taillard and Philip Valta who have accepted to be part of 
my dissertation committee. I am certain that their comments enrich my research at the different 
stages of this thesis.  
My further gratitude goes to Jean Noël Barrot, Stefano Puddu, Ehraz Refayet, Carolina Salva, 
Tobias Scheinert, and seminar participants at the World Finance Conference, the FMA Europe 
2013, and the AFFI International Conference in Paris 2013 for their valuable comments and 
suggestions. I am also grateful to all my Ph.D. student colleagues as well as participants of 
finance seminars at University of Neuchâtel for their significant impact on my research through 
discussions and comments. 
This thesis is impossible without the encouragement and support of my family. I am indebted 
to them. 
  
                                                                                             
 
 
  
                                                                                             
 
 
Summary: 
 
In this dissertation, I analyze the proxies used in literature as the determinants of firm value to 
identify the core variables in modeling firm value. Using these variables, I evaluate the impact 
of interest rate derivatives on firm value. More specifically, I find that interest rate derivatives 
imposed in credit agreements has a positive impact on firm value in contrast to those used 
voluntarily for which the motive behind the use of derivatives is not clear for equity holders. 
The impact of systematic risk in placement structure of debt is also studied. I show that the 
impact of systematic risk on cost of debt is higher for public debts compared to those for private 
credit agreements. However, the emergence of loan secondary market diminishes this difference.  
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Introduction 
In this dissertation, I focus on the determinants of firm value. More specifically, I start by 
investigating the main determinants and core factors in modelling the “normal” value of the firm. 
I review papers published in major accounting, economic and finance journals that relate firm 
value to a set of determinants. Consistent with existing theories, this review reveals that 
profitability, risk, growth, payout policies and size are the main determinants of firm value. 
However, the proxies used for each factor is extremely diverse. Therefore, I apply Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC) to find variables with highest explanatory power. This analysis 
identifies six core variables for firm value. I also test the specification and power of the 
model based on these core variables by conducting a pseudo Mont Carlo simulation. The 
outcome of this research provides an in-depth understating of determinants of firm value as 
well as a baseline model to be applied in my research on the impact of risk management on 
firm value.  
In chapter two, I study the interplay between the use of financial derivatives and firm value. 
I leverage my findings in my research on firm value and analyze the impact of the interest 
rate derivatives on firm value. Market frictions such as income tax, bankruptcy costs and 
access to the financial markets bolster potentials for value generation by risk management. 
For instance, risk management reduces the volatility of cash flows. As a result, it reduces the 
present value of tax liabilities when the tax function is convex and diminishes the 
probability of bankruptcy in unfavorable states of economy. Financial derivatives are one 
of the prevailing tools in risk management. International Swap and Derivative Association 
and Bank of International Settlement (BIS) frequently report a significant increase in the 
use of derivatives. For instance, according to BIS report, the notional value of interest rate 
derivatives increased from $3.3 trillion in 2000 to more than $35.6 trillion in 2009. However, 
these financial derivatives could be used for other purposes rather than risk management. 
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Stulz (1984) and Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that managers may hold derivative positions 
for their own advantage that might not be aligned with shareholders’ interests. Consistent 
with this idea, there is evidence that some firms use financial instruments for speculation; 
see e.g., Faulkender (2005) and Géczy, Minton, and Schrand (2007). This agency conflict 
accounts for inconclusive result of researches on unconditional use of derivatives and firm 
value. Therefore, I turn my attention on the use of derivatives imposed by creditors on firm 
value. More specifically, I investigate the impact of interest rate protection covenants (IRPC) 
in syndicated loans on firm value. An IRPC clarifies the use of derivatives to both 
shareholders and bondholders for the purpose of risk management. Consequently, it alleviates 
the uncertainty in the motive behind the use of derivatives. 
Using a panel of US firms exposed to interest rate risk between 1998 and 2007, I show that 
mandatory interest rate hedging has an economically large and statistically significant positive 
impact on firm value. This finding is robust to various competing hypotheses including the 
existence of additional covenants enhancing firm value, stricter corporate governance rules, 
and more intensive competition on the product market. To check the robustness of this result 
to a potential selection bias, I use a propensity score matching and my results are not altered. 
To reduce endogeneity concerns, I use the introduction of FAS133 rule as a natural 
experiment. This accounting rule imposes the disclosure of hedging policies, which reduces 
the ambiguity about interest rate derivatives usage. I find that, after the implementation of the 
rule, interest rate hedging has a positive impact on firm value. Finally, this analysis shows that 
this value is created by the relaxation of the financial constraint that allows a higher level of 
investment and, to a less extent, the reduction of cost of debt. 
The outcome of this chapter motivates me to study the interplay between firm risk and 
debt structure. In fact, working on firms issued syndicated loans, I notice that a large portion 
of firms with investment grade rating finance their projects through private placement. The 
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literature on the placement structure of debt posits information asymmetries as the main 
determinants of debt structure. In other word, private lenders are superior to public creditors 
in financing “information-problematic” firms (Carey, Post and Sharpe, 1998). However, 
information asymmetry is not an incentive for firms with investment grade rating. Several 
studies document the impact of systematic risks similar to those in equity price on cost of 
debt, e.g. Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001). Since private creditors have a different 
investment horizon from that of public bond holders, I conjecture that private lenders have a 
distinct expectation for price of systematic risk compare to public lenders. As a result, in 
chapter three, I study the systematic risk of private and public borrowers in two groups of 
investment and speculative credit ratings. I also analyze the impact of emerging secondary loan 
market on the difference between systematic risk of public and private lenders. 
To conclude, the results of my research on firm value complement the literature that 
examines the determinants of firm value. While most of the previous research considers the 
main determinants as control variables, I suggest which proxies really matter. I also 
provide novel empirical evidence of the impact of interest rate derivatives usage on firm value 
by comparing non-users, voluntary and mandatory users. It is also a step forward to an 
unbiased estimation of the influence of derivatives on firm value by focusing on derivatives 
usage imposed by creditors rather than that decided by managers alone. Last but not least, 
this research opens a new chapter in the debt structure literature by contrasting the price of 
systematic risk in private and public debt market. I also show that how secondary market 
diminishes the advantage of private lending in information asymmetry and controlling 
incentives. 
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Chapter 1: Which factors are important in firm valuation? 
(In collaboration with Michel Dubois) 
1.1 Introduction 
Variables affecting firm value are of major interest for both corporate finance and asset 
pricing. A significant change in these variables, at a given point in time, allows the quantification 
of their real impact on firm value. Frequently, this identification consists of two steps: (a) the 
computation of cumulated abnormal stock returns around the event date (event studies) and (b) 
the estimation of a regression with cumulated abnormal returns as the dependent variable, the 
independent variables being the variable of interest and a set of controls that determine firm 
value. However, this identification strategy is feasible when the date and the magnitude of the 
change in the variable of interest are observable with a reasonable degree of accuracy; see, e.g., 
Kothari and Warner (2008). It also assumes that the event is not partially anticipated, which 
smooth the market reaction, and that wealth transfers between stockholders and creditors are 
absent. An alternative strategy consists in regressing Tobin’s Q, a proxy for firm value, against 
the variable of interest1 and a set of contemporaneous firm value determinants measured at 
equally spaced intervals. The former strategy has been employed routinely in finance and more 
generally, in economics, while the latter has been used more recently. It is popular for studying 
the impact of corporate governance, the structure of the board and specific manager’s actions 
like the impact of derivatives usage, cash holding, corporate diversification and foreign listing. 
In this paper, we study which variables are the core factors in firm valuation, whether the 
corresponding model is well specified and has power to detect changes in firm value when a 
specific variable of interest is added to the baseline model. We first identify the variables used 
in the literature. While there is a large consensus on the role of profitability, risk, growth, the 
                                                 
1 The method can be accommodated easily when there are several variables of interest 
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payout policy and size as the main determinants of firm value, the proxies for these factors are 
extremely diverse. We examine which proxies explain firm value and, more importantly, exhibit 
a reliable sign. For that purpose, we follow a procedure similar to Frank and Goyal (2009). We 
collect the proxies of the core factors and select our baseline model with the Bayesian 
Information Criterion (BIC). This approach should help reduce the diversity of the control 
variables. Secondly, we evaluate the performance of this baseline model. Beyond the core 
factors, we aim at testing whether the model is well specified and has power to detect a variable 
of interest not already incorporated in the model. We explore these properties through pseudo 
Monte Carlo simulations. 
We begin by reviewing papers published in major accounting, economic and finance journals 
that relate firm value to a set of determinants. We select empirical papers, published between 
1995 and 20132, containing the following key words in the text: “Q ratio”, “Tobin’s Q”, “firm 
value”, “firm valuation” and “firm performance”. Then, we retain exclusively those papers 
where Tobin’s Q is the dependent variable. In total, we find fifty-two papers that match our 
requirements (fourty in finance journals, ten in accounting journals and two in economic 
journals). More specifically, their focus is on corporate governance (twenty-two papers), 
ownership structure (nine papers), followed by risk management (five papers), diversification, 
cross-listing and other corporate policies (sixteen papers). 
These empirical papers typically study whether a variable of interest affects Tobin’s Q after 
controlling for its main contemporaneous determinants (forty-nine papers). However, the 
comparison of their results is unreliable since most models do not share the same proxies for the 
control variables. For example, thirteen different proxies are used for profitability, twelve for 
risk, fifteen for growth, four for the payout policy and six for size. Note that industry, firm and 
                                                 
2 These journals are: Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting and Economics, Journal of Accounting 
Research (accounting journals), American Economic Review, Journal of Political Economy, Quarterly Journal 
of Economics (economic journals), Journal of Finance, Journal of Financial Economics, Journal of Financial 
and Quantitative Analysis, and Review of Financial Studies (finance journals). 
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time fixed effects and their combinations are not counted, which renders the comparison of these 
models even more difficult. 
Over the sample period (1963-2012), ten sub-samples and six sub-periods, our findings 
indicate that the explanatory power of the variables is not equal. We identify EBITDA / 
Total Assets, Market Leverage, CAPEX / Total Assets, R&D / Total Assets, Dividend / 
Total Assets and (the Log of) Total Assets as the core determinants of firm value in a model 
where we account for firm and industry-time fixed effects. In this model, standard errors are 
clustered by firm and industry-time. The adjusted R-square of the baseline model is twenty-three 
percent when the estimation is conducted over the sample period. The variance decomposition 
of Tobin’s Q shows that twenty-two percent of the total variance is attributable to the 
determinants, forty-two percent to the firm fixed effect and six percent to the industry-time fixed 
effect. The sub-samples and the sub-periods that we examine demonstrate similar results with 
an adjusted R-square around twenty percent. 
Fama and French (1998) propose an alternative dynamic panel data model that has been used 
in four papers; see Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006), Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), 
and Frésard and Salva (2010). The core factors are profitability, risk, growth and dividends. This 
model departs from the previous specification by including lead-lag values of the core factors. 
The practical issue that arises is which model should be preferred. To answer this question, we 
proceed as follows. We estimate Fama and French (1998) model over the sample and six sub-
periods. The R-square of this model is twenty percent, which is slightly lower than that of the 
baseline model. Since the baseline model, with the core contemporaneous determinants, and 
Fama and French (1998) model are non-nested, we use Vuong (1989) test to check which one 
(if any) dominates. Our results show that the baseline model should be preferred.  
To examine the specification and the power of the baseline model, we proceed as follows. 
Based on the surveyed papers, we identify the characteristics of the variable of interest. Its effect 
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on Tobin’s Q is: (a) continuous, permanent and all firms are concerned, (b) the impact is 
permanent but it is firm-specific and (c) the treatment is reversible3. For (b) and (c) the number 
of treated firms varies across papers from ten to one hundred percent. In addition, the cross-
sectional intensity of the treatment is constant (twenty-eight papers) or firm dependent (twenty-
five papers)4.  
Second, we use pseudo Monte Carlo simulations. We draw five hundred firms in a given year 
and collect the core determinants for the current and the following seven years. We obtain an 
unbalanced panel data of five hundred firms over an eight-year period. Then, we generate a 
random variable of interest and estimate via OLS the baseline model (including the variable of 
interest) with firm and industry-time fixed effects. We estimate standard errors clustered at the 
firm level, at the firm and the industry-time levels (double clustering with analytical and a 
bootstrap estimate). This procedure is iterated five hundred times to generate the empirical 
distributions. Finally, we study whether the model is well specified and has power at the one, 
five and ten percent levels. Our benchmark is a model with firm fixed effect and standard errors 
clustered at the firm level. 
Our results complement the literature that examines the determinants of firm value. While 
most of the previous research considers the main determinants as control variables, we suggest 
which proxies really matter. The spirit of our research is closely related to Bhojraj and Lee 
(2002). Two differences are noticeable. We use Tobin’s Q as a proxy of firm value (instead of 
equity or enterprise value), a variable that has become standard in finance. We estimate the 
model appropriate fixed effects and standard errors adjustments. Our research is also related to 
                                                 
3 The typical cases are (a) competition pressure or accounting transparency, (b) cross-listing in a foreign capital 
market and (c) derivatives usage since the firm can decide to hedge one year and not to hedge the next year, 
perhaps because the risk does not exist anymore. 
 
4 For instance, to study the impact of derivatives on firm value, the variable of interest can be binary (i.e., a firm 
is classified as derivatives user or non-user) or continuous (i.e., for every firm the hedging intensity is 
measured). Some papers use both variables in different specifications; see, e.g., Jin and Jorion (2006). 
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Fama and French (1998). The main advantage of our model is that it incorporates more 
observations without losing explanatory power when the performance of both models is 
compared on the same data set. In the context of panel data models examining the impact of 
both cross-sectional and time-series dependence, our contribution can be seen as an empirical 
application of recent techniques to a major topic in finance; see, e.g., Bertrand et al. (2004), 
Cameron, Gelbach and Miller (2008), Gow, Ormazabal and Taylor (2010) and Petersen (2009).  
The structure of the paper is as follows. In the next section, we review how firm value and its 
determinants are measured in the literature. We also examine the sample characteristics and the 
estimation methods previously used. Section 1.3 reports the results of the variable selection 
process. In Section 1.4, we analyze the specification and the power of the model selected in the 
previous section and Section 1.5 concludes the paper. 
1.2 The determinants of firm value  
Discounting future cash flows is the classic approach to determine what a firm is worth. By 
making additional assumptions concerning earnings growth and the payout policy, analytical 
formulas are obtained. Empirical models, in a way or another, incorporate these core factors. 
1.2.1. Defining Tobin’s Q 
Tobin’s Q is the ratio of the market value of the firm to the replacement cost of its physical 
assets. As it is well known, the market price of debt and the replacement cost of the assets in 
place are difficult to estimate. However, Chung and Pruitt (1994), and Perfect and Wiles (1994) 
find a strong correlation between the market value of equity plus the book value of non-equity 
financial claims scaled by the book value of total assets, and proxies for Tobin’s Q based on 
more complex methods; see, e.g., Lindenberg and Ross (1981), and Lang and Litzenberger 
(1989). Hence, most of the existing studies use their definition, which is easy to compute, and 
homogeneous among firms. We define Tobin’s Q ratio as follows: 
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where MV is the market value of equity, BV Assets is the book value of assets and BV Equity 
is the book value of equity, i and t refer to firm i at fiscal year-end t.  Due to the skewness of 
Tobin’s Q ratio, we use Log of Q as the proxy of the firm value, a common practice in literature.  
1.2.2. The determinants of firm value 
From forty-nine papers in our survey, we summarize empirical Tobin’s Q models as follows: 
 , 0 1 2 3 4 5 2i t i t itQ                     i,t i,t i,t i,t i,tProf Risk Growth Div Size  
where ,i tQ  is (Log of) Tobin’s Q, and i,tProf , i,tRisk , i,tGrowth , i,tDiv  and i,tSize  are vectors 
of proxies for profitability, risk, growth, the payout policy and firm size. Firm, industry or 
country and time fixed effects are also frequently included. 
Following Fama and French (1998), Dittmar and Mahrt-Smith (2007), Frésard and Salva 
(2010) or Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2006) estimate a model with the current level of 
these core variables and their two-year lead and lag changes. Lead variables are included because 
Tobin’s Q contains the market value of equity. Hence, it incorporates expectations about the 
future value of accounting numbers. Lagged variables are also included to smooth (unusual) 
current values. Again, the core variables are profitability, risk, growth and the payout policy. 
With our notations, it can be written has follows: 
 , 0 1 2 3 4 3
F F F F F
i t itQ               i,t i,t i,t i,tProf Risk Growth Div  
Interestingly, previous studies using this model retain the same proxies for the core factors5. 
Earnings before Extraordinary Items proxies for i,tProf , Interest (rate) Expenses for i,tRisk , 
change in Total Assets and R&D Expenses for i,tGrowth  and Common Dividends for i,tDiv . 
                                                 
5 Frésard and Salva (2009) add two variables, sales growth and the median of Q, plus a country fixed effect. We do 
not consider these variables in our specification.  
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Note that the lead market equity to book equity ratio is also added to capture growth options and 
that size is missing. While also missing in the original model, firm or country and time fixed 
effects have been included in two papers. 
 1.2.3. Measuring the determinants of Tobin’s Q 
1.2.3.1. Profitability and internal financing resources 
Discounting models show that profitability is expected to be positively related to firm value. 
Fernandez (2013) states that cash flows should be preferred. As he put it:  “Cash flow is a fact. 
Net income is just an opinion”. He argues that net income figures are contaminated with 
accounting assumptions while cash flow is not. However, profitability ratios like Net Income, 
Income Before Extraordinary Items, EBIT, or EBITDA scaled by Total Assets, Sales, Tangible 
Assets or the Market Value of Equity represent the vast majority of the proxies in the surveyed 
papers. EBITDA/ Total Asset, the most frequent proxy for profitability, appears ten times, 
followed by ROA and Net Income / Total Asset (four times), and EBIT or EBITDA scaled by 
Sales (three times each). 
1.2.3.2. Risk 
The asset pricing literature states that the discounting rate increases with risk. Hence, 
everything else equal, a negative relation between risk and firm value should be observed. 
Systematic risk (market model Beta) is a classic proxy for risk (four times). The standard 
deviation of the residuals has also been used as a proxy for idiosyncratic risk; see, e.g., 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2009) and Gurun and Butler (2012). There are at least three concerns 
about these proxies: (a) they show a significant instability, (b) they are subject to the error in 
variables problem when used as independent variable, and (c) they are affected by infrequent 
trading. Leverage, particularly book leverage, computed as total debt over total assets, is the 
prevailed proxy for risk (twenty papers). Studies such as Welch (2004) underpin market leverage 
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as a forward looking measure and book leverage as a backward accounting measure. However, 
Myers (1977) advocates book leverage as a measure for risk since debts are more supported by 
assets rather than equity. Long term debt instead of total debt, or scaling debt by equity, are 
alternative proxies. The volatility of stock return (four times), Altman’s Z-Score and the distance 
to default (see Merton, 1974) are also used sporadically. Fama and French (1998) construct a 
proxy of financial risk based on interest payment instead of leverage with its two-year lead and 
lag data. 
1.2.3.3. Growth 
The relation between growth and firm value has two dimensions. The first component 
describes the dynamics of future earnings through the investment policy. The second component 
is the value of real options. Both are expected to be positively related to firm value. Proxies for 
growth are highly diverse but those based on CAPEX and R&D expenditures are the most 
frequent (twenty-six and twenty-three papers respectively). Myers (1977), and Smith and Watts 
(1992) argue about the impact of investment opportunities on firm value and introduce CAPEX 
as a proxy for investment. Morck and Yeung (1991) explain that CAPEX is a measure of tangible 
investment while R&D and Advertisement expenditures (not capitalized intangible investment) 
are proxies for growth options. Studies such as Maury and Pajuste (2005) use tangible assets as 
a proxy for investment growth. They argue that firms with lower tangible assets have higher 
intangibles with potential of generating cash flows. Barth and Clinch (1998) also show the 
positive correlation between firm value and intangible assets. The question is whether this proxy 
is interchangeable with R&D and Advertisement expenditures or whether both should be 
included. Measures based on sales, asset growth and depreciation of assets are other substitutes 
for growth (sixteen papers).  
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1.2.3.4. Payout policy 
There are several potential reasons why the payout policy should matter. As mentioned in 
Fama and French (1998), dividends could signal future profits or just be a smooth version of 
profits. In addition, dividend paying firms could face lower agency costs because less 
discretionary cash is available. Everything else equal, more dividends should enhance firm 
value.  
The payout policy is captured through dividends scaled by sales, equities or assets, or with a 
dummy variable for dividend payments (six papers). Studies such as Lang and Stulz (1993) use 
this dummy as an indicator of access to the financial markets. Following Fazzari, Hubbard and 
Petersen (1988), they state that firms can cut dividend and invest the retained earnings. 
Therefore, a dividend paying firm has access to other financial resources for its investment. 
However, a firm may have a payout because it has no investment opportunities or because it is 
highly profitable. Fama and French (1998) use the level of dividend paid and state the tax 
disadvantage of dividends. 
1.2.3.5. Size 
As equation (2) shows, scaling market value with total assets, neutralizes the impact of size 
on firm value. Stigler (1963) demonstrates that size has no relation with the performance of the 
firm while Peltzman (1977) states that larger firms are more efficient. In his literature review, 
Mueller (2003) concludes that the relation between size and performance, particularly 
profitability, is ambiguous. Despite the above mentioned argument, size is frequently included 
as a determinant of firm value. Access to financial resources, industrial and geographical 
diversification, analysts’ coverage and investors’ visibility, are potential reasons explaining this 
relation. Therefore, firm size indirectly influence two main components of firm value, i.e. risk 
and growth options. Log of book value of assets (thirty papers), age (eleven papers), equities 
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(seven papers), sales and tangible assets are the proxies for the firm size in the surveyed 
literature. 
1.2.4. Estimation methods and sample characteristics 
The models examined previously analyze panel data sets. Because some groups of 
observations have specific characteristics, fixed effects are introduced in the vast majority of the 
models (forty-five papers). Fixed effects have been considered separately or simultaneously 
along the following dimensions: time, firm, industry and country. Time and industry (seventeen 
papers) followed by time and firm (fifteen papers) are the most frequently used. Since firms do 
not change frequently from an industry to another, at least in the mid-term, firm and industry 
fixed effect are not used simultaneously. Hence, several studies use industry-adjusted variables 
(i.e. demeaned by industry). Also some studies introduce the average or median of the Q ratio 
into the model. However, Gormley and Matsa (2014) show that it generates serious biases in 
estimation. As they recommend, industry-year fixed effect ( ,Industry t ) represents an interesting 
alternative since it captures the exposure of the industry to the business cycle and the competition 
within the industry. This type of fixed effect is absent from the previous literature. 
Cross-sectional and time-series dependences are serious issue in panel data; see, e.g., 
Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004), Petersen (2009) and Gow, Ormazabal and Taylor 
(2010). Positive autocorrelation or cross-correlation induces standard errors that are too small 
leading too frequently to the rejection of the null hypothesis (no impact of a variable of interest). 
In the early period of our survey, Fama-McBeth (1973) method was the most frequent method 
of estimation. Different solutions to correct for either cross-sectional or time-series dependence 
are proposed in the literature but do not perform well when both forms of dependence show up.  
Panel data models with parameters estimated through OLS with standard errors clustered at the 
firm level (eighteen papers), at the industry level (one paper) or at the country level (two papers) 
is now the standard method. More specifically, Petersen (2009) suggests that introducing firm 
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fixed effect and clustering of the standard error at the firm level may be sufficient in some 
corporate finance applications. However, he clearly states that this pattern may not generalize 
and that […standard errors clustered by firm and time can be a useful robustness check]; see 
Petersen (2009, p. 473). 
[Table 1.1] 
In Table 1.1, we observe that the impact of the variable of interest on Tobin’s Q is highly 
variable with a median of twelve percent. In fifteen papers, it is lower than ten percent, and 
above twenty percent in twenty-four (five papers show an average impact between ten and 
twenty percent). The standard errors clustered by firm are present in twelve papers while 
clustering by time is never considered. Therefore, the power of the corresponding models, i.e. 
their ability to reject the null when it is false, is questionable. 
Concerning the sample, the typical panel has eight annual observations (median), for eight 
hundred firms (median). Most of the panels are unbalanced so that the number of observations 
has a median of 4200. Finally, the number of treated firms in sample varies from ten to one 
hundred percent. 
1.3 Empirical Analysis 
We extract annual data from the merged COMPUSTAT and CRSP database. The sample 
period starts in 1963 based on Fama and French (1992, p. 429) comments that COMPUSTAT 
is “tilted toward big historically successful firms” for the years before, and ends on 2012. 
Financial institutions and utility companies (SIC code starting with 6 and 49, respectively) are 
removed due to their special and regulated activities.  
The variables are defined in the Appendix 1.A. They are winsorized left and right at one 
percent to reduce the impact of outliers on our tests. We eliminate Z-score from our analysis 
since it is a linear combination of other variables in the model. We follow the general practice 
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in the literature that consists in replacing missing R&D and Advertisement expenditures with 
zero. To identify the core variables of the model, we conduct our tests on the sample over the 
1963-2012 period, ten equal sub-samples where firms are selected randomly with replacement6, 
and annual cross-sections. This data set allows us to observe the stability of the sign and the 
explanatory power of the variables. 
1.3.1. Univariate analysis 
We conduct a univariate analysis similar to that in Frank and Goyal (2009) between each 
variable and the Tobin’s Q ratio. We compute the Pearson correlations and document how 
frequently they are statistically significant at the 1% (and 5%) level for negative and positive 
signs separately. This analysis gives a preliminary insight about the explanatory power of each 
variable and the stability of its corresponding sign.  
[Table 1.2] 
Table 1.2 shows the results. The first column is the correlation between each variable and 
firm value over the sample period. The next four columns show the proportion of correlations 
that are positive (respectively negative) and significant at the 1% and 5% (but not already 
significant at 1%) level in ten sub-samples. Column 6 to 9 report the proportion of correlation 
coefficients significant at the 1% and 5% (but not already significant at 1%) level for annual 
cross-sectional tests. The results indicate that the sign of pairwise correlations between the Q 
ratio and the proxies of profitability is not consistent. For instance, the negative correlation 
between ten profitability proxies and firm value is in contradiction with the theory. For nine of 
them, the correlation is more frequently negative than positive at the 1% level. Also in 
contradiction with the theory, measures of risk based on stock market prices (beta, idiosyncratic 
risk and volatility) are positively correlated with Q while, as expected, leverage proxies are 
                                                 
6 To have a balanced distribution of firm-years in ten sub-samples, we randomly divide the sample at each year and 
index them from 1 to 10, randomly. Then we aggregate them all by index to have the final 10 random sub-
samples.  
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negatively correlated with Q. Two proxies (three) of the payout policy, the dividend yield and 
the dividend dummy (equal to one for firms paying dividends), are negatively (positively) 
correlated with Q. Reassuringly, the signs of the correlation between Q and the proxies for 
growth are consistently positive. Despite the ambiguous correlation predicted by the theory, we 
also obtain a consistent negative correlation for size. These preliminary results show that proxies 
of the core factors should not be considered in isolation. 
1.3.2. Selecting the determinants of Tobin’s Q 
Four model selection criteria have been employed in the literature: (a) Akaike Information 
Criterion (AIC, Akaike (1974)), (b) Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC, Schwartz (1978)), (c) 
Focused Information Criterion (FIC, Wei (1992) and (d) adjusted R2 to evaluate the explanatory 
power of the variables in a model.7 We use the BIC because of its popularity in literature; see 
e.g., Bossaert and Hillion (1999) and Frank and Goyal (2009). BIC is defined as: 
   2 log-likelihood log      4     BIC p n      
where p is the number of variables in the model, and n the number of observations. Models with 
higher explanatory power generate a lower BIC. Given the high number of proxies, it is essential 
to remove those with low explanatory power.  
[Table 1.3] 
For that purpose, we follow Frank and Goyal (2009) recursive procedure. First, we estimate 
the model with all proxies. In Table 1.3, columns 1 and 2, we report the BIC (-417967) and the 
adjusted R-square (42%). We then remove the proxy (Growth Opportunities) with the lowest t-
statistic and estimate the regression of this proxy on Q. The corresponding coefficient (0.001), 
t-stat (0.06) and R-square (0%) are presented in Columns 3 to 5. Then, the model is re-estimated 
without the proxy with the lowest t-stat (Growth Opportunities). On the second row 
                                                 
7 Appendix A in Bossaerts and Hillion (1999) explains each of these criteria. 
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(dR&D / Total Assets), column 1, we observe a slight drop in the BIC from -417967 to -417979. 
This procedure is iterated until the bottom of the table. The lowest BIC (-616175) is obtained 
when R&D / Tangible and all the explanatory variables below in Table 1.3 are included. At this 
stage, we still have nineteen explanatory variables in the model.  
To reduce further the number of variables, the procedure described above is also repeated for 
both the ten groups and annually. At each test, when the lowest BIC is reached, we record the 
variables in the model and compute the proportion of groups for which a specific proxy has a 
positive (negative) coefficient and presents in the minimum BIC model. The variables that show 
most frequently in the lowest BIC model are assigned as core factors in the model. 
Interestingly, there is at least one proxy, and a maximum of two, representing each core factor 
in the model. These proxies are EBITDA / Total Assets and EBITDA / MV for profitability, 
Market Leverage for risk, CAPEX / Total Assets and R&D / Total Assets for growth, Dividend 
/ Total Assets for the payout policy and, Log (Total Assets) and Log (Equity) for size. For each 
core factor, we retain the proxy that has the highest stability in terms of sign. Therefore, 
EBITDA / MV and Log (Equity) are eliminated. Note that we keep two proxies for growth since 
they represent two different dimensions, i.e. CAPEX / Total Assets and R&D / Total Assets. 
The proxies included in our final specification are those present in minimum BIC model at least 
50% of our sub-samples periods (either the ten groups or the annual cross-sections). They have 
also a sign that is consistent with the theory. Finally, they do not switch sign in the annual 
cross-sections or over the sub-samples. These findings are consistent with the literature. As 
indicated, EBITDA / Total Assets and Log (Total Assets) are the most frequent proxies for 
profitability and size in the surveyed papers, respectively. R&D / Total Assets and CAPEX / 
Total Assets are also among the most frequently used as proxies for growth. However, market 
leverage and dividend / Total Assets are not standard variables in firm valuation models. 
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1.3.3. Tobin’s Q baseline model 
From the set of proxies selected in the previous section, we start our regression analysis of 
the baseline model (hereafter “BL”) by estimating equation (2) with firm and industry-time fixed 
effects. The t-statistics are adjusted for clustering at both firm and industry-time levels. Table 
1.4, Panel A, displays results from OLS estimations of equation (2). Column 1 (“All”) to 7, 
report the results of the 1963-2012 period and the subsequent six eight-year sub-periods. 
[Table 1.4] 
Looking at the impact of the core variables in column 1, we notice that all of them have the 
expected sign and are statistically significant at the 1% level. The subsequent columns provide 
a slightly different message. While three core variables (EBITDA / Assets, Market Leverage 
and CAPEX / Assets) have the expected sign and are statistically significant at 1%, the 
remaining ones (Log(Assets), Dividend / Assets and R&D / Assets) are not significant at the 
usual level in three sub-sample periods. The 1972-1979 period shows a core variable 
(R&D / Assets) with the wrong sign but is not significant. The R-square is 23.6% for the 
1963-2012 period and is between 19.9% and 39.6% for the remaining sub-periods. 
In Table 1.4, Panel B, we examine whether clustering standard errors at the firm level only 
changes our inference. In the first and the subsequent columns, we remark that t-stat are higher 
(standard errors are too small). The two-way clustering really matters in our model. In Table 
1.4, Panel C, we estimate the model with firm and time (instead of industry-time) fixed effect 
and cluster standard errors at the firm level. Globally, the statistical inference that we draw from 
the coefficients and their related t-stats are similar to that of Panel B. However, the R-square 
decreases when the whole sample and the sub-periods are considered. 
1.3.4. An alternative Tobin’s Q (dynamic) model 
As mentioned before, there is no variable selection for the Fama and French (1998) model 
(hereafter “FF”). We depart slightly from the original specification by introducing firm and 
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industry-time fixed effects. As for the baseline model, standard errors are clustered at the firm 
and the industry-time level. To check the robustness of our results, we re-estimate the model 
with firm and time fixed effect with standard errors clustered at the firm level. 
[Table 1.5] 
In Table 1.5, Panel A, column 1, we report the results for the 1963-2012 sample period. All 
the coefficients have the expected signs and are significant at the 1% level. Similar results are 
obtained for the six sub-sample periods. Panel B and Panel C confirm these results. Two 
limitations of this specification are noticeable. First, the number of observations is 30% lower 
because lead/lag variables require at least five consecutive years to be computed and, second, 
the explanatory power (R-square) is always lower than that of the baseline model (-4% for the 
1963-2012 sample period). To explore further this issue, we decompose the variance as 
suggested by Coles and Li (2011). To facilitate comparison, we estimate both models on the 
same sample, i.e. the one used to estimate FF. 
[Figure 1.1] 
The observed variables of the BL and FF explain respectively 23% and 19% of the total 
variance. This is consistent with BL having a higher adjusted R-square since there are more 
independent variables in FF. The contribution of the firm fixed effects is high for both models 
(42% and 48% respectively) while the industry-time fixed effect is of a lower magnitude (9% 
and 8% respectively). To summarize the pros and cons: (a) BL has a higher in-sample 
explanatory power, (b) BL does eliminate unnecessarily observations and, (c) FF has parameter 
estimates that are more consistent over time. 
The last step of our analysis consists in comparing directly the performance of both models. 
Since they are non-nested (i.e., they do not share the same independent variables), we use the 
statistical test developed by Vuong (1989). This test compares the log-likelihood functions of 
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both models. Under the null hypothesis (the log-likelihood functions are equal) the VMS 
statistics follows a standard normal: 
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where     ,i BL FF BL FFl  is the log-likelihood of the observation i under BL (FF), and n the number 
of observations. A negative (positive) value of VMS indicates that BL (FF) should be preferred 
to FF (BL) 
[Table 1.6] 
Table 1.6 reports the value of the Vuong (1989) statistics (observed) and the related p-value for 
the whole sample and six sub-periods, and the ten groups. Over the whole sample, BL dominates 
and on the sub-periods BL is chosen three times, FF two times and two times the test is 
inconclusive at the critical level of 1%. For the ten groups, the Vuong statistics is always 
negative. Four and six (four) times it is significant at the 1% and 5% levels (inconclusive), 
respectively. To conclude our selection process, we choose BL because the sample is less 
affected to the survivorship bias, both models being comparable in terms of explanatory power. 
1.4 Specification and power of the regression model 
1.4.1. Description of the pseudo Monte Carlo simulations 
To examine the specific impact of the variable of interest on our BL model, we rewrite the 
model as follows: 
 , 0 1 , 6i t t i Industry t itQ Int              tΓ ×F  
where ,i tQ is the (Log) of Tobin’s Q,  1tInt  the variable of interest (coefficient of interest), 
tF  the core factors in BL, i  and ,Industry t  the firm and industry-time fixed effects. Depending 
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on the variable of interest, we distinguish two cases: (a) tInt is a missing “continuous” variable 
in equation (6), and (b) tInt is a treatment affecting some firms (treated) in the sample and 
leaving unaffected (controls) the remaining ones. The former case is the classic problem of the 
missing variable in a regression setting. The latter case is decomposed further based on whether 
the treatment is affecting specific firms: (b1) persistently after a common date but 
heterogeneously among firm-years (“Specific”), (b2) or constantly but reversible 
(“Reversible”). We do not explore settings in which the intensity of the treatment decays over 
time (e.g., autoregressive process AR(1) with a coefficient lower than 1). 
1.4.1.1. Standard error estimation 
As already shown in Section 1.3, standard error estimates have a strong tendency of being 
too small in our setting. Therefore, the null hypothesis is rejected too often. The potential 
corrections proposed in the literature are well known; see, e.g. Bertrand et al. (2004), Petersen 
(2009) and Gow et al. (2010). We use three different methods to estimate the standard errors. 
Our benchmark is the OLS standard errors without any adjustment. This benchmark is compared 
one-way clustered standard errors (firm level), two-way clustered standard errors (firm and the 
industry-time level), and the bootstrapped one- and two-way clustered standard errors as 
suggested by Cameron et al. (2008). 
1.4.1.2. The specification and the power of the baseline model 
 Specification 
To test whether the variable of interest has any impact on Tobin’s Q, we use Model (3). The 
null hypothesis is 0 1 1: 0 0H vs   . If the model is well specified, we should not reject the 
null in this setting. Therefore, to test the specification of the model, we generate 500 random 
panels, estimate the regression model for each panel and test whether we reject the null at 1%, 
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5% and 10% (α) significant level. The model is conservative if we reject the null lower than 
500α times and anticonservative if we reject the null more than 500α. The control variables in 
our model is potentially skewd. This skewness increases the probability of Type I error in our 
test. Barber, Lyon, and Tsai (1999) address similar concern and refer to Sutton’s (1993) 
statement: “[Bootstrap] should be preferred to the t-test when the parent distribution is 
asymmetrical, because it reduces the probability of type I error in cases where the t-test has an 
inflated type I error rate and it is more powerful in other situations.”. Hence, we estimate the 
probability of rejection on both sides of the distribution. 
More specifically, to generate a panel, we randomly choose a year t between 1963 and 2005. 
On year t, we randomly choose 500 firms with replacement. To calibrate our simulations with 
the surveyed research, we explore additional dimensions. We select an eight-year panel data 
from year t to t+7. This panel length corresponds to the median of the surveyed papers; see 
Table 1.1. Some firms may not exist for the whole period. As a result, our panels are unbalanced. 
We conduct our tests for each type of treatments separately. For “Reversible” treatment, at each 
iteration, after generating panel from a randomly chosen year and firms, we assign Treatment = 
1 to random firm-years in our sample. We conduct separate tests when 20%, 40% and 60% of 
firm-years in the panel are treated. For “Continuous” variable, at each iteration we generate 
random numbers from a normal distribution with zero mean and variance equal to 1%, 2.5% and 
5% of the variance of the Log (Q) in our randomly generated panel. These marginal variances 
are in line with those of control variables in our model. Last, for “Specific” treatments, we 
generate random numbers with similar procedure explained for “Continuous” treatments. Then, 
we assign these numbers to random firms after a random year in the period of the panel. This 
test is repeated for different portion of treated firms, i.e. 20%, 40% and 60% of the firms in each 
panel.  
 Power 
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We turn our attention to the power of the model (Type II). We follow the methodology 
applied in Barber et al. (1999). For “Reversible” and “Specific” treatments, after generating the 
panel, we manipulate firm value by artificially adding ±20%, ±15%, ±10%, and ±5% of the firm 
values for treated firms. For “Continuous” treatment, we add ±20%, ±15%, ±10%, and ±5% of 
Intt to Log (Q) as abnormal firm values. Similar to specification test, we focus on the coefficient 
of the variable of interest and test the null hypothesis of  1 10 0    for negative (positive) 
abnormal firm values at 1%, 5% and 10% (α) statistical significance levels. The rejection rate 
of the null gives the power test.  
For both specification and power tests, we run the model with firm and industry-time fixed 
effects and estimate the standard error of the coefficients robust to heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation clustered at firm level. We also estimate the model with firm and industry-time 
clusters. Bootstrapping with 200 times resampling is also conducted for these tests. Finally, we 
estimate the model with random effects and clustering at firm level.   
1.4.2. Results 
Table 1.7 reports the results of specification tests for “Reversible” treatments. The numbers in 
the table show the percentage of rejection of the null at corresponding statistical significance 
levels of 1%, 5% and 10%. As indicated in the table, the model is anticonservative when 20% 
of the firms are treated. It might be the result of high number of zero values for treatments that 
generates a strong autocorrelation for this variable. This autocorrelation results in 
underestimation of the standard errors for variable of interest. In this context, we observe that 
the additional layer of clustering at industry-time level improves the performance of the model 
but not significantly. Bootstrapped resampling exacerbates the underestimation of the standard 
errors for this type of treatment. Last, we observe that the performance of the random effect 
model is identical to fixed effect in specification tests. Moreover, our results reveal that 
increasing the number of treated firms significantly improves the performance of the model. The 
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model is almost well specified when 40% of firms are treated and is almost conservative when 
the number of treated firms is 60%. In fact, for higher number of treated firms, we have less 
clustered zero values and consequently less autocorrelation in variable of interests. When the 
number of treated firms are increased, the advantage of double clustering vanishes. Similar to 
previous results, there is no improvement in the results in bootstrap and random effect models. 
Result show that when the number of treated firms are low and the impact of treatment is 
constant, researchers should be cautious in interpreting the results in which the null hypothesis 
could be rejected based on the nature of the data rather than the economic impact of the 
treatment.  
[Table 1.7] 
Results of power test of the model for “Reversible” treatments are reported in Table 1.8. As 
demonstrated in the table, when Log (Q) is increased or decreased 10% or more, the model 
identifies the abnormal firm values in 100% of the tests. For 5% abnormal firm values, the model 
still performs well in more than 80% of the tests. Similar to results for specification test, there 
is no significant difference in the performance of the model when we apply double clustering, 
bootstrap or random effects in our model. 
[Table 1.8] 
Furthermore, we conduct our tests for “Continuous” variable of interests. Specification tests are 
reported in Table 1.9. Compared to “Reversible” treatment, we observe a significant 
improvement in the model specification which is well specified when the variance of the variable 
of interest is 1% of that of Log (Q). The model becomes more conservative when the marginal 
variance increases to 2.5% and 5%. It is natural since we have an increase in standard deviation 
of coefficient and consequently less rejection. We should note that the simulated variable of 
interest does not have autocorrelation in this test that explains the improvement in specification 
tests compare to “Reversible” treatments. Similar to previous test, increasing the layer of 
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clustering as well as bootstrap and random effect do not improve the performance of the model 
for “Continuous” variable of interest.  
[Table 1.9] 
In Table 1.10, we report the results for power test of the model. Similar to specification test, we 
conduct our analysis with different variance of variable of interest, i.e. 1%, 2.5% and 5% of 
variance of the Log (Q) as well as different level of abnormal Q. In all tests, the model rejects 
the null hypothesis. In summary, this model can explain the impact of continuous variables of 
interest (without autocorrelation) on firm value with high reliability and confidence. 
[Table 1.10] 
In the last step, we estimate the model for “Specific” treatments. Our test varies in two 
dimensions in this step. We conduct our test on different portion of treated firms – i.e. 20%, 40% 
and 60% of the firms – with variances of variable of interest equal to 1%, 2.5% and 5% of the 
Log (Q). Results of specification tests are presented in Table 1.11. Independent from portion of 
treated firms, an increase in variance of the variable of interest improves the performance of the 
model. In terms of portion of treated firms, the model is almost well specified when 20% of 
firms are treated. When this portion increases to 40% and 60%, we observe that the model 
becomes more conservative. Similar to previous tests, double clustering, bootstrap or random 
effect do not improve the specification of the model.  
 
[Table 1.11] 
In terms of power of the model, we report the results for portion of firms treated for 20%, 40% 
and 60% in Panels A to C in Table 1.12 respectively. As presented, in all three portion of treated 
firms, the power of the model increases when the abnormal treatment of the firm value decreases. 
This trend looks counterintuitive at first glance. However, the variance of the variable of interest 
explains this trend. In fact, abnormal values are applied exclusively to treated firms. It means 
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that the impact of the marginal increase on the variance of variable is larger than its impact on 
its average value. It results in the increase of standard error of estimates and consequently the 
model fails to identify the abnormal increase. Based on this explanation, we should observe an 
increase in the power of the model when the portion of treated firms increases. As reported in 
Tables B and C, when the portion of treated firms increases to 40% and 60%, the performance 
of the model increases significantly. At the limit, when all firms are treated, we have a 
continuous treatment in which the model identifies abnormal Qs in all tests, as reported in Table 
1.10. Consistent to previous results, double clustering, bootstrap and random effect models do 
not show any improvement in performance of the model. Overall, researchers should interpret 
the results of “Specific” treatments in panels cautiously when the variance of the variable of 
interest is significantly lower than that of firm value.     
[Table 1.12.A] 
[Table 1.12.B] 
[Table 1.12.C] 
1.5 Conclusion 
Firm value theories describe profitability, risk and growth options as the main elements of 
firm value. In this study, we review several papers in firm value literature. We identify proxies 
used for the profitability, risk and growth separately. We also find that the majority of studies 
evaluate the impact of dichotomy variables in firm value. These dichotomy variables are 
generally random over firms and time (“Reversible” treatments) but there are also researches 
work on variables persistent for specific firms after a certain date (“Specific” treatment). Using 
all proxies used in reviewed papers, we apply Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) 
methodology and identify Log (assets), EBITDA / Total Assets, market leverage, CAPEX / 
Total Assets, R&D / Total Assets, and Dividend / Total Assets as the core factors in firm value. 
                                                                                             
27 
 
We test the power and specification of the model based on these variables. Our tests reveal that 
when the variable of interest is “Continuous” without autocorrelation, the specification and 
power of the model is ideal.  In “Reversible” treatments, the specification of the model is 
sensitive to the portion of treated firms due to its impact on the autocorrelation in non-treated 
firms. This sensitivity does not exist for power of the model. Alternatively, the power of the 
model is sensitive to the magnitude of the abnormal firm values. In particular, the power of the 
model significantly reduces when the abnormal firm value is lower than 5% in absolute values. 
For “Specific” treatment, the performance changes over two dimensions. The specification, 
improves when the variance of the variable of interest increases. When the portion of treated 
firms is 20%, the power of the model is highly sensitive to the magnitude of the abnormal firm 
value. This sensitivity diminishes when the portion of treated firms increases to 40% and 60%. 
In summary, researchers can rely on the result of the model for “Continuous” treatment with 
low autocorrelation for testing the hypothesis. However, the results should be cautiously 
interpreted when treatments are not continuous. The portion of treated firms as well as the 
variance of the treatment should be taken into consideration for interpretation of the results.  
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Appendix 1.A: Description of variables 
Variable Description Compustat 
Advertisement Advertisement expense item 45 
Age Number of year since the appearance at COMPUSTAT  
Asset growth Total assets  divided by total assets of previous years minus one item 6 
Beta250 CAPM Beta calculated over last 250 daily returns  
Beta36 CAPM Beta calculated over last 36 monthly returns  
Beta60 CAPM Beta calculated over last 60 monthly returns  
Book leverage (ltd) Long term debt divided by total assets item 9 / item 6 
Book leverage(total) Long term debt plus debt in current liabilities divided by total assets (item 9 + item 34) / item 6 
Equity Book value of equity item 60 
CAPEX Capital expenditure item 128 
CAPEX proxy One year change in property, plants and equipment’s plus depreciation Δ(item 8+ item 14) 
Dividend Common Dividend item 21 
Dividend yield Dividend divided by market value of equity item 21/(item 199×item 25) 
E Income before extraordinary items  + interest expense + noncash charges item 18 + 15 + 50 + 51 
EBIT Earnings before interest and tax: item 178 
EBITDA Earnings before interest, tax and depreciation: item 13 
FCF EBITDA - tax - interest expense - common and preferred shares dividends item 13 -16 - 35 - 15 - 19 - 21 
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Appendix 1.A - Continued 
Variable Description Compustat 
Idiosyncratic volatility (all) Standard deviation of residuals in market model for all daily returns since appearance in CRPS  
Idiosyncratic volatility (250) Standard deviation of residuals in market model for the last 250 daily returns  
Idiosyncratic volatility (60) Standard deviation of residuals in market model for the last 60 monthly returns  
Interest Interest expense item 15 
Market leverage Long term debt plus debt in current liabilities divided by MV item 9 + item 34) /  (item199 × item 25 
item 6 - item 60) 
MV Market value of equity plus total assets minus book value of equity  item 199× item 25 +item 6-item 60 
Net income  item 172 
Net income before extraordinary  item 18 
PPE (Tangible assets) Property, plant and equipment item 8 
R&D Research and development expense:  item 46 
Return volatility Standard deviation of return over last 60 monthly returns (minimum 24 months)  
ROA Operating income before depreciation plus the decrease in receivables, the decrease in inventory, the 
increase in current liabilities, and the decrease in other current assets. This measure is divided by the 
average of beginning and ending-year book value of total assets. 
(item 13+ item 2+ item 3 item 72+ item 
68)/ item 6 
ROE  Net income before extraordinary items divided by MV item 18 /  (item199 × item 25 +item 6 - 
item 60) 
Sales  item 12 
Sales growth Increase in sales from 2-year before in percentage   
Sales growth dummy Equal one if sales growth is higher than the medina of the industry (2-digit SIC)  
Sales/total assets  item 12 / item 6 
Z-score Altman Z-Score (1.2×item 179+1.4×item 36+ 
3.3×item 178+ 0.999×item 12) / item 6 
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Figure 1.1: Variance decomposition 
This Figure shows the variance decomposition of Firm fixed-effect, Industry-time fixed-effect and control variables in the baseline and Fama and French (1998) models. 
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Table 1.1: Variables of Interest in the literature on Firm Value 
This table lists the main characteristics of the surveyed papers. Columns 1 to 3 describe the publication (authors, year and journal); Column 4 to 7 describe the area of research, the nature of the variable of interest (binary 
versus continuous) and the type of treatment (Specific or Reversible). Column 8 reports the impact of the corresponding variable of interest on Tobin’s Q and column 9 is its statistical significance. Finally, Columns 10 
to 13 present the fixed effects and Column 14, the standard error adjustments (if any). 
Publication Variable of Interest Sample Impact Fixed effect and clustering 
Author(s) Date Journal Area Binary Type #obs. #treated #years %  sig Time Ind. Firm Country Clustering 
  Corporate Governance 
Adams and Ferreira 2009 JFE Board structure No - 9300  8 7% *** X  X  Firm 
Agrawal and Knoeber 1996 JFQA Corporate governance No Reversible 400  1 9% *      
Ahern and Dittmar 2012 QJE Change in Board No - 2700  8 12% *** X  X  Firm 
Baek, Kang and Park 2004 JFE Corporate governance Yes Reversible 650 150 13 6%   X    
Bebchuck and Cohen 2005 JFE Entrenched boards Yes Reversible 4200 2500 4 20% *** X     
Black and Kim 2012 JFE Board structure Yes Specific 3700 500 24 1% ** X X X  Firm 
Dey 2008 JAR Governance No - 150  2 11% **      
Dittmar and Mahrt. 2007 JFE Governance Yes Reversible 2700 350 14 28% *** X  X   
Evans et al. 2010 JAR CEO turnover Yes Reversible 350 150 4 22% *** X X   Firm 
Faleye 2007 JFE Entrenchment manager Yes Reversible 12400 6200 8 10% *** X X    
Fauver et al. 2003 JFQA Investors protection Yes Specific 28800 2000 5 5% ** X   X  
Fich and Shivdasani 2006 JOF Busy boards Yes Reversible 3400 1750 7 4% *** X     
Gompers et al. 2003 QJE Governance No - 4600  4 18% **      
Hope and Thomas 2008 JAR Firm disclosure No - 2150  5 5% ** X X    
Lang et al. 2004 JAR Firm control No - 2500  1 10% **  X  X  
Lang et al. 2012 JAR Transparency No - 77000  14 16% *** X X X X  
Masulis et al. 2012 JAE Foreign directors Yes Reversible 10000 1250 9 14% *** X X X  Firm 
Oxelheim and Randoy 2003 JBF Foreign board member Yes Specific 650 100 3 15% ** X X    
Palia 2001 RFS Manager compensation No Reversible 3250  13 0.6%  X  X   
Ringaert and Thomas 2012 JAR Insider trading Yes - 450 250 2 21% ***  X   Firm 
Yermack 1996 JFE Small board No - 3450  8 20% *** X X    
Zhao and Chen 2008 AR Staggered board Yes Reversible 4300 2650 7 9% ** X X   Firm 
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Table 1.1 - Continued 
Publication Variable of Interest Sample Impact Fixed effect and clustering 
Author(s) Date Journal Area Binary Type #obs. #treated #years %  sig Time  Ind.  Firm  Country  Clustering 
      Ownership Structure 
Anderson and Reeb 2003 JOF Family ownership Yes Reversible 2700 950 8 14% *** X X     Industry 
Cronqvist and Nilsson 2003 JFQA Minority shareholders No - 1300  7 18% *** X  X   
Fahlenbrach 2009 JFQA Founder-CEO Yes Specific 14000 1450 11 18% *** X  X  Firm 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz 2009 JFE Manager ownership No - 21500  18 5% *** X  X  Firm 
King and Segal 2008 RFS Ownership structure Yes Specific 7050 1900 18 22% *** X X    
Laeven and Levine 2007 RFS Ownership structure No - 1650  1 18% **   X  X Country 
Lemmon and Lins 2003 JOF Ownership structure Yes Reversible 800 200 1 10% **   X    
Villalonga and Amit 2006 JFE Family ownership Yes Specific 2800 1050 7 13% ** X X   Firm 
Woidtke 2002 JFE Institutional investors No - 1750   5 26% *** X         
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Table 1.1 - Continued 
Publication Variable of Interest Sample Impact Fixed effect and clustering 
Author(s) Date Journal Area Binary Type #obs. #treated #years % sig Time Ind. Firm Country Clustering 
   Firm Policies 
Allayannis and Weston 2001 RFS Risk management Yes Reversible 2050 750 6 5% ** X X   Firm 
Bartram et al. 2011 JFQA Risk Management Yes Reversible 2100 1200 2 18% **  X  X  
Billett and Mauer 2003 RFS Financing Constraints No Reversible 4200  9 8% *** X  X   
Campa and Kedia 2002 JOF Diversification Yes Reversible 58900 17000 19 6% *** X  X  Firm 
Daines 2001 JFE Bankruptcy law Yes Specific 39000 19000 16 14% *** X  X   
Daske et al. 2008 JAR IFRS Yes Specific 106000 35000 5 7% **      
Denis, Denis and Yost 2002 JOF Diversification Yes Specific 33500 13500 14 19% ***      
Durnev et al. 2004 JOF Capital Budgeting No - 16700  5 28% ***  X    
Fama and French 1998 JOF Tax No Reversible 66700  28 N/A       
Fang, Noe and Tice 2009 JFE Stock liquidity No Reversible 8300  6 28% *** X X   Firm 
Fauver and Naranjo 2010 JFQA Risk management Yes Reversible 11000 5450 10 8% *** X     
Fresard and Salva 2010 JFE Cross-listing and cash Yes Specific 60000 7000 17 15% ** X   X Country 
Gozzi et al. 2008 JFE Internationalization Yes Specific 67000 7000 12 11% *** X   X  
Gurun and Butler 2012 JOF Advertising No Reversible 3000  5 5% *** X X   Firm 
Jin and Jorion 2006 JOF Risk management Yes Reversible 350 150 4 1%  X    Firm 
Lang et al. 2003 JAR Cross listing No - 2500  1 12% ***  X  X  
Mansi and Reeb 2002 JOF Diversification Yes Specific 18900 6500 12 5% ***      
Nguyen and Swanson 2009 JFQA Firm characteristics No Reversible 48200  23 N/A       
Opler and Titman 1994 JOF Financial distress No Reversible 47000 1400 20 10% ***      
Perez-gonzalez and Yun 2013 JOF Risk management No Reversible 5500  18 11% *** X  X  Firm 
Pinkowitz et al. 2006 JOF Cash and Dividend No Reversible 30000  16 N/A       
Rountree et al. 2008 JFE Smooth performance No Reversible 12000  3 15% *** X   X Firm 
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Table 1.2: Univariate Analysis 
This table reports the Pearson correlations between firm value and the proxies of the core factors. In Column 1, these correlations are calculated for the whole sample. We calculate the correlation 
on ten equal random sub-samples (columns 2 to 5) and annually separately (columns 6 to 9). The percentage of correlations that are positive or negative and statistically significant at the 1% (or 
at 5% but not at 1%) level are shown in columns 2 (3) and 4 (5) respectively. The description of variables is available in the Appendix. 
 All Ten random sub-samples Annual cross-section 
 Corr. % pos. at 1% % pos. at 5% % neg. at 1% % neg. at 5% % pos. at 1% % pos. at 5% % neg. at 1% % neg. at 5% 
Profitability          
EBIT / Total Assets -0.033 0% 0% 90% 10% 40% 4% 30% 6% 
EBIT / Sales -0.180 0% 0% 100% 0% 18% 0% 70% 0% 
EBITDA / Total Assets -0.018 0% 0% 60% 20% 44% 4% 26% 2% 
EBITDA / MV -0.183 0% 0% 100% 0% 4% 0% 90% 0% 
EBITDA / Sales -0.182 0% 0% 100% 0% 24% 0% 70% 0% 
EBITDA / Tangible Assets -0.066 0% 0% 100% 0% 34% 0% 56% 2% 
FCF / Total Assets -0.086 0% 0% 100% 0% 32% 0% 60% 4% 
Net income / Total Assets -0.065 0% 0% 100% 0% 36% 0% 48% 0% 
E  / Sales -0.085 0% 0% 100% 0% 36% 0% 50% 2% 
dE / Total Assets 0.100 100% 0% 0% 0% 90% 4% 0% 0% 
ROA -0.002 10% 0% 0% 10% 54% 6% 18% 8% 
ROE 0.026 100% 0% 0% 0% 46% 8% 22% 2% 
Risk          
Beta250 0.144 80% 0% 0% 0% 64% 0% 18% 2% 
Beta36 0.162 90% 0% 0% 0% 69% 0% 13% 2% 
Beta60 0.115 80% 0% 0% 0% 57% 0% 17% 3% 
Book leverage (ltd) -0.175 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 96% 2% 
Book leverage (total) -0.211 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 98% 0% 
Idiosyncratic risk (all daily) 0.151 90% 0% 0% 0% 72% 0% 4% 8% 
Idiosyncratic risk (250) 0.188 100% 0% 0% 0% 78% 0% 4% 6% 
Idiosyncratic risk (60) 0.129 100% 0% 0% 0% 70% 0% 3% 7% 
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Table 1.2 - Continued 
 All Ten random sub-samples Annual cross-section 
 Corr. % pos. at 1% % pos. at 5% % neg. at 1% % neg. at 5% % pos. at 1% % pos. at 5% % neg. at 1% % neg. at 5% 
Risk          
Interest  / Total Assets -0.154 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 94% 0% 
dInterest / Total Assets -0.021 0% 0% 60% 20% 24% 6% 18% 12% 
Total Debt / BV Equity -0.095 0% 0% 100% 0% 2% 0% 80% 2% 
Market leverage -0.458 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
Return volatility 0.192 100% 0% 0% 0% 74% 2% 6% 2% 
Growth          
Advertis. / Tangible Assets 0.008 60% 0% 0% 0% 46% 10% 0% 0% 
Advertis. / Total Assets 0.056 100% 0% 0% 0% 78% 6% 4% 2% 
Advertisement / Sales 0.090 100% 0% 0% 0% 80% 8% 0% 0% 
Asset growth 0.131 100% 0% 0% 0% 96% 2% 0% 0% 
CAPEX / Total Assets 0.125 100% 0% 0% 0% 94% 6% 0% 0% 
CAPEX / PPE 0.019 70% 10% 0% 0% 70% 4% 0% 0% 
CAPEX / Sales 0.126 100% 0% 0% 0% 92% 0% 0% 0% 
CAPEX Proxy 0.126 100% 0% 0% 0% 98% 2% 0% 0% 
Growth Opportunities 0.105 100% 0% 0% 0% 72% 0% 0% 2% 
PPE / Total Assets -0.093 0% 0% 100% 0% 10% 4% 62% 6% 
PPE / Sales 0.020 60% 30% 0% 0% 32% 6% 16% 8% 
R&D / Total Assets 0.323 100% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
dR&D / Total Assets 0.151 100% 0% 0% 0% 92% 6% 0% 2% 
R&D / Sales 0.256 100% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
R&D / Tangible Assets 0.272 100% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
Sales / Total Assets 0.03 80% 0% 0% 0% 12% 0% 0% 0% 
Sales growth 0.205 100% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 
Sales growth dummy 0.07 20% 0% 0% 0% 18% 0% 0% 0% 
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Table 1.2 - Continued 
 All Ten random sub-samples Annual cross-section 
 Corr. % pos. at 1% % pos. at 5% % neg. at 1% % neg. at 5% % pos. at 1% % pos. at 5% % neg. at 1% % neg. at 5% 
Payout policy          
Dividend / Total Assets 0.107 100% 0% 0% 0% 90% 0% 2% 0% 
Dividend / BV Equity 0.055 100% 0% 0% 0% 66% 8% 10% 2% 
Dividend dummy -0.160 0% 0% 100% 0% 6% 4% 70% 6% 
Dividend Yield -0.233 0% 0% 100% 0% 0% 0% 100% 0% 
dDividend / Total Assets 0.124 100% 0% 0% 0% 98% 0% 0% 0% 
Size          
Log (Age) -0.163 0% 0% 100% 0% 6% 6% 84% 0% 
Log (Total Assets) -0.137 0% 0% 100% 0% 6% 2% 80% 6% 
Log (Equity) -0.073 0% 0% 100% 0% 10% 2% 72% 2% 
Log (PPE) -0.131 0% 0% 100% 0% 8% 0% 76% 2% 
Log (Sales) -0.119 0% 0% 100% 0% 4% 0% 78% 2% 
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Table 1.3: Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) Analysis 
This table reports the results of Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) analysis explained in the text. Starting with all the 
variables in the model, variables are ranked from the lowest to the highest in terms of the explanatory power in the model. 
Description of variables is available in the Appendix. 
 
BIC Cum. R2 Coef. t-stat Own R2 
Ten groups Cross-section 
Pos. Neg. Pos. Neg. 
Growth Opportunities -417967 0.42 0.001 0.06 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
dR&D / Total Assets -417979 0.42 0.001 0.08 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
dDividend / Total Assets -417990 0.42 0.005 0.17 0.01 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Growth dummy -418010 0.42 0.001 0.08 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
EBITDA / Tangible Assets -418419 0.37 0.000 -0.21 0.01 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Beta60 -418422 0.37 0.001 0.17 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Beta250 -418431 0.37 0.000 0.22 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
EBIT / Sales -418442 0.37 -0.003 -0.35 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
EBITDA / Sales -418452 0.37 0.001 0.43 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Dividend dummy -418461 0.37 -0.001 -0.58 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 8.00% 
Beta36 -418470 0.37 0.001 0.98 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
ROA -418472 0.37 0.002 0.61 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Log (PPE) -418483 0.37 -0.001 -0.62 0.02 0.00% 6.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Book leverage (ltd) -418491 0.36 -0.003 -0.67 0.01 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
CAPEX / PPE -418501 0.36 0.016 0.83 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
dE / Total Assets -418508 0.36 -0.003 -0.88 0.02 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Dividend / BV Equity -418708 0.36 0.027 0.92 0.01 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
FCF / Total Assets -418712 0.36 0.007 0.92 0.01 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Advertisement / Total Assets -474653 0.36 -0.016 -0.46 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Advertisement / Sales -474664 0.36 0.010 0.41 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
EBIT / Total Assets -474674 0.36 0.009 0.62 0.04 11.00% 0.00% 6.00% 0.00% 
Idiosyncratic risk (60) -474677 0.36 0.002 1.01 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Sales / Total Assets -474685 0.36 0.001 0.77 0.05 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Idiosyncratic risk (all daily) -474694 0.36 0.004 0.85 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Idiosyncratic risk (250) -474710 0.36 0.002 1.11 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Log (Age) -520485 0.36 0.003 0.36 0.02 0.00% 17.00% 0.00% 44.00% 
CAPEX Proxy -520497 0.36 -0.005 -1.33 0.02 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
R&D / Sales -533733 0.36 0.005 1.19 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
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Table 1.3 - Continued 
 
BIC Cum. R2 Coef. t-stat Own R2 
Ten groups Cross-section 
Pos. Neg. Pos. Neg. 
dInterest / Total Assets -533731 0.36 -0.033 -1.43 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Return volatility -533735 0.36 0.024 1.67 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Sales growth -586111 0.36 0.004 -0.11 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Adver. / Tangible Assets -586123 0.36 0.000 -1.72 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
CAPEX / Sales -586134 0.36 0.006 2.45 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Asset growth (dAT) -586104 0.36 0.003 2.78 0.02 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
R&D / Tangible Assets -616175 0.36 0.002 2.41 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
PPE / Sales -585531 0.35 -0.006 -3.25 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
PPE / Total Assets -585197 0.35 0.007 1.77 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Log (Sales) -588991 0.35 -0.011 -3.89 0.01 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 9.00% 
Net income / Total Assets -588181 0.35 -0.035 -3.8 0.02 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Leverage (over BV Equity) -588213 0.35 -0.002 -4.09 0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
R&D / Total Assets -588100 0.35 0.004 5.06 0.03 20.00% 0.00% 91.00% 0.00% 
Log (Equity) -584014 0.35 -0.008 -6.53 0.01 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 18.00% 
Dividend yield -582159 0.35 0.314 6.87 0.02 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Dividend / Total Assets -576648 0.35 -0.073 -4.67 0.03 46.00% 0.00% 16.00% 0.00% 
CAPEX / Total Assets -576439 0.34 0.013 7.15 0.03 80.00% 0.00% 9.00% 0.00% 
Interest / Total Assets -575680 0.34 0.300 7.86 0.01 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
E / Sales -575370 0.34 -0.159 -8.04 0.02 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
ROE -575074 0.34 0.110 6.34 0.04 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
EBITDA / MV -575015 0.34 -0.062 -6.39 0.00 0.00% 29.00% 0.00% 11.00% 
EBITDA / Total Assets -574760 0.34 0.034 5.78 0.05 66.00% 0.00% 4.00% 0.00% 
Book leverage (total) -574715 0.34 0.204 10.85 0.01 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Market leverage -573588 0.34 -0.092 -9.94 0.17 0.00% 100.00% 0.00% 100.00% 
Log (Total Assets) -571767 0.31 -0.940 -15.03 0.02 0.00% 51.00% 0.00% 28.00% 
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Table 1.4: Tobin’s Q baseline model 
This table reports the result of the baseline model. The variables are defined in Appendix 1. In Panel A, the model is estimated 
with firm and industry-time fixed effect and the standard errors are clustered at the firm and the industry-time level. In Panel B, 
the model is estimated with firm and industry-time fixed effect and the standard errors are clustered at the firm level. In Panel 
C, the model is estimated with firm and time fixed effect and the standard errors are clustered at the firm level.  
 
 All 1963-1971 1972-1979 1980-1987 1988-1995 1996-2003 2004-2012 
 Panel A: Firm and industry-time fixed effect, firm and industry-time clustering 
Log (Assets) -0.047*** 0.019 -0.033*** -0.093*** -0.042*** -0.096*** -0.119*** 
 [14.27] [1.26] [2.79] [9.83] [4.65] [11.88] [12.50] 
Dividend/Asset 1.403*** 0.727 0.12 0.135 0.950*** 1.103*** 1.197*** 
 [11.71] [1.35] [0.32] [0.44] [4.88] [4.74] [7.93] 
EBITDA/Asset 0.540*** 1.043*** 0.608*** 0.432*** 0.392*** 0.562*** 0.519*** 
 [26.69] [11.64] [11.56] [11.80] [9.70] [16.11] [11.35] 
Market Leverage -1.015*** -1.229*** -0.644*** -0.924*** -1.200*** -1.223*** -0.994*** 
 [67.65] [23.22] [20.02] [30.23] [34.03] [39.63] [29.61] 
R&D/Asset 0.803*** 0.043 -0.04 0.724*** 0.512*** 0.349*** 0.637*** 
 [12.31] [0.14] [0.14] [4.01] [3.85] [3.22] [4.56] 
CAPEX/Asset 0.753*** 0.374*** 0.567*** 0.602*** 0.612*** 0.562*** 0.520*** 
 [30.72] [6.89] [13.03] [13.16] [11.50] [9.29] [7.74] 
# of observations 250172 19657 32209 41719 47180 58181 49702 
Adjusted R2 0.236 0.396 0.253 0.261 0.199 0.227 0.238 
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Table 1.4 – Continued 
 All 1963-1971 1972-1979 1980-1987 1988-1995 1996-2003 2004-2012 
 Panel B: Firm and industry-time fixed effect, firm clustering 
Log (Assets) -0.047*** 0.019* -0.033*** -0.093*** -0.042*** -0.096*** -0.119*** 
 [29.26] [1.95] [4.10] [14.23] [6.72] [16.51] [19.12] 
Dividend/Asset 1.403*** 0.727** 0.12 0.135 0.950*** 1.103*** 1.197*** 
 [20.86] [2.32] [0.45] [0.62] [6.37] [6.00] [10.14] 
EBITDA/Asset 0.540*** 1.043*** 0.608*** 0.432*** 0.392*** 0.562*** 0.519*** 
 [42.64] [15.76] [15.68] [15.01] [13.09] [20.96] [16.96] 
Market Leverage -1.015*** -1.229*** -0.644*** -0.924*** -1.200*** -1.223*** -0.994*** 
 [129.31] [36.87] [29.37] [42.94] [50.72] [56.72] [43.10] 
R&D/Asset 0.803*** 0.043 -0.04 0.724*** 0.512*** 0.349*** 0.637*** 
 [18.70] [0.20] [0.17] [5.40] [4.82] [4.03] [6.32] 
CAPEX/Asset 0.753*** 0.374*** 0.567*** 0.602*** 0.612*** 0.562*** 0.520*** 
 [42.70] [8.77] [15.91] [16.22] [14.47] [11.55] [9.84] 
# of observations 250172 19657 32209 41719 47180 58181 49702 
Adjusted R2 0.236 0.396 0.253 0.261 0.199 0.227 0.238 
 Panel C: Firm and time fixed effect, firm clustering 
Log (Assets) -0.036*** 0.055*** -0.075*** -0.086*** -0.027*** -0.113*** -0.178*** 
 [17.26] [5.46] [9.60] [11.67] [3.85] [16.88] [21.80] 
Dividend/Asset 1.181*** 0.538 -0.42 -0.122 0.945*** 1.334*** 0.734*** 
 [9.81] [1.07] [1.11] [0.46] [5.30] [6.22] [4.99] 
EBITDA/Asset 0.499*** 1.057*** 0.330*** 0.422*** 0.386*** 0.661*** 0.569*** 
 [26.17] [11.80] [6.85] [12.83] [10.82] [20.34] [12.94] 
Market Leverage -1.278*** -1.779*** -1.141*** -1.169*** -1.337*** -1.388*** -1.346*** 
 [90.65] [37.27] [40.51] [43.29] [43.97] [50.98] [44.11] 
R&D/Asset 0.612*** -1.096*** -0.427 0.631*** 0.454*** 0.119 0.092 
 [9.65] [3.89] [1.46] [3.84] [3.85] [1.17] [0.66] 
CAPEX/Asset 0.714*** 0.473*** 0.580*** 0.718*** 0.545*** 0.692*** 0.501*** 
 [29.85] [8.98] [13.42] [17.07] [11.47] [13.03] [8.11] 
# of observations 248182 19247 31575 40356 45312 56575 48645 
Adjusted R2 0.211 0.38 0.236 0.238 0.191 0.204 0.223 
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Table 1.5: Fama and French’s model for Tobin’s Q 
This table reports the results for the Fama and French (1998) model. The variables are defined in Appendix 1. In Panel A, the model is estimated with firm and industry-time fixed effect and the 
standard errors are clustered at the firm and industry-time level. In Panel B, the model is estimated with firm and industry-time fixed effect and the standard errors are clustered at the firm level. 
In Panel C, the model is estimated with firm and time fixed effect and the standard errors are clustered at the firm level.   
  
 
Panel A: Firm and industry-time fixed effect, firm and industry-time clustering 
  All 1963-1971 1972-1979 1980-1987 1988-1995 1996-2003 2004-2012 
E 0.117*** 1.603*** 0.590*** 0.446*** 0.08 0.297*** 0.227**  
 [2.28] [3.75] [3.65] [3.08] [1.34] [4.94] [2.48]    
dE 0.237*** 0.164 0.240** 0.031 0.181*** 0.184*** 0.215*** 
 [7.57] [0.66] [2.34] [0.62] [3.83] [5.88] [2.80]    
dE2 0.096*** 0.314** 0.394*** 0.197*** 0.086*** 0.116** 0.092 
 [3.57] [2.30] [4.87] [3.06] [2.69] [2.44] [1.53]    
dAT 0.169*** 0.268*** 0.164*** 0.102*** 0.116*** 0.138*** 0.130*** 
 [15.65] [7.69] [7.60] [4.05] [9.92] [5.50] [9.47]    
dAT2 0.275*** 0.276*** 0.247*** 0.253*** 0.236*** 0.257*** 0.281*** 
 [19.28] [9.25] [4.07] [13.62] [16.61] [12.30] [10.35]    
R&D 1.407*** -0.752 1.194** 1.775*** 1.610*** 1.766*** 1.457*** 
 [9.83] [1.10] [2.15] [4.37] [9.12] [9.76] [5.50]    
dR&D 0.324*** -0.474 0.906** 0.821** -0.264** 0.222 0.290**  
 [2.80] [0.79] [2.27] [2.30] [1.99] [1.34] [2.22]    
dR&D2 1.455*** -0.062 1.898*** 1.799*** 1.239*** 1.547*** 1.561*** 
 [14.61] [0.13] [4.61] [10.88] [11.59] [8.39] [6.82]    
Interest -1.819*** -1.738 0.776 -0.51 -1.702*** -0.352 1.722*** 
 [4.31] [1.10] [0.50] [1.53] [2.94] [0.56] [3.58]    
dInterest -1.462*** -2.528*** -1.645** -0.869*** -1.103*** -1.213*** -1.884*** 
 [4.61] [3.82] [2.10] [2.89] [5.45] [4.80] [4.57]    
dInterest2 -1.858*** -0.914 0.579 -0.667** -1.134*** -0.890*** -0.12 
 [8.50] [1.03] [1.13] [2.31] [4.20] [3.49] [0.41]    
Dividend 4.271*** 4.473*** 4.168*** 2.511*** 2.175*** 3.629*** 1.288*** 
 [12.07] [6.05] [3.45] [6.49] [6.63] [7.55] [3.43]    
dDividend -0.131 1.649*** -1.592** 0.570* 0.827*** -0.741 0.657**  
 [0.40] [2.65] [2.25] [1.76] [3.45] [1.47] [2.16]    
dDividend2 1.886*** 2.227*** 1.423** 2.012*** 1.593*** 1.462*** 1.286*** 
 [7.19] [4.62] [1.97] [8.76] [7.64] [5.31] [3.79]    
dMV2 -0.076*** -0.105*** -0.167*** -0.113*** -0.074*** -0.081*** -0.099*** 
 [12.17] [7.04] [3.26] [17.54] [12.02] [8.53] [6.02]    
# of observations 173939 15548 25955 27150 31897 39526 29939 
Adjusted R2 0.196 0.302 0.261 0.194 0.105 0.172 0.206 
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Table 1.5 – Continued 
  Panel B: Firm and industry-time fixed effect, firm clustering 
  All 1963-1971 1972-1979 1980-1987 1988-1995 1996-2003 2004-2012 
E 0.117*** 1.603*** 0.590*** 0.446*** 0.08 0.297*** 0.227**  
 [3.61] [3.75] [3.65] [3.08] [1.34] [4.94] [2.48]    
dE 0.237*** 0.164 0.240** 0.031 0.181*** 0.184*** 0.215*** 
 [16.19] [0.66] [2.34] [0.62] [3.83] [5.88] [2.80]    
dE2 0.096*** 0.314** 0.394*** 0.197*** 0.086*** 0.116** 0.092 
 [6.39] [2.30] [4.87] [3.06] [2.69] [2.44] [1.53]    
dAT 0.169*** 0.268*** 0.164*** 0.102*** 0.116*** 0.138*** 0.130*** 
 [28.91] [7.69] [7.60] [4.05] [9.92] [5.50] [9.47]    
dAT2 0.275*** 0.276*** 0.247*** 0.253*** 0.236*** 0.257*** 0.281*** 
 [64.93] [9.25] [4.07] [13.62] [16.61] [12.30] [10.35]    
R&D 1.407*** -0.752 1.194** 1.775*** 1.610*** 1.766*** 1.457*** 
 [13.70] [1.10] [2.15] [4.37] [9.12] [9.76] [5.50]    
dR&D 0.324*** -0.474 0.906** 0.821** -0.264** 0.222 0.290**  
 [4.21] [0.79] [2.27] [2.30] [1.99] [1.34] [2.22]    
dR&D2 1.455*** -0.062 1.898*** 1.799*** 1.239*** 1.547*** 1.561*** 
 [23.04] [0.13] [4.61] [10.88] [11.59] [8.39] [6.82]    
Interest -1.819*** -1.738 0.776 -0.51 -1.702*** -0.352 1.722*** 
 [9.90] [1.10] [0.50] [1.53] [2.94] [0.56] [3.58]    
dInterest -1.462*** -2.528*** -1.645** -0.869*** -1.103*** -1.213*** -1.884*** 
 [13.56] [3.82] [2.10] [2.89] [5.45] [4.80] [4.57]    
dInterest2 -1.858*** -0.914 0.579 -0.667** -1.134*** -0.890*** -0.12 
 [20.14] [1.03] [1.13] [2.31] [4.20] [3.49] [0.41]    
Dividend 4.271*** 4.473*** 4.168*** 2.511*** 2.175*** 3.629*** 1.288*** 
 [21.18] [6.05] [3.45] [6.49] [6.63] [7.55] [3.43]    
dDividend -0.131 1.649*** -1.592** 0.570* 0.827*** -0.741 0.657**  
 [0.88] [2.65] [2.25] [1.76] [3.45] [1.47] [2.16]    
dDividend2 1.886*** 2.227*** 1.423** 2.012*** 1.593*** 1.462*** 1.286*** 
 [12.81] [4.62] [1.97] [8.76] [7.64] [5.31] [3.79]    
dMV2 -0.076*** -0.105*** -0.167*** -0.113*** -0.074*** -0.081*** -0.099*** 
  [46.42] [7.04] [3.26] [17.54] [12.02] [8.53] [6.02]    
# of observations 173939 15548 25955 27150 31897 39526 29939 
Adjusted R2 0.196 0.302 0.261 0.194 0.105 0.172 0.206 
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Table 1.5 – Continued 
  Panel C: Firm and time fixed effect, firm clustering 
  All 1963-1971 1972-1979 1980-1987 1988-1995 1996-2003 2004-2012 
E 0.165*** 2.163*** 0.641*** 0.544*** 0.173*** 0.322*** 0.281*** 
 [3.32] [5.84] [4.18] [3.98] [2.62] [5.23] [3.15]    
dE 0.228*** -0.127 0.257*** -0.014 0.165*** 0.181*** 0.213*** 
 [7.20] [0.92] [2.79] [0.32] [3.21] [6.03] [2.76]    
dE2 0.117*** 0.384** 0.445*** 0.236*** 0.121*** 0.122** 0.125**  
 [4.32] [2.44] [5.80] [3.68] [4.96] [2.40] [2.08]    
dAT 0.175*** 0.266*** 0.171*** 0.113*** 0.123*** 0.141*** 0.131*** 
 [16.18] [8.05] [7.53] [4.84] [11.04] [5.34] [9.31]    
dAT2 0.274*** 0.271*** 0.238*** 0.259*** 0.237*** 0.256*** 0.283*** 
 [19.10] [9.96] [4.09] [16.05] [15.29] [12.02] [10.73]    
R&D 1.466*** -0.614 0.747 1.782*** 1.871*** 1.852*** 1.541*** 
 [10.08] [0.95] [1.35] [4.80] [9.67] [10.15] [6.03]    
dR&D 0.295** -0.514 1.140*** 0.867*** -0.370*** 0.196 0.234*   
 [2.54] [0.87] [2.69] [2.58] [2.92] [1.13] [1.89]    
dR&D2 1.482*** -0.02 1.777*** 1.759*** 1.292*** 1.574*** 1.622*** 
 [14.27] [0.04] [4.13] [10.76] [11.16] [8.43] [6.98]    
Interest -1.820*** -2.282 0.898 -0.594 -1.481** -0.219 1.539*** 
 [4.23] [1.47] [0.59] [1.62] [2.48] [0.34] [3.35]    
dInterest -1.476*** -1.801*** -1.765** -0.895*** -1.225*** -1.282*** -1.760*** 
 [4.49] [2.90] [2.28] [2.94] [5.58] [4.94] [4.41]    
dInterest2 -1.903*** -1.046 0.652 -0.734*** -1.208*** -0.823*** -0.283 
 [8.51] [1.16] [1.29] [2.74] [4.63] [3.03] [1.00]    
Dividend 4.233*** 4.025*** 4.236*** 2.518*** 2.127*** 3.627*** 1.213*** 
 [11.87] [4.87] [3.54] [6.89] [6.30] [7.56] [3.24]    
dDividend -0.132 1.767*** -1.617** 0.427 0.864*** -0.758 0.707**  
 [0.40] [2.82] [2.28] [1.40] [3.40] [1.54] [2.24]    
dDividend2 1.878*** 2.118*** 1.402* 1.991*** 1.566*** 1.482*** 1.267*** 
 [7.17] [4.18] [1.90] [8.57] [7.61] [5.50] [3.84]    
dMV2 -0.077*** -0.107*** -0.171*** -0.121*** -0.076*** -0.082*** -0.101*** 
  [11.91] [6.95] [3.35] [17.62] [11.46] [8.52] [6.00]    
# of observations 173147 15531 25927 26939 31685 39309 29858 
Adjusted R2 0.173 0.282 0.246 0.175 0.097 0.158 0.195 
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Table 1.6: Comparing Tobin’s Q models 
This table reports the Vuong z-stats comparing the explanatory power of BL and FF models estimated with the same panel data. The z-stat and the critical probability are reported. A negative 
(positive) z-stat indicates that BL (FF) should be preferred to FF (BL). In Panel A, models are compared over the whole period and six eight-year sub-periods. In Panel B, the models are 
estimated over the whole period on different groups. 
 Panel A: 1963- 2012 and sub-periods 
 All 1963-1971 1972-1979 1980-1987 1988-1995 1996-2003 2004-2012 
Vuong z-stat -16.3279 -0.3329 3.5324 -13.0799 -9.9326 0.3165 22.9977 
Vuong p-value 0.0% 73.9% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 75.2% 0.0% 
  Panel B: Ten groups 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
Vuong z-stat -0.8473 -5.5935 -2.3587 -1.6477 -1.7038 -2.7925 -1.5775 -6.0492 -3.8477 -2.53 
Vuong p-value 39.7% 0.0% 1.8% 9.9% 8.8% 0.5% 11.5% 0.0% 0.0% 1.1% 
 
Table 1.7 Specification Test for Reversible Treatment 
This table reports the specification test of “Reversible” treatment. The numbers in table report the percentage of rejection of null in 500 iterations explained in the text at corresponding 1%, 5% 
and 10% significant levels. FE is firm and industry-time fixed effect. Single cluster is at estimation of standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation at firm level while double 
clustering has additional industry-time clustering level. BS. is bootstrapping of standard errors with 200 resampling.   
 
 20% of Firms are Treated 40% of Firms are Treated 60% of Firms are Treated 
Rejection at -> 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
FE Single Cluster 3 9 14 2 5 9 2 4 6 
FE Double Cluster 3 8 13 2 6 8 2 3 9 
FE BS. Single Cluster 6 10 19 5 6 9 2 6 9 
FE BS. Double Cluster 3 10 14 2 9 14 2 2 6 
Random Effect 3 9 14 2 6 10 2 3 6 
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Table 1.8 Power Test for Reversible Treatment 
This table reports the power test of “Reversible” treatment. The numbers in table report the percentage of rejection of null in 500 iterations explained in the text at corresponding 1%, 5% and 10% 
significant levels. FE is firm and industry-time fixed effect. Single cluster is at estimation of standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation at firm level while double clustering 
has additional industry-time clustering level. BS. is bootstrapping of standard errors with 200 resampling.   
 
  20% of Firms are Treated 40% of Firms are Treated 60% of Firms are Treated 
 Abnormal Q -> -20% +20% -20% +20% -20% +20% 
Rejection at -> 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
FE Single Cluster 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE Double Cluster 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Single Cluster 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Double Cluster 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Random Effect 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Abnormal Q -> -15% +15% -15% +15% -15% +15% 
FE Single Cluster 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE Double Cluster 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Single Cluster 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Double Cluster 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Random Effect 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Abnormal Q -> -10% +10% -10% +10% -10% +10% 
FE Single Cluster 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE Double Cluster 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Single Cluster 100 100 100 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Double Cluster 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Random Effect 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Abnormal Q -> -5% +5% -5% +5% -5% +5% 
FE Single Cluster 89 94 95 91 95 96 94 98 100 89 98 99 82 91 94 80 90 95 
FE Double Cluster 91 93 96 93 95 96 94 98 100 91 98 99 80 91 95 81 92 95 
FE BS. Single Cluster 85 93 94 87 95 96 94 96 99 89 96 99 78 88 92 73 88 91 
FE BS. Double Cluster 87 92 95 88 96 96 94 98 100 84 93 98 77 88 93 74 86 93 
Random Effect 89 94 95 94 96 96 94 99 100 90 98 99 83 93 96 79 91 95 
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Table1.9 Specification Test for Continuous Variable of Interest 
This table reports the specification test of “Continuous” variable of interest. The numbers in table report the percentage of rejection of null in 500 iterations explained in the text at corresponding 
1%, 5% and 10% significant levels. FE is firm and industry-time fixed effect. Single cluster is at estimation of standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation at firm level while 
double clustering has additional industry-time clustering level. BS. is bootstrapping of standard errors with 200 resampling.   
 
 1% of Log(Q) Variance 2.5% of Log(Q) Variance 5% of Log(Q) Variance 
Rejection at -> 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
FE Single Cluster 0 5 10 1 4 8 1 2 7 
FE Double Cluster 0 5 9 1 4 8 1 2 8 
FE BS. Single Cluster 2 5 9 3 7 12 1 4 11 
FE BS. Double Cluster 3 8 12 2 11 12 1 5 9 
Random Effect 0 3 9 2 6 7 1 3 10 
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Table 1.10 Power test for Continuous Variable of Interest 
This table reports the power test of “Continuous” variable of interest. The numbers in table report the percentage of rejection of null in 500 iterations explained in the text at corresponding 1%, 5% 
and 10% significant levels. FE is firm and industry-time fixed effect. Single cluster is at estimation of standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation at firm level while double 
clustering has additional industry-time clustering level. BS. is bootstrapping of standard errors with 200 resampling.   
 
 1% of Log(Q) Variance 2.5% of Log(Q) Variance 5% of Log(Q) Variance 
 Abnormal Q -> -20% +20% -20% +20% -20% +20% 
Rejection at -> 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
FE Single Cluster 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE Double Cluster 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Single Cluster 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Double Cluster 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Random Effect 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Abnormal Q -> -15% +15% -15% +15% -15% +15% 
FE Single Cluster 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE Double Cluster 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Single Cluster 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Double Cluster 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Random Effect 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Abnormal Q -> -10% +10% -10% +10% -10% +10% 
FE Single Cluster 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE Double Cluster 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Single Cluster 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Double Cluster 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Random Effect 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Abnormal Q -> -5% +5% -5% +5% -5% +5% 
FE Single Cluster 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE Double Cluster 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Single Cluster 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Double Cluster 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Random Effect 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Table 1.11 Specification Test for Specific Treatment 
This table reports the specification test of “Specific” treatment. The numbers in table report the percentage of rejection of null in 500 iterations explained in the text at corresponding 1%, 5% and 
10% significant levels. FE is firm and industry-time fixed effect. Single cluster is at estimation of standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation at firm level while double clustering 
has additional industry-time clustering level. BS. is bootstrapping of standard errors with 200 resampling.   
 
 20% of firms are treated 
 1% of Log(Q) Variance 
2.5% of Log(Q) 
Variance 
5% of Log(Q) Variance 
Rejection at -> 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
FE Single Cluster 3 8 12 1 6 14 2 5 10 
FE Double Cluster 3 8 13 0 5 14 2 5 10 
FE BS. Single Cluster 3 8 18 3 10 15 4 11 16 
FE BS. Double Cluster 5 10 14 5 8 15 1 6 10 
Random Effect 1 7 13 1 5 13 2 4 7 
 40% of firms are treated 
FE Single Cluster 0 7 12 1 9 15 0 2 8 
FE Double Cluster 2 7 12 1 10 17 1 4 7 
FE BS. Single Cluster 4 7 10 4 10 14 0 3 7 
FE BS. Double Cluster 3 9 12 8 11 16 2 5 6 
Random Effect 0 5 8 1 8 12 0 1 8 
 60% of firms are treated 
FE Single Cluster 2 5 13 1 4 10 0 6 9 
FE Double Cluster 2 5 12 0 4 11 0 6 9 
FE BS. Single Cluster 2 9 15 3 7 12 1 7 15 
FE BS. Double Cluster 5 8 14 0 9 17 3 4 11 
Random Effect 2 4 7 0 4 10 0 7 9 
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Table 1.12 Power Test for Specific Treatment 
This table reports the power test of “Specific” treatment. The numbers in table report the percentage of rejection of null in 500 iterations explained in the text at corresponding 1%, 5% and 10% 
significant levels. FE is firm and industry-time fixed effect. Single cluster is at estimation of standard errors robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation at firm level while double clustering 
has additional industry-time clustering level. BS. is bootstrapping of standard errors with 200 resampling.   
 
 Panel A: 20% of the firms are treated 
 1% of Log(Q) Variance 2.5% of Log(Q) Variance 5% of Log(Q) Variance 
Abnormal Q -> -20% +20% -20% +20% -20% +20% 
Rejection at -> 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
FE Single Cluster 56 74 83 89 96 96 93 96 99 100 100 100 99 99 100 100 100 100 
FE Double Cluster 54 76 86 90 96 96 92 97 99 100 100 100 99 99 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Single Cluster 54 74 81 84 95 96 91 98 99 100 100 100 98 99 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Double Cluster 49 69 81 83 95 97 94 97 98 100 100 100 98 100 100 100 100 100 
Random Effect 55 77 83 91 95 97 92 98 99 100 100 100 99 100 100 100 100 100 
Abnormal Q -> -15% +15% -15% +15% -15% +15% 
FE Single Cluster 62 79 88 87 95 96 93 98 100 100 100 100 99 100 100 100 100 100 
FE Double Cluster 63 81 89 89 94 96 93 99 100 100 100 100 99 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Single Cluster 58 80 84 82 90 96 95 97 100 98 100 100 99 99 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Double Cluster 49 72 80 76 92 96 93 99 99 100 100 100 98 99 100 100 100 100 
Random Effect 61 82 86 89 93 96 93 98 100 100 100 100 99 100 100 100 100 100 
Abnormal Q -> -10% +10% -10% +10% -10% +10% 
FE Single Cluster 68 83 88 85 93 96 95 99 100 100 100 100 99 100 100 100 100 100 
FE Double Cluster 69 87 89 89 93 96 95 99 100 99 100 100 99 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Single Cluster 58 80 86 78 90 95 96 99 100 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Double Cluster 64 80 88 74 92 93 96 100 100 99 100 100 99 100 100 100 100 100 
Random Effect 68 83 91 86 93 96 96 100 100 100 100 100 99 100 100 100 100 100 
Abnormal Q -> -5% +5% -5% +5% -5% +5% 
FE Single Cluster 70 87 90 80 90 96 98 100 100 98 100 100 99 100 100 100 100 100 
FE Double Cluster 74 89 91 83 91 96 98 100 100 99 100 100 99 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Single Cluster 63 77 88 74 87 92 96 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Double Cluster 68 82 92 77 88 93 97 100 100 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Random Effect 74 88 93 83 93 93 97 100 100 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Table 1.12 - Continued 
 Panel B: 40% of the firms are treated 
 1% of Log(Q) Variance 2.5% of Log(Q) Variance 5% of Log(Q) Variance 
 Abnormal Q -> -20% +20% -20% +20% -20% +20% 
Rejection at -> 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
FE Single Cluster 88 97 97 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE Double Cluster 89 96 97 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Single Cluster 81 93 96 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Double Cluster 84 97 99 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Random Effect 91 97 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Abnormal Q -> -15% +15% -15% +15% -15% +15% 
FE Single Cluster 92 97 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE Double Cluster 93 97 99 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Single Cluster 86 97 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Double Cluster 83 96 99 97 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Random Effect 92 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Abnormal Q -> -10% +10% -10% +10% -10% +10% 
FE Single Cluster 93 97 100 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE Double Cluster 95 99 99 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Single Cluster 86 98 100 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Double Cluster 89 98 99 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Random Effect 94 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Abnormal Q -> -5% +5% -5% +5% -5% +5% 
FE Single Cluster 97 100 100 97 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE Double Cluster 96 99 100 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Single Cluster 97 100 100 97 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Double Cluster 94 98 100 97 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Random Effect 96 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
 
                                                                                             
57 
 
Table 1.12 - Continued 
 Panel C: 60% of firms are treated 
 1% of Log(Q) Variance 2.5% of Log(Q) Variance 5% of Log(Q) Variance 
 Abnormal Q -> -20% +20% -20% +20% -20% +20% 
Rejection at -> 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 1% 5% 10% 
FE Single Cluster 97 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE Double Cluster 97 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Single Cluster 94 99 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Double Cluster 97 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Random Effect 97 99 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Abnormal Q -> -15% +15% -15% +15% -15% +15% 
FE Single Cluster 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE Double Cluster 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Single Cluster 94 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Double Cluster 97 99 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Random Effect 98 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Abnormal Q -> -10% +10% -10% +10% -10% +10% 
FE Single Cluster 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE Double Cluster 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Single Cluster 98 100 100 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Double Cluster 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Random Effect 99 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Abnormal Q -> -5% +5% -5% +5% -5% +5% 
FE Single Cluster 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE Double Cluster 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Single Cluster 97 99 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
FE BS. Double Cluster 98 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Random Effect 99 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Chapter 2: Which Firms Benefit from Interest Rate Hedging? 
(In Collaboration with Michel Dubois) 
2.1 Introduction 
Theories state that risk management increases firm value in imperfect capital markets by 
reducing expected tax liabilities, financial distress costs, and by increasing firm’s debt capacity 
and interest tax deductions; see e.g. Smith and Stulz (1985), Bessembinder (1991), Froot, 
Scharfstein, and Stein (1993), Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993), Géczy (1997), and Leland 
(1998) 8. However, empirical results on the relation between derivatives usage, one of the main 
tools of risk management, and firm value is inconclusive. For instance, Allayannis and Weston 
(2001), Graham and Rogers (2002), Carter, Rogers, and Simkins (2006), Adam and Fernando 
(2006) and Pérez-Gonzáles and Yun (2013) find a positive impact of hedging on firm value, 
while Tufano (1996), Jin and Jorion (2006), Lookman (2009b) and Bartram, Brown, and 
Conrad (2011) document no significant impact. Stulz (1984) and Smith and Stulz (1985) argue 
that managers may hold derivative positions for their own advantage that might not be aligned 
with shareholders’ interests. Consistent with this idea, there is evidence that some firms use 
financial instruments for speculation; see e.g., Faulkender (2005) and Géczy, Minton, and 
Schrand (2007). 
In this paper, we study whether creditors’ control on hedging policies affects firm value. 
More specifically, we investigate the impact of interest rate protection covenants (IRPC) in 
                                                 
8 For a literature reviews on hedging and firm value, see Smithson and Simkins (2005) and Aretz and Bartram (2010). 
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syndicated loans on firm value. By imposing covenants in credit agreements, creditors 
effectively limit the managers’ opportunism and clarify the use of derivatives to both 
shareholders and bondholders. This setting should alleviate, at least partly, endogenous 
variations in hedging.  
Previous empirical evidence suggests that, beyond payment default states, creditors play an 
active role in the governance of corporations that is beneficial to shareholders; see Nini, Smith 
and Sufi (2009, 2012). Moreover, commitment to hedge also reduces the agency conflicts 
between creditors and shareholders (Campbell and Kracaw, 1990) and mitigates 
underinvestment (Bessembinder, 1991; Nance, Smith, and Smithson, 1993; and Géczy, 1997) 
or overinvestment (Morellec and Smith, 2007). A floating rate loan with IRPC is beneficial to 
the borrower too when its manager and creditors disagree about the future credit quality of the 
firm at the time the loan is initiated. A fixed rate loan may carry an additional cost if the 
borrower expects an improvement of its credit quality before the loan matures, assuming that 
fixed rate loans have no or expensive repayment (call) option. Therefore, firms borrowing at a 
floating rate enjoy the benefit of performance-based interest expenses.9 This argument provides 
an additional support for the value implication of IRPC in credit agreements. 10 In parallel to 
these theoretical studies, Campello, Lin, Ma, and Zou (2011) empirically document a significant 
reduction in the cost of debt (LIBOR spread in syndicated loans) for hedging firms. Beatty, 
                                                 
9 Symmetrically, Vickery (2008) explains that maturity mismatch in banks’ holdings makes them more inclined 
toward floating rate lending. This argument also applies to syndicated loan agreements since maturity mismatch 
is even more complicated to deal with several lenders. In addition, almost all syndicated loans have the 
repayment option that amplifies the issue of maturity mismatch in case of a fixed rate loan. 
 
10 One may argue that the borrower pays higher swap or collar rate instead. Since these financial instruments 
exchange the net amount of position not the notional, they have lower credit risk spread than in lending the same 
notional amount with fixed rate. Even with equal credit spread, the borrower still saves the extra cost of the call 
option of a fixed rate lending. 
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Petacchi and Zhang (2011) show that this reduction is restricted to firms whose contracts 
include IRPC. The natural extension of this line of research is to explore whether IRPC has a 
positive impact on firm value. 
Three reasons motivate studying interest rate derivatives usage for firms raising funds 
through a syndicated loan. First, the use of mandatory interest rate derivatives reduces the 
likelihood of speculation, or manager’s self-interest, in using derivatives since the decision-
making is mostly outside shareholders’ and managers’ reaches. A derivative position imposed 
by creditors is not speculative and the borrower cannot terminate this position unless it bears 
the cost of breaching a covenant. Second, hedging covenants are more prevalent in bank loans 
than in bond indentures since banks’ monitoring resources are more concentrated than those of 
individual bondholders; see Lookman (2009a). Interest rate hedging covenants are also more 
frequent than currency or commodity hedging covenants as it is more difficult for non-financial 
firms to pass-through, or naturally hedge, interest rate exposure compared to commodity price 
or exchange rate risk. Third, syndicated loan agreements have clear and detailed terms and 
covenants. Due to their material impact on firms’ capital structure and operations, firms report 
this information in their SEC filings. Details and conditions of IRPC, which are less prone to 
measurement errors, allow the classification of interest rate derivatives positions as voluntary 
or mandatory 
Our empirical analysis proceeds in four steps. First, we examine whether the valuation of 
firms with IRPC is higher than that of otherwise similar firms that do not use derivatives or use 
derivatives voluntarily. We also check if the results of our baseline model are robust to a 
selection bias. Second, we examine how additional monitoring tools, i.e. additional covenants, 
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corporate governance, and competition on the product market, interact with hedging and 
whether they have explanatory power beyond that of IRPC in terms of firm’s value 
enhancement. Third, we provide an additional check that reinforces the causality relation 
between IRPC and firm value. More specifically, we take advantage of the introduction of 
FAS133 as a (quasi) natural experiment. This rule makes mandatory the disclosure of hedging 
policies after January 1st, 2001. A difference-in-differences analysis shows that, after the 
implementation of FAS133, the difference in valuation between interest rate derivatives users, 
with and without IRPC, vanishes. Our interpretation of this result is that before the regulation, 
only credible hedging policies (i.e., those enforced by creditors) were value enhancing. Under 
FAS133, information on hedging policy is also available for voluntary hedgers through the 
annual financial statements. Therefore, everything else equal, their value should:  (a) converge 
to that of mandatory hedgers and (b) be higher than that of non-hedgers.  Our empirical results 
confirm this conjecture. Fourth, based on Campello et al. (2011), Beatty et al. (2012) and Perez-
Gonzales and Yu (2013), we estimate how potential drivers of firm value enhancement 
(decrease of the LIBOR spread, changes in the financing and the investment policy) could 
explain the valuation effect of the IRPC.  
Across a sample of 1117 firms (4636 firm-year observations) from 1998 to 2007, all exposed 
to interest rate risk, we show that firms using derivatives voluntarily are different in terms of 
profitability, risk and growth opportunities from those that use derivatives mandatorily. A 
multivariate analysis that controls for various determinants of firm value shows that mandatory 
interest rate derivatives usage increases firm value, while voluntary interest rate derivatives 
usage does not. These results are robust to the exclusion of firms using foreign exchange and 
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commodity price derivatives and to alternative measures of hedging intensity. The special 
characteristics of the firms with IRPC, and their acceptance of this covenant in the credit 
agreement, leave simultaneity concerns. 
To reinforce our conclusions, we specifically control for a potential selection bias by 
implementing a propensity score matching. Interest rate derivatives users are matched with non-
users, year by year, along with profitability, risk and growth dimensions. The difference 
between the mean (median) of the Log of Q ratio of the two groups is not economically large 
(0.01 for both the mean and the median) and is not statistically significant (p-value = 17.8% 
and 42.5% respectively). However, when we match mandatory interest rate derivatives users 
and non-users based on their propensity score, our results confirm that the average (median) 
value of mandatory interest rate derivatives users is 5% (7%) higher than that of similar non-
users and is significant at 2.9% (2.0%) level. These findings suggest that investors perceive 
positively the mandatory term of using interest rate derivatives while they do not price voluntary 
derivatives usage, whose purpose is not clear.  
Next, we examine the concurrent effects of other covenants included in the loan, corporate 
governance, and competition pressure. First, we study the interaction of IRPC with other 
covenants usually found in syndicated loans contracts. These covenants impose different 
restrictions on cash flow, leverage, liquidity, capital expenditures or net worth assets. With such 
influence on firm’s operations, these covenants may impact firm value in parallel to, or 
independently from, IRPC. Using a dummy variable for each type of covenant, and its 
interaction with IRPC, we find similar results to those previously obtained in the baseline 
model. Second, we also uncover that the strength with which firms are governed does not 
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capture the positive valuation effect of mandatory interest rate hedging. On this ground, we use 
the index as defined in Allayannis, Lel, and Miller (2012). We find that strict governance has 
no direct significant effect on firm value. Then, we estimate the impact of the interaction of 
strict governance with interest rate derivatives usage, either voluntary or mandatory, on firm 
value. We show that the value enhancing effect of IRPC is lower for firms with strict 
governance, nevertheless, it remains significant. Third, we study whether competition pressure 
is a substitute for IRPC. Following Hoberg, Philips and Prabhala (2012), we measure market 
competition with the product market fluidity index. While the value of mandatory interest rate 
derivatives users is positively related to interest rate hedging, our results show that the value of 
voluntary interest rate derivatives users is not related to the product market fluidity index. All 
in all, our results confirm the positive effect of IRPC on firm value and show that additional 
monitoring tools as corporate governance or market competition are not acting as substitutes of 
creditors’ control. 
Finally, to reduce endogeneity concerns of mandatory hedging on firm value, we study the 
impact of the introduction of FAS133 as a natural experiment. This regulation was designed to 
reduce information asymmetries between managers and stockholders with regards to 
derivatives usage. The disclosure of the hedging policy in the financial statements through the 
10-K form makes this information easily available to investors. We find that the introduction 
of FAS133 has a larger positive and significant valuation effect, both economically and 
statistically, on firms that voluntary hedge than on firms that mandatorily hedge their interest 
rate exposure. 
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This research contributes to the literature in several ways. We provide novel empirical 
evidence of the impact of interest rate derivatives usage on firm value by comparing non-users, 
voluntary and mandatory users. It is also a step forward to an unbiased estimation of the 
influence of derivatives on firm value by focusing on derivatives usage imposed by creditors 
rather than that decided by managers alone. It also complements empirical studies that examine 
the impact of hedging on the cost of debt. Campello et al. (2011), show that hedging reduces 
the cost of debt by lowering interest spread. Beatty et al. (2011) find that this reduction is 
effective only for mandatory interest rate derivatives users or for firms that practice 
conservative financial reporting. We examine such a reward from the shareholders’ point of 
view and document a positive impact of IRPC on firm value as soon as the hedging policy is 
credible (i.e. under creditors’ control or disclosed in the financial statements). Consistent with 
Nini, Smith, and Sufi (2012), this result illustrates that there are cases, such as imposing IRPC, 
for which creditors’ and shareholders’ interests are aligned. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the sample 
construction and outlines the methodology. Section 2.3 presents the contribution of interest rate 
protection on firm value. Section 2.4 reports the interaction of interest rate protection with 
additional covenants in syndicated loans, corporate governance, and competition on the product 
market. Section 2.5 explores how the introduction of FAS133 changed the impact of interest 
rate derivatives usage, either mandatory or voluntary, on firm value. The channels through 
which the IRPC creates value is also described in this section. Section 2.6 concludes the paper. 
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2.2 Data and methodology 
2.2.1 Sample construction 
After the adoption of regulation FRR48 on July 15th, 1998, quantitative information on 
derivative positions and market risks is disclosed in the 10-K filings11. To measure accurately 
interest rate risk hedging, we take advantage of this regulation so that our sample period starts 
on July 15th, 1998. Since IRPCs are more common when the LIBOR is high, we cover a full 
cycle in terms of US-LIBOR-3Month rate, the main index for variable interest rates; see Beatty 
and al. (2011). The end of the sample period is on December 31st, 2007. To identify the presence 
and the magnitude of interest rate risk, we collect syndicated loans from LPC’s DealScan12. 
From this sample of syndicated loans, we retain “Term loans” because this is the only type of 
contracts that include IRPC13. We also directly search “Term loans” in 10-K and 10-Q filings. 
We exclude “Debtor-in-Possession” contracts, which are for bankruptcy cases, lease 
agreements, and loans issued by financial institutions and utilities due to their special capital 
structure and regulatory system. We extract 10-K filings from EDGAR and search for “term 
loan”, “term-loan”, “term agreement”, “term contract”, “term credit”, “LIBOR” and “prime 
rate” keywords in the text file of each filing to make sure that the term loan is outstanding and 
is not repaid. Based on interest rate hedging information available from the contracts14, 
10-Q/10-K filings, firms are classified as mandatory interest rate derivatives users, voluntary 
                                                 
11 Including 10-K405 and 10-KSB filings but we use only “10-K” in the text for brevity. 
12 Since LPC’s Dealscan starts in 1988, we miss contracts initiated before that date and still outstanding in 1998. Their number 
should be extremely small since only 0.80% of the contracts launched during the 1998-2007 period had a maturity higher 
than ten years.  
13 We remove “notes” since their interest rate is fixed. “Revolvers” and “Line of credit” are also removed because these 
contracts do not include IRPCs. 
14 We thank Amir Sufi for providing the text of the contracts in his website: http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/amir.sufi/data.html. 
3720 contracts are extracted from this dataset. The rest, 5063 contracts, are evaluated with 10-Q and 10-K filing searches.  
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interest rate derivatives users and non-users. Firms with missing information are 
eliminated.  Finally, we merge accounting and market data from COMPUSTAT/CRSP database 
to measure firm characteristics; see Appendix 2, Table 2.A1 for details on the sample 
construction. 
2.2.2 Empirical methodology 
To appraise the differential impact of mandatory interest rate derivatives usage on firm 
value, we examine the effect of hedging intensity, the existence of an IRPC and their interaction 
on Tobin’s Q. We also control for a set of additional variables that are known to affect firm 
value, i.e. profitability, risk and growth options. On this ground, we estimate the following 
baseline regression specification: 
 , 1 , 2 , 3 , , , ,    (1)i t i t i t i t i t i t t Industry i itLog Q IRP Mandatory IRP Mandatory                α ΓX  
where the subscripts i and t represent respectively the firm, and the date of the fiscal year end. 
The dependent variable,  , i tLog Q  is the Log of Tobin’s Q. We follow prior studies, e.g. 
Allayannis and Weston (2001), Jin and Jorion (2006), Fauver and Naranjo (2010) and 
Allayannis et al. (2012) and compute Tobin’s Q as the Market Value of Equity plus Total Assets 
less the Book Value of Equity divided by Total Assets. We measure firm’s interest rate 
protection with the ratio of Net notional value of interest rate derivatives (Float to Fixed 
Notional minus Fixed to Float) divided by Total Assets.15 We capture mandatory interest rate 
derivatives usage with a dummy variable that equals one if the firm has an IRPC (float to fixed 
                                                 
15 We use Total assets instead of the Debt in the financial statements because there is hedging in advance and the corresponding 
debt can be nil. We also use Float to Fixed Notional plus Fixed to Float (absolute values) and the results are qualitatively 
similar. 
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contract) and zero otherwise. Hence, the coefficient 
1 measures the impact of interest rate 
hedging on firm value. If interest rate hedging has a positive effect, this coefficient is positive. 
The coefficient of interest  3 in Equation (1) is on the interaction between Mandatory and 
IRP. This coefficient measures the marginal impact of the interest rate protection when hedging 
is mandatory (IRPC). Consistent with our hypothesis, this coefficient should be positive. 
Also, in line with empirical studies on the valuation effect of risk management policies, 
Equation (1) includes variables  ,i tX  that control for other potential time-varying determinants 
of firm value. First, we introduce firm interest risk exposure (IR Exposure) that measures the 
amount of debt carrying variable interest rate divided by Total Assets minus Equity. Following 
Chernenko and Faulkender (2011, p. 1751), we define variable debt as commercial paper, credit 
facilities, short-term debt classified as long-term and term loans unless stated otherwise in the 
10-K filling. Second, we use return on asset (ROA) and a dividend dummy (Dividend) that 
equals one if the firm pays dividends during the corresponding year and zero otherwise, as 
proxies for internal financing resources. Third, as in Campello et al. (2011), we use the distance 
to default (Dist. to Def.) as a proxy for bankruptcy risk. This variable is based on Merton’s 
structural model; see Crosbie and Bohn (2003) and Campello et al. (2011) for a definition. We 
retain this variable instead of Altman’s Z-score or Ohlson’s O-score because it incorporates 
market information (volatility of stock price) and not only accounting ratios already used as 
determinants of firm value. We also include Tangible Assets, which are more valuable as 
collateral in credit agreements. This variable is defined as the net amount of properties, plant 
and equipment divided by Total Assets. Fourth, we use CAPEX (capital expenditures) divided 
by Total Assets, Advertisement divided by Sales and R&D expenditures divided by Total 
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Assets as proxies for growth options. We also control for firm size and include (Log of) Total 
Assets. Finally, to account for firm/industry and time specific effects, we introduce firm fixed 
effect  i  and industry (two-digit SIC code) time fixed effects  ,t Industry in Equation (1). The 
industry-time fixed effect controls for the time-varying characteristics of industries that are not 
controlled in the model such as competition or regulatory changes that affect a specific industry; 
see Gormley and Matsa (2014). We further adjust estimated standard errors for within-firm 
error clustering and heteroskedasticity; see Petersen (2009) and Gow, Ormazabal and Taylor 
(2010). The construction of the variables in the model is presented in the Appendix 2, Table 
2.A2. 
2.3 IRP and firm value 
2.3.1 Univariate results 
Overall, the sample covers 1117 individual firms (4636 firm-year observations) exposed to 
interest rate risk from 1998 to 2007. Among these firms, 548 (1646 observations) are voluntary 
interest rate derivatives users, 217 (664 observations) are mandatory interest rate derivative 
users, and 812 (2326 observations) are non-users. Firms in Transportation and Telecom industry 
have the highest number of voluntary and mandatory interest rate derivatives users followed by 
Machinery and electronics (voluntary users) and Personal and business services (mandatory 
users). The number of voluntary, mandatory and non-users is almost evenly distributed except 
in 2006, when we have the lowest number of observations for each group; see Appendix 2, 
Table 2.A1, Panel C. 
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Table 2.1, Panel A, reports descriptive statistics of the main variables for derivatives users 
and non-users. The mean (median) of Log of Q is respectively 0.30 (0.24) for users and 0.32 
(0.25) for non-users; this difference is statistically (not) different from zero at 5%. The interest 
rate exposure is also different for both samples, derivatives users being more exposed to interest 
rate fluctuations. The average (median) difference is 0.09 (0.10), which is economically and 
statistically significant (at 1%). Derivatives users are larger in size, have more tangible assets, 
and are less risky; these variables have means and medians that are statistically different from 
those of non-users.  
 [Table 2.1] 
In Table 2.1, Panel B, we split the sample of interest rate derivatives users into mandatory 
and voluntary users. The mean (median) of Log of Q is respectively 0.32 (0.26) for mandatory 
users and 0.29 (0.23) for voluntary users with a difference that is (not) statistically significant 
at 10%. Compared to voluntary users, mandatory users are more exposed to interest rate 
fluctuations (IR Exposure) with a mean (median) of 0.40 (0.38) instead of 0.32 (0.28). Their 
hedging intensity (IRP) is also significantly higher with a mean (median) of 0.19 (0.15) for 
mandatory users versus 0.13 (0.08) for voluntary users. Compared to voluntary users, 
mandatory users are smaller in size, with fewer tangible assets; they are also less profitable and 
more risky. It is also interesting to note that our sample offers substantial variation in firms’ 
size. For example, the inter-quartile range (75th percentile minus 25th percentile) is $1527M for 
mandatory users and $2344M for voluntary users. These results are similar to those presented 
in Beatty et al. (2012) and Campello et al. (2011). 
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Our univariate results are consistent with risk management theories predictions (Nance et 
al., 1993). However, some characteristics presented above are known to affect negatively firm 
value (e.g., lower profitability and higher risk to default), which precludes a direct comparison 
of Q ratios across sub-samples. Based on these figures, firms with IRPC demonstrate special 
characteristics, which exacerbate the potential of selection bias. 
2.3.2 Multivariate results 
We start the regression analysis by examining the average effect of hedging intensity on firm 
value. Table 2.2 displays the results from OLS estimation of Equation (1). The first column 
reports the impact of hedging on firm value, which represents the natural benchmark with 
respect to previous studies. We find that interest rate protection has an impact on firm value 
that is statistically significant (at 5%). However, its economic magnitude is small (i.e. a 1% 
increase in IRP translates into a 0.10% increase in firm value). The second column reports the 
baseline specification. The interaction between Mandatory and interest rate derivatives 
intensity (IRP) identifies the marginal impact of mandatory interest rate derivatives usage on 
firm value. As opposed to the results in column 1, interest rate derivatives do not have any 
impact on firm value, showing that voluntary derivatives users do not enjoy any value 
enhancement. Interestingly, the interaction between Mandatory and IRP captures the valuation 
effect previously documented. The corresponding coefficient  3 is positive and statistically 
significant (at 1%). After controlling for other determinants of Q ratio, on average, mandatory 
interest rate derivatives increase firm value by 6%. 
[Table 2.2] 
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Then, we verify that our results are robust to the definition of IRP. In column 3, we modify 
the definition of IRP, which is restricted to Float to Fixed Notional only (instead of the Net 
value of the Notional) divided by Total Assets. Lel (2012) suggests that firms use frequently 
interest rate derivatives with currency and commodities derivatives. In column 4, we present 
the results after excluding these observations (373 firm-year) to avoid any interaction with the 
usage of other derivatives contracts. Overall, our results are little affected by these 
modifications. 
Turning to the control variables, we find results that are consistent with previous research. 
Size and Tangibility have a negative sign that is statistically significant at 1%. Return on Assets 
(ROA), Financial Risk (Dist. to Def.) and Growth (CAPEX) have as a positive sign that is 
statistically significant at 1% while R&D and Advertisement are not significant; see e.g., 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) and Allayannis et al. (2012). 
2.3.3 Controlling the selection bias with propensity score matching 
As we document in Section 2.3.1., banks enforce firms with special characteristics to hedge 
interest rate risk. To control for this selection bias, we conduct a propensity score matching; see 
Bartram et al. (2011). Based on our hypothesis, we define two treatments: a) interest rate 
derivatives usage and b) mandatory interest rate derivatives usage.  In both cases, we match the 
treated firms with non-users of interest rate derivatives.  
For both tests, we generate propensity scores with a logit model. The dependent variable is 
equal to one if the firm uses interest rate derivatives during the current year and zero otherwise. 
The control variables are the explanatory variables already used in Equation (1). We iterate this 
procedure year by year so that the financial statements of treated and control firms are 
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contemporaneous. After generating propensity scores for both tests, we conduct our analysis by 
matching a treated firm with firms from the controlling samples (with replacement) whose 
propensity score is the closest (Caliper 0.01)16. 
[Table 2.3] 
Table 2.3, Panel A, reports the results for interest rate derivatives users and non-users. After 
matching, the mean (median) of the Log of Q ratio of interest rate derivatives users is 0.01 
(0.01) lower than that of non-users (p-value = 17.8% and 42.5%  respectively). Table 2.3, Panel 
B, reports the results for mandatory interest rate derivatives users and non-users. In contrast to 
Panel A, the mean (median) of the Log of Q ratio of mandatory users is 0.05 (0.07) higher than 
that of the non-users counterfactual. This difference is statistically significant at 2.9% (2.0%) 
level17.    
This result supports our previous findings and suggests that the higher firm value of 
mandatory hedgers is not biased by the special characteristics of mandatory users. As Panel B 
shows, our matching significantly reduces the bias of the variables from average (median) 
14.8% (10.2%) to 4.4% (4.8%).  
The low bias in observable variables reported in Table 2.3 significantly reduces the 
probability of unobservable variables impacting the results. More specifically, we perform a 
sensitivity analysis to evaluate the concern of hidden biases in our inference; see Rosenbaum 
(2002) and Bartram et al. (2011). In a large and purely random selection of observations, the 
                                                 
16 We also estimated the logit model with industry-year dummies and constructed the controlling sample without replacement. 
The results, not reported here, are qualitatively similar and available upon request. All of the estimates are obtained using 
Leuven and Sianesi (2003) psmatch2 and pstest programs for Stata. 
17 When expressed in percent, the difference in valuation is exp⁡[(𝐿𝑛(𝑄𝑈) − 𝐿𝑛(𝑄𝑁𝑈)] − 1. Therefore, the average (median) 
value of interest rate derivatives users (U) is 1% lower than that of non-users (NU) while the value of mandatory interest 
rate derivatives users is 5.1% (7.2%) higher. 
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expected odds ratio in having IRPC in a credit agreement is one for two firms with identical 
characteristics. Indeed, a hidden bias from an unobservable characteristic can produce a 
multiple of odds and reduce the precision of our inference about the impact of the treatment. In 
this analysis, we compute an interval of p-values related to uncertainty about the hidden bias 
for odds of treatment greater than one (0.01 steps). We stop our analysis at p-value greater than 
5% where we have the maximum odds of treatment for which we reject the impact of hidden 
bias on the probability of receiving treatment, at 95% confidence level. The higher is the odds 
ratio at this level of confidence, the lower our result is sensitive to unobservable variables.  
Our sensitivity analysis shows 1.05 (1.00) odds of mandatory hedgers (IR derivative users) 
with non-users. The value of odds of treatment at 95% confidence level for propensity score 
matching is 1.00 for interest rate derivatives users and non-users, which is consistent with 
Bartram et al. (2011). When we restrict our analysis to mandatory interest rate derivatives users, 
this value is larger (1.05). It indicates that IRPC is a strong signal for real risk management that 
significantly reduces the sensitivity of our results to hidden biases. We also conduct a sensitivity 
analysis, as in DiPrete and Gangl (2002), to quantify the impact of unobservable variables. This 
analysis shows to what extend the average of each observable variable should change to have 
the same impact as an unobservable variable. In matching mandatory users with non-users, the 
effect of an unobservable variable with potential impact on our inference is equivalent to 0.15 
change in IR exposure, $770M change in Total Assets, 0.01 change in ROA, 0.55 changes in 
Tangibility, 0.05 change in CAPEX, 0.015 in R&D, and 0.07 change in Advertisement. Note 
that our result is almost insensitive to Dist. to Def.  Notwithstanding all the reported numbers 
are based on conservative measures, these results indicate that the impact of an unobservable 
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variable must be relatively large to change our conclusion about the value implication of IRPC. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that our results are driven by unobservable variables. 
2.4 Firm value, IRP, and alternative monitoring tools 
Our hypothesis states that shareholders’ confidence in the real purpose of mandatory interest 
rate derivatives usage accounts for a significant difference in valuation between mandatory and 
voluntary users. Nevertheless, other covenants included in the loan contract along with IRPC 
could have also a positive valuation effect; see Nini et al. (2012). Moreover, strict corporate 
governance and competition in the product market have a positive impact on firm value through 
an increased monitoring pressure and a reduced flexibility in exerting corporate assets; see 
among other Beatty et al. (2012), Allayannis et al. (2012), and Adam and Fernando (2006). In 
fact, we check whether these forces increase the value implication of the voluntary interest rate 
derivatives usage. More specifically, we check whether they serve as a substitute or a 
complement to IRPC. 
2.4.1 The impact of other covenants 
It is possible that IRPC are bonded to other types of covenants whose impact on firm value 
is not controlled in our model. There is also a possibility of a tradeoff between relaxing such 
covenants and accepting IRPC. Therefore, we check the robustness of our results to the 
inclusion of other covenants in the syndicated loan agreements. Specifically, we use the typical 
classification of covenants in credit agreements including cash flow, leverage, net worth, 
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liquidity, and capital expenditures covenants18. We add a dummy variable that equals one if the 
corresponding covenant applies to the baseline model. Then, we conduct our test for each class 
of covenants separately. To investigate the interplay between these covenants and interest rate 
derivatives usage as well as their impact on firm value, three interaction terms Covenant × IRP, 
Covenant × Mandatory, and Covenant × IRP × Mandatory are added.  We estimate the 
following regression specification: 
 
 
, 1 , 2 , 3 ,
4 , , 5 , , 6 , ,
7 , , , , ,
 
    2
i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t i t i t
i t i t i t i t t Industry i it
Log Q IRP Mandatory Covenant
IRP Mandatory IRP Covenant Mandatory Covenant
IRP Mandatory Covenant
  
  
   
      
        
       
α
Γ X
 
[Table 2.4] 
The results are presented in Table 2.4. First, the estimates show that mandatory interest rate 
derivatives usage has a positive and significant impact on firm value in all our tests. Its 
magnitude (Mandatory × IRP coefficient) is similar to the one in the baseline model. Second, 
the interaction terms of these covenants with IRP are not significant. Despite the fact that these 
covenants impose restrictions on management, they do not change investors’ perception about 
the use of derivatives as shown by the Wald tests. These covenants also do not influence the 
marginal impact of IRPC. It indicates that the positive impact of IRPC is not affected by the 
presence of other covenants in the credit agreement.  
When firms violate a covenant out of states of bankruptcy, creditors actively get involved in 
corporate management; see Nini et al. (2012). In particular, creditors influence corporate 
                                                 
18 Covenants in this classification are as follows. Earnings, cash flow, and coverage ratios are classified as cash flow covenants. 
Debt to capitalization, debt to assets, debt to equity and other debt to balance sheet covenants are classified as leverage 
covenants. Liquidity covenants are quick ratio, current ratio, and working capital restrictions.  Net worth and capital 
expenditure covenants include any restriction for these terms. 
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governance quality, which has a positive impact on firm value. Hence, it is also possible that 
the valuation impact of the IRPC results from a technical default. To rule out this hypothesis, 
we proceed as follows. From Nini et al. (2009), we identify credit agreements in which the 
borrower violates a covenant in the year before the current syndicated loan and match these 
credit agreements with contracts including an IRPC. We find twelve firms (57 observations) in 
our sample having an IRPC in their credit agreements and a record of technical default in the 
year before. We remove these firms from our sample and re-estimate the baseline model. 
Reassuringly, the results are qualitatively similar to what we find for the whole sample. 19  
2.4.2 Does the valuation effect of IRPC go beyond that of corporate governance? 
There is empirical evidence that corporate governance affects firm value; see, e.g., Gompers, 
Ishii and Metrick (2003), Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz and Williamson (2009) and Bebchuk, Cohen 
and Ferrell (2009). However, the number of provisions included in corporate governance 
indexes is highly variable, from six in Bebchuk et al. (2009) to forty four in Aggarwal et al. 
(2009). Bebchuk et al. (2009) document that only six of these provisions really matter in terms 
of firm valuation. These indexes include several provisions such as poison pill or supermajority 
to approve a merger, which do not address any special control in the use of derivatives. Instead, 
Allayannis et al. (2012) construct a corporate governance index (G7) containing seven 
provisions that is directly related to shareholders’ ability to control the management practices 
concerning the use of derivatives. 20 They document that foreign exchange derivatives usage 
                                                 
19 The corresponding results are available upon request. 
20 Allayannis et al. (2012) define the value of the index as the number of positive answers (out of seven possible) to the following 
provisions: 1) the firm has no inside blockholder, 2) there is at least one outside blockholder, 3) there is at least an institutional 
investor, 4) the CEO is not also the chairman, 5) the cash flow rights of the largest managerial blockholder is greater than its 
median value, 6) the voting rights of the largest managerial blockholder is lower than its median value, 7) there is no 
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has a positive effect on firm value only for firms that have strict corporate governance rules. In 
our setting, strict corporate governance could act as a substitute of mandatory interest rate 
derivatives usage. Therefore, to check the robustness of our previous findings, we follow 
Allayannis et al. (2012) and compute the G7 index using 10-K and DEF 14A (Definitive proxy 
statements) filings.  
Due to data availability, we have complete information for 3366 firm-year observations 
(instead of 4625). We compare the means (medians) of the G7 index for mandatory and 
voluntary interest rate derivatives users to that of non-users. The means (medians) are 3.4 (3), 
3.6 (4) and 3.6 (4) respectively. The mean (median) of the G7 index of mandatory hedgers is 
significantly different from that of voluntary and non-users (p-value = 1.0%).  
To test the value implication of shareholders’ rights with respect to mandatory interest rate 
derivatives usage, we follow Allayannis et al. (2012). We distinguish firms with strict corporate 
governance rules by defining a dummy variable (StrictGov) that equals one if their G7 index is 
higher than, or equal to, the median of the corresponding year. We measure the impact of 
StrictGov and its interactions with IRP and IRP × Mandatory. Table 2.5, column 1 reports the 
coefficients of IRP × StrictGov and IRP × Mandatory, which are positive and statistically 
significant at 10% and 1%, respectively. In parallel to previous findings (Allayannis et al., 2012 
; Lel, 2012 and Fauver and Naranjo, 2010), these results indicate that the monitoring pressure 
from shareholders shifts the use of interest rate derivatives toward real risk management with a 
positive impact on firm value. To test whether strict corporate governance has additional 
explanatory power beyond that of mandatory interest rate derivatives usage, we estimate the 
                                                 
discrepancy between the cash flow and the voting rights. A high value of this index indicates a strict corporate governance 
system. 
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model without StrictGov. The corresponding Wald test (p-value = 14.1%) shows that the 
incremental value is not statistically significant at the usual level. Hence, strict governance does 
not change the value implication of IRPC since shareholders regain their confidence in the 
motive of derivatives usage through creditor’s enforcement. 
2.4.3 Does competition on the product market reduce the valuation effect of IRPC? 
Several theoretical (Hart, 1983; Schmidt, 1997; and Raith, 2003) and empirical studies 
(Hoberg et al., 2013 and Frésard and Valta, 2012) document how product market competition 
influences corporate financial policies and aligns managers’ and shareholders’ interests in the 
use of corporate resources. In the same spirit of shareholders rights, we expect that competition 
pressure positively influences the value implication of voluntary interest rate derivatives usage. 
However, we conjecture that the positive impact of IRPC does not vanish after controlling for 
the influence of product market competition. To test this argument, we use the product market 
fluidity index developed by Hoberg et al. (2013) as a proxy for market competition. This index 
is based on a text-search in corporate filings and address firm-level competitive threats by 
capturing the change in products of the firm relative to those produced by rivals. 
We merge our dataset with that of Hoberg et al. (2013) 21 to collect the Product market 
fluidity index for each firm-year. We compare the mean (median) of the Product market fluidity 
index for both mandatory and voluntary interest rate derivatives users with that of non-users. 
The means (medians) for mandatory, voluntary users, and non-users are 7.4 (6.8), 6.3 (5.6) and 
6.6 (6) respectively. Mandatory users face the highest competition pressure. Pairwise tests show 
                                                 
21 We appreciate Gerard Hoberg and Gordon Philips for providing this dataset in their website 
(http://www.rhsmith.umd.edu/industrydata/industryconcen.htm). 
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that the mean (median) of its Product market fluidity index is significantly higher than that of 
the other groups (p-value = 1.0%).  
Again, we construct a dummy variable Competition that equals one if Product market fluidity 
is larger than, or equal to, the sample median of the corresponding year and zero otherwise. 
This dummy represents the level of competition (high vs low) for each firm-year. We conduct 
our test similarly to the previous section and report the results in Table 2.5, column 2.  The 
coefficient of Mandatory × IRP is positive and statistically significant at 5% while the 
coefficient of Competition × IRP is negative and not significant. Interestingly, the coefficient 
of Mandatory × IRP increases when Competition × IRP is introduced and, in parallel to previous 
tests, the coefficient of Competition × IRP × Mandatory is negative and not significant (p-value 
52%). As a result, competition pressure does not increase the value implication of interest rate 
derivatives usage. However, it reduces the marginal impact of mandatory hedging since the 
manager of firms under competitive pressure have less flexibility in the use of corporates 
resources.  
2.5 Information asymmetries, mandatory hedging and firm value  
Issued in June 1998 by the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the Accounting for 
Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities rule, known as FAS133, requires firms to book 
at fair value the assets and liabilities related to all derivative positions on their balance sheet. 
This rule attempts to clarify derivative positions for investors, enabling them to distinguish 
between derivatives used for risk management and those used for earnings management or 
speculation. Therefore, it lowers the information asymmetry between managers and investors 
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with regard to interest rate derivatives usage. In this context, interest rate derivatives usage 
should enhance firm value for both mandatory and voluntary users (compared to a similar non-
hedging firm) and the investors’ perception about mandatory and voluntary interest rate 
derivatives usage should be reduced. Consequently, their Tobin’s Q should be closer after the 
adoption of the rule.  
2.5.1 The impact of FAS133: A difference-in-differences analysis 
We use the adoption of FAS133 as an external (exogenous) shock and conduct a difference-
in-differences estimate to check the robustness of our previous findings (i.e. the positive impact 
of interest rate derivatives usage). We construct our test based on the adoption of this standard. 
The effective date of this rule was June 15th, 1999 but its implementation was postponed to 
January 1st, 2001 with two amendments. We split the sample to before 2002 (including 2002) 
and after 2002. We apply a one year delay to make sure that the standard is settled in all firms 
and to reduce the impact of derivatives positions initiated before the implementation of 
FAS133.  We follow the same procedure as in Section 2.3.3 to match mandatory (treated) and 
voluntary (control) interest rate derivatives users based on their propensity score. We also add 
interest rate protection (IRP) to the set of control variables to match voluntary and mandatory 
interest rate derivatives users. This procedure allows us to better control for firm’s 
heterogeneity. After matching, we compute the mean (median) of the difference between treated 
firms and their corresponding control group, respectively before and after the adoption of 
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FAS133. Last, we test the equality of the difference (difference-in-difference) before and after 
the adoption of FAS13322.  
[Table 2.6] 
Table 2.6 reports the results. In parallel with our prediction, we observe a significant 
decrease in the difference between the Log of Q ratio of voluntary and mandatory interest rate 
derivatives users after adopting FAS133. More importantly, this reduction is mainly related to 
the significant increase in the value of voluntary users. Before FAS133, the mean (median) of 
the mandatory users is 0.31 (0.22), which increases to 0.36 (0.34) after the standard is 
implemented. For voluntary users, the mean of the Log of Q significantly increases from 0.24 
(0.19) to 0.39 (0.34) after FAS133. In fact, the value of both mandatory and voluntary users 
increases. However, the impact of accounting standard on the value of the voluntary users is 
higher. The average (median) gap between the Log of Q of the voluntary and mandatory users 
before and after the adoption is -0.10 (0.01) and is statistically (not) significant (p-value = 3.1% 
and 16.1% respectively) level. These results are consistent with the purpose of FAS133 since 
the disclosure of the hedging policy discourages firms to use derivatives for purposes other than 
risk management.  The positive value implication of interest rate derivatives usage is also 
reassuring since the adoption of FAS133 is not directly related to endogenous factors. 
To cement our finding about the value implication of interest rate derivatives usage after the 
adoption of FAS133, we define a dummy variable After2002, which is equal to one for years 
after 2002 and zero otherwise. We use the interaction of this dummy with IRP and conduct our 
                                                 
22 We do not use the baseline model since the variable IRP that controls for the interest rate protection is continuous. 
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test on voluntary versus non-user and mandatory versus non-user subsamples. We also conduct 
our test based on Equation (2) on whole sample.  
[Table 2.7] 
Table 2.7 reports the results. Consistent with our previous finding, for voluntary versus non-
users, the coefficient of After2002 × IRP is positive and significant (p-value = 1.1%) while this 
coefficient is negative and insignificant (p-value = 62.9%) for mandatory versus non-users. It 
means that this standard significantly improves investors’ perception about the use of IR 
derivatives for voluntary users while it does not alter the value implication of mandatory ones. 
In column 3, where we have all IR derivatives users and non-users, the coefficient of After 2002 
× IRP is positive and significant (p-value = 2.5%). The coefficient of Mandatory × IRP is still 
positive but is not as significant (p-value = 8.1%) as it is in the baseline model. The coefficient 
of After 2002 × Mandatory × IRP is negative but insignificant. It indicates that the more 
transparent disclosure of IR derivatives after adoption of FAS133 standard reduces, but do not 
eliminate, the marginal impact of mandatory interest rate derivatives usage on firm value. 
2.5.2 Analyzing the value creation 
In this section, we discuss how the premium on firm value is generated. For that purpose, we 
focus on the impact of IRPC on the financial constraint, the subsequent increase of investment, 
and the reduction of the cost of debt documented in the literature; see Campello et al. (2011) 
and Beatty et al. (2011). In fact, financially constraint firms commit themselves to hedge their 
interest rate risk to grant the credit facility and invest in projects. The impact of IRPC on 
financial constrains is noticeable, in particular for mandatory interest rate derivatives users. 
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To estimate the firms’ external finance constraints, we use the index proposed in Whited and 
Wu (2006) (hereafter WW index23). We measure the change in WW-index around the loan 
inception. The mean (median) of WW-index decreases by 6% (3%) for mandatory interest rate 
derivatives users, while this reduction is 5% (2%) and 4% (2%) for voluntary interest rate 
derivatives users and non-users, respectively. The pairwise difference between mandatory 
interest rate derivatives users and non-users is significant at 5% while the difference between 
mandatory and voluntary interest rate derivatives users is not significant (p-value = 27%). The 
differences between the medians are not significant (p-value = 33% and 57% respectively). 
In this context, we compare the dynamic of investments over mandatory users, voluntary 
users and non-users. We measure the change of capital expenditures two years after the credit 
facility is granted. Our analysis shows that, on average, this growth rate is about 24% for 
mandatory users while it is 14% for voluntary users and 13% for non-users, respectively. The 
corresponding differences (mandatory vs. voluntary and mandatory vs. nonusers) are 
statistically significant at 5.4% and 2.1%. Referring to the baseline model, where the coefficient 
of CAPEX is 0.57, a 10% increase in CAPEX increases the firm value by almost 6%. The 
median of change in CAPEX for mandatory, voluntary and nonusers are -10%, -8%, -8%, 
respectively. The p-value of the difference between the median of the change in CAPEX of 
mandatory and that of voluntary (non-user) is 57% (68%).  In firms with high probability of 
risk-shifting, creditors impose restrictions on capital expenditures. The commitment to hedge 
the interest rate risk reduces the probability or willingness of risk-shifting in a firm that 
                                                 
23 We use the estimates of Whited and Wu (2006, p. 543, eq. 3). When computed over different sample periods, Whited and 
Wu (2006) show that the cross-sectional correlation is high. Therefore, our results should not affected by the fact that our 
sample periods do not match. 
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encourages creditors to relax this restriction (Campello et al., 2011).  Therefore, the growth in 
investments is the result of relaxing financial constraints for funding new investment 
opportunities as well as the reduction in investment restrictions imposed by creditors. The 
significant gap between the dynamic of investments of mandatory hedgers and that of the other 
two groups explains the value implication of IRPC. 
We then examine the reduction of the cost of debt resulting from IRPC. Beatty et al. (2012) 
document that IRPC reduces the cost of debt measured as the spread paid over LIBOR or Prime 
rates. Moreover, as discussed before, since most of the syndicated loans have a performance 
pricing, firms have the opportunity to reduce the spread by improving their creditworthiness. 
In the same spirit, the reduction in the cost of debt increases the value of the firm. We estimate 
the change in the LIBOR spread paid two years after loan initiation for the three groups of 
firms. Credit agreements have several types of performance pricing grids. Consequently, we 
calculate interest expenses as follows. First, we split interest payments into the fixed and the 
floating part based on the ratio of Variable Debt to Total Debt. Then, we decompose the floating 
part of the debt in three components: a) the part covered by swap, b) the part covered by collar, 
and c) the unhedged part. For each part, we apply the corresponding rate, i.e. swap rate, collar 
rate if the LIBOR is below the floor or above the cap, and LIBOR rate for the remaining part, 
to its notional. The total is the interest expenses without the spread charged in the agreement. 
Therefore, the floating rate interest expense calculated from the first stage minus this sum and 
divided by floating rate debt is an approximation of the LIBOR spread. Our analysis indicates 
that, on average, mandatory interest rate derivatives usage reduces the LIBOR spread by 97 
basis points (median is 36 basis points) in two years while this change is almost zero for 
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voluntary users and non-users. The difference between the mean of reduction in spread of 
mandatory users and voluntary users (non-users) is statistically significant at 1.0% (0.0%) while 
the difference between the median is significant at 9.4% (15.2%). We multiply this reduction 
in the cost of debt by the average value of floating debts in the year of initiation and two years 
after to calculate the dollar value of this saving. We multiply this value by (1 - tax rate) in which 
tax rate is the income tax divided by sales. Then we divide this value by total assets to measure 
the impact of this saving on return on assets (ROA). This reduction in cost of debt increases 
ROA by about 0.02 for mandatory users and has zero impact on that of voluntary and non-users. 
The coefficient of ROA in the baseline model is 0.46. Therefore, this saving increases the firm 
value by almost 1%. We should note that the impact of hedging is isolated in this calculation 
and this reduction is merely related to the change in the spread paid over LIBOR. 
To identify the source of reduction in the cost of debt, we also analyze the change in 
creditworthiness of three groups by measuring the change in distance to default in two years 
after credit agreement. Two years after the loan inception, the average (median) increase in 
Dist. to Def.  is almost 30% (16%) for mandatory users while it is 17% (8%) and 20% (10%) 
for voluntary and non-users, respectively. The mean (median) difference between mandatory 
and voluntary users is significant at 0.0% (0.0%) while it is significant at 0.0% (3.6%) for 
mandatory users and non-users. These results indicate one of the channels through which firms 
with IRPC reduce the cost of debt. 
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2.6 Conclusion 
In this paper, we study the value implication of interest rate derivatives usage. We identify 
interest rate derivatives mandated by credit agreements. These derivatives are used for risk 
management purposes in contrast to voluntary hedging positions, which could be used for the 
self-benefit of the managers. We find that the average mandatory interest rate derivatives user 
enhances its value by 6% while a similar voluntary interest rate derivatives user does not 
experience any significant change. Our propensity score matching analysis shows that this 
impact is not influenced by selection bias. By interacting IRPC with cash flow, leverage, net 
worth, liquidity and CAPEX covenants, we show that the positive impact of IRPC is 
independent from the impact of other covenants in the credit agreements. Several empirical 
studies document that corporate governance and product market competition reduce the 
flexibility of managers in the (mis)use of corporate resources. In parallel to these findings, we 
show that these factors, particularly corporate governance, significantly reduce the gap between 
the value implication of mandatory and voluntary derivatives usage. We also study the impact 
of the FAS133 accounting standard for derivatives and hedging instruments. Consistent with 
the purpose of this rule, we document a positive and statistically significant valuation effect of 
FAS133. The positive valuation impact of interest rate hedging imposed by creditors remains 
positive, even after the adoption of FAS133. Interestingly, the valuation of voluntary users does 
not differ from that of mandatory users. Lastly, we also analyze the sources of value creation 
following the implementation of IRPCs. We find that the growth in investments and the 
reduction in cost of debt are the main consequence of imposing IRPCs, which generate value 
for the firm.  
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In summary, this study provides a new insight into the value implication of risk management 
and highlights the critical role of shareholders’ perception about derivative positions in value 
generation of financial instruments; see Campello et al. (2011) and Chernenko and Faulkender 
(2011). It also complements the empirical studies that show a reduction of the cost of debt by 
mandatory use of IR derivatives and documents the ultimate positive impact of these derivatives 
on firm value; see Beatty et al. (2011). The result of this research illustrates how shareholders 
value the indirect influence of creditors on financial decisions despite the existence of conflict 
of interest between creditors and shareholders.  
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Appendix 2 
Table 2.A1: Sample construction 
 
Panel A: Sample selection 
 Contracts Firm-year Firms 
Initial sample 8783  1618 
Term Loans from 10-K and 10-Q search 330  382 
Special contracts -5047  -120 
Maturity year before 1998 and less than one year -221  -124 
Utilities and Financials -236  -130 
Map contract-years to firm-years  6536 1297 
Merge with COMPUSTAT  -336 -38 
Missing IR hedging information  -365 -43 
Missing or zero float rate exposure   -1199 -99 
Final sample  4636 1117 
Panel B: Industry distribution (firm-years) 
 Mandatory users Voluntary users Non-users 
01-09 Agriculture 0 4 5 
10-19 Mining and construction 36 136 253 
20-27 Food, paper, and finished goods 74 198 269 
28-29 Chemicals and pharmaceuticals 28 109 135 
30-34 Rubber, leather, and metal works 29 134 178 
35-36 Machinery and electronics 53 203 324 
37-39 Other equipment and machinery 63 167 240 
40-48 Transportation and telecom 149 216 210 
50-51 Wholesalers 15 103 132 
52-59 Retailers 43 133 151 
70-79 Personal and business services 133 181 277 
80-99 Other services 41 62 152 
Total 664 1646 2326 
Panel C: Year distribution (firm-years) 
 Mandatory users Voluntary users Non-users 
1998 51 181 252 
1999 61 180 252 
2000 85 185 248 
2001 86 187 260 
2002 87 178 279 
2003 70 172 263 
2004 63 167 239 
2005 62 157 235 
2006 37 86 127 
2007 62 153 171 
Total 664 1646 2326 
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Table 2.A2: Definitions and sources of the variables 
 
Variable name  Description COMPUSTAT Item 
Advertisement Advertising expense divided by sales. 
Zero for missing variables. 
data45 / data12 
Assets Book value of total assets. data6 
CAPEX Capital expenditures divided by total 
assets. 
data128/data6 
Distance to Default See Crosbie and Bohn (2003).   
Dividend  A dummy equals to one if common 
dividend is paid and zero otherwise. 
data21 
IRP Net notional value of interest rate 
derivatives divided by total assets. 
  
IR exposure Notional value of debts with variable 
interest rate divided by (Total assets – 
book value of equity). 
 
Q ratio Market value of equity at fiscal year-end 
plus total assets minus book value of 
equity) divided by total assets. 
(data199 × data25 + data6 – 
data60)/data6 
R&D Research and development expenses 
divided by total assets (zero if missing). 
data46/data6 
ROA 
Net income divided by total assets. data172/data6 
Tangibility Net properties, plant and equipment 
divided by total assets. 
data8 / data6 
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Table 2.1: Descriptive statistics 
This table reports the characteristics of the firms depending on derivatives usage. The definition of the variables is available in the Appendix, Table A2. Panel A reports the characteristics and a 
pairwise test of the difference between interest rate derivatives users versus non-users. Panel B split the interest rate derivatives users into mandatory interest rate derivatives users and voluntary 
interest rate derivatives users.   *, **, *** represent 10%, 5%, and 1% significant level of the t-test (Wilcoxon rank-sum Z-test) for the mean (median) comparison.  
 
Panel A: Interest rate derivative users versus non-users 
 
Interest rate derivative users (i) 
N = 2310 
 
Interest rate derivative non-users (ii) 
N = 2326 
 
(i) – (ii) 
 Mean SD 25th 50th 75th  Mean SD 25th 50th 75th 
 
Mean Median 
Log of Q 0.30 0.42 0.02 0.24 0.53  0.32 0.45 0.01 0.25 0.56  -0.02** -0.01 
IRP 0.14 0.17 0.05 0.10 0.19  - - - - -  - - 
IR Exposure 0.35 0.29 0.17 0.31 0.47  0.26 0.28 0.09 0.21 0.38  0.09*** 0.10*** 
Assets 3176.12 8388.69 338.93 973.19 2387.00  1825.70 8281.07 176.52 493.95 1285.56  1350.42*** 479.24*** 
Tangibility 0.34 0.23 0.14 0.28 0.48  0.32 0.24 0.13 0.25 0.47  0.02** 0.03*** 
ROA 0.02 0.12 0.00 0.03 0.06  0.01 0.15 -0.01 0.03 0.07  0.01*** 0.00 
Dist. to Def. 29.78 32.27 22.90 33.65 45.40  26.71 29.44 20.32 29.38 40.80  3.07*** 4.27*** 
CAPEX 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.07  0.06 0.07 0.02 0.04 0.07  0.00 0.00 
R&D 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01  0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01  0.00 0.00 
Advertisement 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01  0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00 
Dividend 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01  0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.01*** 0.00 
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Panel B: Mandatory versus Voluntary IR derivative users 
 
Mandatory users (i) 
N = 664 
 
Voluntary users (ii) 
N = 1646 
 
(i) – (ii) 
 Mean SD 25th 50th 75th  Mean SD 25th 50th 75th 
 
Mean Median 
Log of Q 0.32 0.44 0.02 0.26 0.57  0.29 0.41 0.02 0.23 0.50  0.03* 0.03 
IRP 0.19 0.16 0.09 0.15 0.24  0.13 0.17 0.04 0.08 0.16  0.06*** 0.07*** 
IR Exposure 0.40 0.27 0.23 0.38 0.54  0.32 0.30 0.16 0.28 0.44  0.08*** 0.10*** 
Assets 1564.6 2636.04 236.5 654.1 1763.48  3826.21 9721.26 402.52 1143.94 2746.7  -2261.61*** -489.84*** 
Tangibility 0.31 0.22 0.12 0.26 0.44  0.35 0.24 0.15 0.3 0.51  -0.04*** -0.04*** 
ROA 0.00 0.17 -0.02 0.02 0.05  0.03 0.1 0.01 0.03 0.06  -0.03*** -0.01*** 
Dist. to Def. 25.78 32.32 20.11 30.06 41.38  31.39 32.13 24.49 34.87 47.14  -5.61*** -4.81*** 
CAPEX 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.08  0.06 0.06 0.02 0.04 0.07  0.00 0.00 
R&D 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01  0.00 0.00 
Advertisement 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01  0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.01  0.00 0.00 
Dividend 0.01 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.01 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.01  0.00 0.00 
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Table 2.2: The impact of IRP on firm value 
This table presents the results of the regressions examining the impact of interest rate protection on firm value. The 
dependent variable is the log of Tobin’s Q ratio. IRP measures the interest rate derivatives hedging intensity. Mandatory 
is a dummy equal to one if the IRP is required by lenders. The description of the remaining variables is available in the 
Appendix, Table A2. In column (1) and (2), IRP is the net value of the notional of float-to-fixed and fixed-to-float 
derivatives divided by Total Assets. In column (3), Fixed to Float derivative users are excluded. In column (4), firms 
hedging currency risk exposure and commodities with derivatives are excluded, the intensity of hedging being estimated 
as in column (2). The estimations are corrected for heteroskedasticity and within-firm error clustering. We report the 
corresponding coefficient and the t statistics below. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
level, respectively. 
 IR Hedging Baseline 
Float to Fixed 
Only 
Without FX 
and Other 
hedgers 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
IRP 0.112** 0.052 0.053 0.047 
 [2.17] [1.21] [1.15] [1.06] 
Mandatory  -0.049 -0.052 -0.046 
  [1.60] [1.57] [1.43] 
IRP×Mandatory  0.307*** 0.316*** 0.276** 
  [2.79] [2.85] [2.46] 
IR Exposure -0.026 -0.018 -0.014 -0.014 
 [0.85] [0.61] [0.41] [0.47] 
Log of assets -0.194*** -0.192*** -0.189*** -0.205*** 
 [8.63] [8.57] [7.83] [8.51] 
ROA 0.454*** 0.460*** 0.465*** 0.447*** 
 [4.08] [4.18] [4.00] [3.90] 
Dividend 0.007 0.005 0.003 0.008 
 [0.30] [0.18] [0.10] [0.31] 
Tangibility -0.273** -0.273** -0.285** -0.285** 
 [2.22] [2.23] [2.08] [2.19] 
Dist. to Def. -0.003** -0.003** -0.004** -0.003** 
 [2.06] [2.33] [2.27] [2.20] 
CAPEX 0.562*** 0.572*** 0.600*** 0.595*** 
 [3.80] [3.90] [3.71] [3.89] 
R&D 0.621 0.617 0.738 0.525 
 [0.86] [0.85] [0.98] [0.69] 
Advertisement -0.273 -0.248 -0.322 -0.309 
 [0.36] [0.32] [0.35] [0.39] 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 
# of Observations 4625 4625 4127 4252 
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Table 2.3: The impact of IRP on firm value: A propensity score approach 
This table presents the comparison of Log of Tobin’s Q ratios of interest rate derivatives users versus non-users, and mandatory versus 
non-users. The treatment effect is the use (mandatory use) of interest rate derivatives in Panel A (B). Control firms are the matched 
firm-years after propensity score matching procedure explained in the text. The number of observations (firm-year) is reported 
separately. In Panel A, non-users whose propensity scores are equal to or lower than 0.01 are used as controlled firms (caliper). In Panel 
B, we exclude voluntary IR derivatives users and repeat the test as in Panel A. The difference of the mean (median) of Log of Q ratios 
of treated and controlled firm-years and the corresponding p-value of pairwise t-test (Wilcoxon rank-sum Z-test) is reported. 
 
Panel A: All IR derivatives users versus non-users 
 Observations  Mean  Median 
 Before 
matching 
After 
matching 
 Before 
matching 
After 
 matching 
 Before 
matching 
After 
matching 
Log of Q (Treated) 2207 2084  0.30 0.30  0.24 0.25 
Log of Q (Control) 2420 2245  0.32 0.31  0.24 0.26 
Difference    -0.02 -0.01  0.00 -0.01 
p-value    6.1% 17.8%  37.3% 42.5% 
Bias (absolute)    14.5% 3.3%  8.4% 2.6% 
Panel B: Mandatory IR derivatives users versus non-users 
Log of Q (Treated) 653 608  0.32 0.33  0.26 0.28 
Log of Q (Control) 2429 1839  0.32 0.28  0.24 0.21 
Difference    0.00 0.05  0.02 0.07 
p-value    50.3% 2.9%  48.2% 2.0% 
Bias (absolute)    14.8% 4.4%  10.2% 4.8% 
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Table 2.4: Interest rate derivatives and other covenants 
This table presents the results of the regressions examining the impact of covenants in credit agreements and their 
interaction with IRP on firm value. The dependent variable is the log of Tobin’s Q ratio. IRP measures the interest rate 
derivatives hedging intensity of firms. Mandatory is a dummy equal to one if the IRP is required by lenders. Covenant is 
a dummy equal to one if the firm-year is subject to the financial covenant corresponding to each column and zero 
otherwise. The description of the remaining variables is available in the Appendix, Table A2.  The estimations are 
corrected for heteroskedasticity and within-firm error clustering. We report the corresponding coefficient and the t 
statistics below. The p-values of the Wald test for the difference between each and its nested model (without Covenant 
and its interaction terms) is reported, separately. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, 
respectively.  
 Cash flow Leverage Net worth Liquidity CAPEX 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
IRP 0.017 0.063 0.023 0.037 0.02 
 [0.38] [1.39] [0.51] [0.94] [0.47] 
Mandatory -0.051 -0.048 -0.035 -0.05 -0.043 
 [1.51] [1.47] [0.94] [1.63] [1.32] 
Covenant -0.009 0.048* -0.02 -0.016 -0.013 
 [0.52] [1.77] [1.07] [0.40] [0.63] 
IRP × Mandatory   0.274** 0.300*** 0.384*** 0.314*** 0.274** 
 [2.16] [2.62] [2.97] [2.90] [2.10] 
IRP × Covenant 0.219** -0.05 0.11 0.115 0.118 
 [2.15] [0.54] [1.27] [0.95] [1.20] 
Mandatory × Covenant  0.007 -0.018 -0.029 -0.034 -0.018 
 [0.15] [0.28] [0.55] [0.20] [0.35] 
IRP × Mandatory × Covenant -0.033 -0.022 -0.287 0.24 0.087 
 [0.17] [0.05] [1.47] [0.31] [0.45] 
IR Exposure -0.021 -0.015 -0.017 -0.019 -0.024 
 [0.73] [0.50] [0.60] [0.66] [0.77] 
Log of assets -0.191*** -0.192*** -0.192*** -0.192*** -0.192*** 
 [8.59] [8.53] [8.60] [8.52] [8.57] 
ROA 0.464*** 0.457*** 0.461*** 0.460*** 0.460*** 
 [4.27] [4.28] [4.23] [4.17] [4.17] 
Dividend 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.005 0.004 
 [0.14] [0.12] [0.14] [0.21] [0.18] 
Tangibility -0.281** -0.273** -0.267** -0.271** -0.262** 
 [2.29] [2.22] [2.18] [2.21] [2.12] 
Dist. to Def. -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** -0.003** 
 [2.37] [2.29] [2.23] [2.34] [2.42] 
CAPEX 0.570*** 0.575*** 0.569*** 0.572*** 0.567*** 
 [3.91] [3.92] [3.90] [3.94] [3.89] 
R&D 0.64 0.616 0.606 0.616 0.606 
 [0.89] [0.85] [0.84] [0.86] [0.84] 
Advertisement -0.202 -0.247 -0.256 -0.248 -0.236 
 [0.26] [0.32] [0.33] [0.32] [0.31] 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2  0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 0.71 
# of Observations 4625 4625 4625 4625 4625 
Wald test (p-value) 14.5% 48.2% 10.1% 87.1% 55.8% 
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Table 2.5: Interest rate derivatives and controlling forces 
This table presents the results of the regressions examining the impact of corporate governance and competition in the 
product market and their interaction with IRP on firm value. The dependent variable is the log of Tobin’s Q ratio. IRP 
measures the interest rate derivatives hedging intensity of firms. Mandatory is a dummy equal to one if the IRP is required 
by lenders. StrictGov (respectively Competition) is a dummy equal to one if the level of the G7 index (respectively Product 
market fluidity index) is equal or greater than the median of the sample in the same year and zero otherwise. The 
description of the remaining variables is available in the Appendix, Table A2. The estimations are corrected for 
heteroskedasticity and within-firm error clustering. We report the corresponding coefficient and the t statistics below. The 
p-values of the Wald test for the difference between each and its nested model (without Force and its interaction terms) 
is reported, separately. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.  
 StrictGov Competition 
 (1) (2) 
IRP -0.078 0.078 
 [0.82] [1.12] 
Mandatory -0.111*** -0.064 
 [2.59] [1.42] 
Force -0.023 0.012 
 [0.94] [0.66] 
IRP × Mandatory 0.594*** 0.423** 
 [4.23] [2.24] 
IRP ×  Force 0.193* -0.04 
 [1.86] [0.53] 
Mandatory × Force 0.119** 0.015 
 [2.11] [0.31] 
IRP × Mandatory × Force -0.514** -0.145 
 [2.13] [0.67] 
IR Exposure -0.012 -0.022 
 [0.36] [0.68] 
Log of assets -0.194*** -0.193*** 
 [8.10] [8.59] 
ROA 0.506*** 0.463*** 
 [4.06] [4.17] 
Dividend 0.013 0.003 
 [0.47] [0.13] 
Tangibility -0.339** -0.278** 
 [2.41] [2.27] 
Dist. to Def. -0.003* -0.003** 
 [1.94] [2.25] 
CAPEX 0.553*** 0.580*** 
 [3.35] [3.97] 
R&D 0.33 0.61 
 [0.38] [0.85] 
Advertisement -0.247 -0.263 
 [0.31] [0.34] 
Firm FE Yes Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2  0.71 0.71 
# of Observations 3366 4609 
Wald test (p-value)  14.1% 87.3% 
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Table 2.6: Interest rate derivatives and FAS133 accounting standard 
This table reports the difference-in-differences estimate of the Log of Tobin’s Q ratio of mandatory (treated) and voluntary 
(control) interest rate derivatives users until 2002 (one year after FAS133 generally takes effect) and after 2002. Mandatory and 
Voluntary IR derivative users are matched with propensity scores explained in the text. Panel A and B report the comparison 
before and after the adoption of FAS133, respectively. The difference between the mean and the median of the distance between 
the Log of Q ratios of the mandatory and voluntary IR derivative users before and after FAS133 is reported in Diff-in-Diff 
estimates. The p-values are reported for the t-test (Wilcoxon rank-sum Z-test) for the mean (median) comparison.  
  
 
Panel A: Mandatory IR derivatives users versus voluntary users until 2002 
 Observations  Mean  Median 
 Before 
matching 
After 
matching 
 Before 
matching 
After 
 matching 
 Before 
matching 
After 
matching 
Log of Q (Treated) 362 325  0.29 0.31  0.19 0.22 
Log of Q (Control) 872 659  0.23 0.24  0.14 0.19 
Difference     0.06 0.07  0.05 0.03 
p-value    1.1% 2.6%  5.4% 24.1% 
Bias (absolute)    24.8% 5.7%  22.9% 3.8% 
Panel B: Mandatory IR derivatives users versus voluntary users after 2002 
Log of Q (Treated) 291 252  0.35 0.36  0.32 0.34 
Log of Q (Control) 682 506  0.37 0.39  0.34 0.30 
Difference    -0.02 -0.03  -0.02 0.04 
p-value    23.5% 23.6%  24.1% 20.9% 
Bias (absolute)    25.2% 4.4%  20.7% 2.9% 
Diff-in-Diff (matched)    - -0.10  - 0.01 
p-value    - 3.1%  - 16.1% 
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Table 2.7: Interest rate derivatives and FAS133 accounting standard 
This table presents the results of the regressions examining the influence of FAS133 accounting standard on value 
implication of interest rate derivatives and the marginal impact of mandatory use of these derivatives. The dependent 
variable is the log of Tobin’s Q ratio. IRP measures the interest rate derivatives hedging intensity of firms. Mandatory is 
a dummy equal one if the IRP is required by lenders. After2002 is a dummy equal one if year is after 2002 (one year after 
FAS133 generally takes effect), and zero otherwise. The explanations of all variables are available on Appendix A2.  The 
estimations are corrected for heteroskedasticity and within-firm error clustering. We report the corresponding coefficient 
and the t statistics below. The p-values of the Wald test for the difference between each and its nested model (without 
After2002 and its interaction terms) is reported, separately. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 
10% level, respectively. 
 
Voluntary vs.  non-
users 
Mandatory vs. non-
users 
IR derivatives users 
vs. non-users 
 (1) (2) (3) 
IRP 0.007 0.319** 0.012 
 [0.15] [2.39] [0.29] 
After2002 0.358*** 0.068*** 0.522*** 
 [3.61] [2.58] [7.90] 
After2002 × IRP 0.182** -0.075 0.151** 
 [2.55] [0.48] [2.24] 
Mandatory   -0.043 
   [1.06] 
Mandatory × IRP   0.281* 
   [1.75] 
After2002 × Mandatory   -0.009 
   [0.18] 
After2002 × Mandatory × IRP   -0.030 
   [0.15] 
IR Exposure -0.023 -0.052 -0.019 
 [0.67] [1.18] [0.65] 
Log of assets -0.190*** -0.214*** -0.192*** 
 [8.00] [6.27] [8.56] 
ROA 0.470*** 0.386*** 0.460*** 
 [5.17] [3.20] [4.17] 
Dividend 0.003 0.002 0.003 
 [0.10] [0.07] [0.13] 
Tangibility -0.260** -0.376** -0.274** 
 [1.98] [2.34] [2.23] 
Dist. to Def. -0.002* -0.004* -0.003** 
 [1.66] [1.85] [2.28] 
CAPEX 0.534*** 0.607*** 0.576*** 
 [3.51] [3.80] [3.97] 
R&D -0.015 0.946 0.604 
 [0.02] [1.06] [0.84] 
Advertisement -0.050 -0.636 -0.255 
 [0.05] [0.59] [0.33] 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry-Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Adjusted R2  0.74 0.71 0.73 
# of Observations 3972 3073 4625 
Wald test (p-value)  0.0% 3.1% 0.0% 
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Chapter 3: Why do firms with investment grade rating borrow from 
private lenders? 
3.1 Introduction 
Starting with Modigliani and Miller (1958), the choice between debt and equity has 
attracted a lot of attention in the academic world. A large body of theoretical and 
empirical research explains how market frictions shape the corporate decision-making 
in financing projects; see Frank and Goyal (2008), Graham (2008) for recent surveys. In 
particular, information asymmetries between creditors and borrowers help understand 
the co-existence of public and private debt markets. Diamond (1984, 1991) and Fama 
(1985) argue that private lenders are better at monitoring borrowers compared to 
individual bondholders who have less experience, fewer resources, or willingness to 
control. To summarize, private lenders are superior to public creditors in financing 
“information-problematic” firms; see Carey, Post and Sharpe (1998, p. 845). In addition, 
the renegotiation of private debt contracts is easier when firms default, which 
significantly reduces the liquidation costs; see, e.g., Berlin and Master (1992), Rajan 
(1992), and Gorton and Kahn (2000). Therefore, information asymmetries between 
investors and the firm combined with an easy renegotiation in case of default shape the 
private loans market. 
However, empirical evidence shows that investment grade firms facing lower 
information asymmetries sometimes raise private debt. In this paper, I ask the following 
question: Why investment (non-investment) grade firms, with reduced information 
asymmetries, sometimes prefer private (public) debt to public bond (private debt) 
markets? I explore an alternative hypothesis, i.e. the impact of firm systematic risk, on 
the choice between private and public debt. 
Empirical evidence shows that the private and public debt markets are populated with 
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investors having different investment horizons. On one hand, the private debt market 
attracts “hold-to-maturity” investors while, on the other hand, the public debt market is 
mainly composed of investors that rebalance their holdings more frequently. The typical 
maturity (median) of a private debt is half of maturity of a public debt, their respective 
trading volumes is one to ten.  
From a theoretical perspective, a corporate bond can be seen as a portfolio of long on 
a risk free bond and short on a European put option written on the corporate assets, 
with an exercise price and a maturity equal to the face value and the maturity of the debt; 
see Merton (1974). If the bondholder closes her position before maturity, the bondholder 
cares about the price of the put option, which includes the expected cost of default. 
While investors rebalancing their portfolio care about the total value of the put option, 
“hold-to-maturity” investors are only concerned with the cost of default. When the 
premium associated to credit risk is negligible (investment grade issues), I argue that high 
systematic risk firms issuing public instead of private debt pay a premium. Conversely, 
when the credit risk premium is significant (non-investment grade issues), high 
systematic risk firms issuing private debt pay a premium. 
To test my conjecture, I use a sample of 3323 (984) private and 2929 (1843) public 
investment (non-investment) grade debts of US listed firms from 1990 to 2011. I test 
the impact of systematic risk, lender type, and their interaction on the yield spread of 
these contracts. After controlling for debt contract specifications, firm characteristics, 
and macroeconomic factors, I find that the impact of the systematic risk (beta) on the real 
cost of investment grade debt is significantly higher (p-value = 1.8%) in public debt 
than in private debt. The impact of systematic risk is almost 16% higher than that of 
its counterfactual (private debt). For non-investment grade issuers, the result is the 
opposite. Choosing a public contract significantly reduces the impact of systematic 
risk on the cost of debt (p-value = 0.0%). A typical non-investment grade issuer reduces 
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the impact of systematic risk on the real cost of debt by almost 18% through the 
issuance of a public debt. To summarize, these empirical results are consistent with my 
conjecture. 
To cement my hypothesis, I show that debt issuers consider the impact of systematic 
risk when issuing private or public debt. Indeed, investment grade public debt issuers 
have a significantly lower beta (p-value = 1.1%) than private debt issuers. I also find 
that non-investment grade public debt issuers have a significantly higher systematic risk 
than private issuers (p-value = 1.20%). A 1% increase in log of beta reduces (increases) 
the odds of choosing a public agreement by 12% (28%) for investment (non-investment) 
grade borrowers. It indicates a considerable difference in the systematic risk of private 
and public debt issuers. These findings are robust to different systematic risk estimates 
(i.e., the beta from the CAPM or the Fama and French (1992) three-factor models, time 
horizon - one to five years - and the frequency of returns -daily vs monthly).  
Despite this strong evidence, the selection bias and simultaneity are concerns in 
interpreting these results. To address these issues, I match private and public investment 
(non-investment) grade issuers based on their propensity score. For investment (non-
investment) grade public debt issuers, the average beta is 7% (22%) lower (higher) than 
that of private debt issuers (p-value < 1%).24 A nonparametric test between the beta of 
public debt issuers and of their private issuers’ counterfactual asserts that the results are 
not driven by a small number of observations. The propensity score matching 
significantly reduces the average (median) bias from 49.7% (26.1%) and 21.5% (12.9%) 
to lower than 4.1% (3.1%) and 4.0% (3.0%) for investment and non-investment grade 
debts, respectively. Given the low bias in the controlling variables, there is little chance 
that unobservable variables affect significantly the results. To alleviate the remaining 
                                                 
24 The difference in systematic risk between the medians of public debt issuer is 5% (19%) lower (higher) than 
that of private debt issuers and where the difference is significant at 1% level. 
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concern of unobservable variables and simultaneity in my result, I turned my attention 
to the secondary loan market. The introduction of syndicated loan ratings by Moody’s 
and S&P in 1995 had a significant impact on liquidity and trading volumes in the 
secondary loan market. Consequently, this innovation changed private lenders 
investment horizon. Therefore, I consider the initiation of a loan rating service as a 
quasi-natural experiment and conduct a difference-in-differences matching test between 
the difference of systematic risk of private and public debt issuers before and after the 
introduction of a rating service for investment grade debt issuers. For this test, I focus on 
non-speculative debts to reassure that the incentive of trade was not related to the private 
information of the poor performance of the debt. This analysis reveals that the systematic 
risk of private debt issuers is significantly lower than that of public debt issuers before 
the introduction of the loan rating service. This difference vanishes after the loan rating 
service is settled in the market. 
This paper contributes to the debt structure literature by contrasting the impact of 
systematic risk in the private and public debt markets. I show that the emergence of the 
fast growing secondary loan market must be taken into account. An active secondary 
market diminishes the advantage of private lending based on information asymmetry 
and controlling incentives while it raises the exposure of loan securities to systematic 
risk. This research shows empirically how the investment horizon influences the impact 
of systematic risk in pricing risky assets. It also documents the indirect impact of the 
secondary loan market on the cost of debt in private lending which is unfavorable 
for firms with high systematic risk. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 3.2 reviews the related 
literature. Section 3.3 explains the construction of the sample. Section 3.4 presents the 
empirical models and reports the results. Section 3.5 describes how potential selection 
bias is controlled for and reports the difference-in-differences estimates based on the 
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introduction of a loan rating service. Some additional robustness checks are also 
presented Section 3.6 concludes the paper. 
3.2 Review of the literature 
This intuition concerning the role of systematic risk on the choice of private debt 
versus public debt comes from the similarity of risk characteristics in stock and bond 
returns. Campello, Chen, and Zhang (2008) explain that bonds and equity naturally 
share similar risk factors since both are contingent claims written on the same risky 
assets. In their multi-period cross-sectional tests, they show that firms with a  higher 
systematic risk have a higher yield, even after controlling for default risk. Kwan (1996) 
and Hotchkiss and Ronen (2002) also show a strong correlation between stock and 
bond returns. At first glance, these findings contradict Fama and French (1993), who 
show that the interest rate risk (TERM) and the default premium (DEF) dominate the 
impact of market risk and almost completely explain bond returns. However, by 
working on the spread between corporate bond yields and Treasury (or AAA corporate 
bond) and by separating the premium for default risk from the yield spread, the impact of 
TERM and DEF is almost eliminated. 
The empirical evidence shows that bond yields net of TERM and DEF are largely 
explained by market risk. Elton, Gruber, Agrawal, and Mann (2001) demonstrate that 
systematic risk strongly explains the spread between corporate and Treasury bonds 
yields, even after controlling for the costs related to expected default. Moreover, in 
contrast to government bonds, corporate bond returns move systematically with other 
assets in the market. Therefore, investors require a premium for corporate bond yields to 
compensate for this risk, just like as for any other asset. Since the compensation for this 
risk in capital markets changes over time, it introduces a systematic impact on yield 
spread as well. Further research reaffirms these findings by explaining that the impact of 
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systematic risk is not limited to its influence on the probability of default. Chen, 
Lesmond, and Wei (2007) show that default risk does not fully explain the yield spread 
in the bond market. Consequently, the impact of systematic risk on the yield spread is 
significant, even in states with low probability of default. Huang and Huang (2012) also 
find that a small fraction of the yield spread is associated with credit risk, particularly for 
non-speculative bonds. In sum, as stated in Fama and French (1993), interest rate and 
default risk are the main risk factors in bond returns while systematic and default risks 
are the major factors in yield spreads. 
An important difference between the bond and the loan secondary markets is their 
respective trading volumes. While private lenders are akin to a  “hold- to-maturity” 
strategy, bondholders are generally trade-oriented investors. From 2002 to 2012, the 
median of annual trading volume in the bond market is more than $4255B while the 
median of trading volume at secondary loan market is $395B.25 The difference in the 
median of the trade volume over new issue is also significantly different. For the same 
period, the median of this ratio is more than 5.1 for the bond market compared to 1.2 for 
the loan market. The securitization of corporate loans also does not show any 
significant trading activity compared to the bond market. For instance, the median of the 
annual Collateralized Loan Obligation (CLO) issuance is $20B from 2002 to 2012, 
according to Thomson Reuters CLO Primer 2013 report. 
Assuming zero default probability, the “hold-to-maturity” investment strategy in 
the debt market makes the cash flow of a corporate bond deterministic (coupon payments 
plus face value paid at maturity). Therefore, “hold-to-maturity” limits the impact of 
systematic risk to its influence on the probability of default.26 I mirror the distinction 
                                                 
25 These figures are from the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association and LPC DealScan 
respectively. 
26 As I discuss the yield spread in corporate bonds, I assume the interest rate risk is negligible in spread. 
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between short and long-term investment horizons to the investment strategy of public 
bondholders and private lenders, respectively. 
As shown above, private lenders are less likely to trade. Hence, they are not 
concerned about the inter-temporal price variations of debt securities and have a lower 
expected premium for systematic risk. All else being equal, the cost of public debt should 
be higher than the cost of private debt for firms with high systematic risk. However, for 
debt with low credit quality, systematic risk is more related to the probability of default, 
which weakens the advantage of a “hold-to-maturity” strategy. In this case, because 
private lenders have more concerns about the default, they ask for a  higher premium 
compared to public bondholders who are typically dispersed and exposed to smaller 
fractions of the debt. In addition, some specific private lenders, such as banks or insurance 
companies, face regulatory issues in holding low credit quality debts that offer extra cost 
burdens compared to individual bondholders.  
I assume that the put option related to an investment grade debt is completely 
“out-of-the-money” (the face value of the debt is substantially lower than corporate 
assets and is less likely to be exercised) while the same option related to a non-
investment grade debt is almost “at-the-money” (the face value of the debt is almost 
equal to corporate assets and more likely to be exercised). Moreover, an investor with 
a “hold-to-maturity” investment strategy closes her position (buys the put option) near to 
maturity while a trade-oriented investor might close her position at any time before 
maturity. Since my argument is based on yield spread, I ignore the interest rate risk (i.e., 
the sensitivity of the value of the risk free bond) and analyze the sensitivity of the value 
of the put option to the volatility of its underlying assets. I decompose the volatility of 
the assets to systematic and idiosyncratic risks. Investors are able to diversify specific 
risk. As a result, systematic risk is the main factor of volatility. In this context, I evaluate 
the sensitivity of the put option (delta) in four different scenarios. 
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[Figure 3.1] 
 
Figures 3.1.A and 3.1.B show the delta for arbitrary out-of-the-money put options 
which replicate investment grade debts with 0.1 and five-year maturity, respectively. The 
sensitivity of “out-of-the-money” put options close to maturity is almost zero (see 
Figure 3.1.A). In addition, it does not change significantly with the volatility of the 
underlying asset. However, delta increases when time to maturity is five years and, 
more importantly, it increases significantly with volatility (see Figure 3.1.B). Trade-
oriented (“hold-to-maturity”) investors have more concern about delta during life (close 
to maturity) of the put option. This sensitivity is considerable in periods distant from 
maturity. Since systematic risk mainly drives sensitivity (investment grade debt has a low 
probability of default), it also shows that trade-oriented investors in public debt market 
expect a higher premium. Results for an “at-the-money” put option akin to non-
investment grade debts are shown in Figure 3.1.C and 3.1.D. In contrast to the previous 
scenario, the price of an “at-the-money” put option close to maturity (T = 0.1) is very 
sensitive to the volatility of the underlying asset. With a five-year maturity, delta changes 
slowly with volatilities lower than 20% and even decreases with volatilities above 20%. 
Therefore, in opposite to investment grade debts (out of the money options), 
“hold-to-maturity” investors have more concern about volatility and expect a higher 
premium for bearing systematic risk. 
While increase in systematic risk raises the yield spread based on market risk 
premium, it also accounts for an increase in the premium for default risk. Therefore, to 
test my hypothesis, I need to disentangle the impact of beta on default risk from its 
impact on the real cost of debt (net of default premium). Following Cooper and 
Davydenko (2007), I calculate the spread related to the expected default loss (δ). Then, 
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I conduct my tests on the real cost of debt (Net spread), (i.e., the total spread minus δ).27 
Similar to Huang and Huang (2012), I separate investment from non-investment grade 
issuances, which are more vulnerable to default, and I conduct my test on the two groups 
separately. In this context, I test the interplay between the impact of systematic risk on 
the real cost of debt and lender type (public versus private) in states distant from default 
(investment grade issuance). Similarly, I evaluate this relation in states close to default 
for non-investment grade (high-yield) debts. 
3.3 Data and methodology 
3.3.1 Impact of systematic risk on the cost of debt 
I collect bank loans from 1990 to 2011 on Loan Pricing Corporation’s DealScan. 
From this list, I identify firms publicly traded in the US by matching names and tickers. 
This leaves 6016 contracts in my list including contract details such as all-in-spread of 
the loan, currency, amount, maturity, type, rating, and purpose. I drop deals with 
currencies other than US dollars since the term structure is not similar for all currencies. 
I also drop deals with special purposes such as “debtor in possession” or “commercial 
paper backup”. I also exclude financial institutions and utilities (SIC code starting with 6 
or 9), and loans with less than one year to maturity. I obtain 5604 contracts, of which 
455 are non-investment grade issues. 
Nonconvertible public debt issuance and non-bank private loans are from Security 
Data Company (SDC) for the same period. As with the bank loans, financial institutions 
and utilities (one-digit SIC codes equal to 6 or 9 respectively), deals with currencies other 
than USD, and bonds with maturity lower than one year, are eliminated. This leaves 
3695 (5969) private (public) contracts of which 1370 (1637) are non-investment grade 
                                                 
27 Campello, Lin, Ma, and Zou (2011) also use the same methodology for calculating the real cost of debt. 
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issuances. Debt issues with credit rating equal or better than BBB are classified as 
investment grade. For debt issues without rating, I refer to the SDC classification in 
which high yield bonds are explicitly identified. Speculative loans in LPC DealScan are 
classified as “non-investment grade” securities. 
Next, I merge these two datasets and match these observations with CRSP and 
COMPUSTAT. I keep those with: (a) no missing share price for twenty four consecutive 
months before debt issuance, and (b) non-missing firm characteristics such as assets, long 
term debts, outstanding shares, and EBIT at the end of the fiscal year following the debt 
issuance. In the last stage, I remove contracts with the same issuer, month, and year of 
issuance. I filter outliers with negative or zero sales or assets, and firms with negative 
EBITDA larger than assets. Ultimately, I have 3323 (984) investment (non-investment) 
private contracts, including private placements and bank loans, and 2929 (1843) 
investment (non-investment) grade public bonds in my sample; see Appendix 3.A. 
3.3.2 Methodology 
Since, the focus of this study is on the impact of systematic risk on the real cost of 
debt, I follow Cooper and Davydenko (2007) to disentangle the premium for default risk 
from the real cost of debt. I also follow Graham et al. (2008) for modelling debt spreads 
and testing the impact of systematic risk. My baseline model is: 
 
where Log (Net spread) is the logarithm of the yield spread net of premium for default 
as the dependent variable. This variable is constructed as follows. For bank loans, I 
follow Graham, Li, and Qiu (2008) and use the spread which is usually charged over an 
index, such as LIBOR, as the cost of debt28. For corporate bonds, I calculate the spread 
                                                 
28 To control the maturity for spread in bank loans, I use the average of all AAA rating as a benchmark instead 
of those with the same maturity to have the spreads comparable between public and private debts. 
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between the yield-to-maturity of the issue and the average yield of AAA corporate 
bonds29 at the issuance date since most public issues have fixed coupons. I find that 
LIBOR is more correlated to the yield of AAA corporate bonds than that of Treasury, 
i.e., 86% compared to 80% during my sample period (both are statistically significant at 
the 1% level). This makes the cost of debt between public and private debts more 
homogeneous. 
The remaining variables are Public, a dummy variable that equals one if the contract 
is public and zero otherwise. Beta represents systematic risk extracted from CAPM or 
Fama and French (1992) three-factor model30. As the estimated betas are positively 
skewed, I use the natural logarithm of Beta as a measure of systematic risk. The coefficient 
of interaction between Public and log (Beta) is my main interest. In fact, this coefficient 
shows the difference in the impact of systematic risk on real cost of debt in public versus 
private debts. Based on my hypothesis, the coefficient 3 is positive (negative) and 
significant for investment (non-investment) grade debts. Control variables are firm 
characteristics (cash flow volatility, profitability, tangibility, market-to-book  and 
leverage), contract details (type of contracts, credit ratings, callable bonds, performance 
pricing, and purpose of debts), and macroeconomic factors, which are used in Graham 
et al. (2008). Instead of Altman’s (1968) Z-score, I use KMV-Merton distance to default 
(see Crosbie & Bohn, 2003), which is more informative because it takes into account 
the volatility and the value of assets. I also control for Industry fixed-effect (ɷi), and for 
non-bank debts with dummy variables. 
                                                 
29 A considerable portion of the yield spread between Treasury and corporate bonds is related to taxes; see, 
e.g. Elton et al. (2001) and Liu, Shi, Wang, and Wu (2007). Therefore, the yield spread of a bond over an 
AAA corporate bond issue is more comparable to the yield spread over LIBOR in bank loans.  
30 To ensure that missing prices or illiquid trading do not induce biases in systematic risk estimates, I use a 
two-year trailing period of monthly stock returns and CRSP value-weighted return before debt issuance. 
This time frame is sufficient to estimate the systematic risk and does not linger long enough to create a 
significant change in the systematic risk of the firm. In addition, since the average time between the two 
issues of the same firm is about twenty three months in my sample, this period minimizes the overlap of 
the period in calculation of the systematic risk. 
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3.4 Empirical tests and results 
3.4.1 Univariate results 
 
Table 3.1 shows the yearly distribution of public and private contracts for investment 
and non-investment grade issues. The number of contracts for each type is balanced in all 
years except during financial crisis in 2008 and 2009.  
[Table 3.1] 
It shows that in each year, a substantial number of investment grade borrowers issue 
private debt. Moreover, a significant increase in private debts with rating is observed 
after 1995. 
Table 3.2 shows firm and contract specification of public and private debt issuers for 
investment and non-investment grade issuances, separately.  
[Table 3.2] 
The average (median) size and maturity of public investment grade debts is $291M 
($200M) and 15.6 (12.2) years respectively. The average (median) size and maturity 
of investment grade private debts were $222M ($65M) and 7 (5) years respectively. These 
results are close to Denis and Mihov (2003) who study the determinants of placement 
structure of debt. The profitability, leverage, and tangibility are also comparable. 
However, due to the difference in the sample period, (1990-2011 in this paper as opposed 
to 1995-1996 in Denis and Mihov, 2003), the average of total assets is larger in my 
sample. 
[Table 3.3] 
As demonstrated in Table 3.3, public investment grade issuers have a significantly 
lower beta than private investment grade issuers while I find the opposite for 
non-investment grade issuers. Public debt issuers are more profitable, tangible, and 
stable in terms of cash flow volatility compared to private debt issuers. They have also 
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higher (lower) distance to default (leverage). The comparison of debt contract 
specifications in Table 3.3 shows that the spread in private debts is larger than that of 
public ones. Nevertheless, the difference is negligible for speculative debts. The 
comparison between investment and non-investment grade issuers also shows that 
speculative debts have higher spread, lower maturity, and size. Non-investment grade 
issuers are also less profitable, have lower distance to default, and have lower proportion 
of debt with maturity longer than three years compared to investment grade issuers. In 
sum, private and public debts are significantly different in terms of contract and issuer 
characteristics. Therefore, a multivariate analysis is needed to compare the systematic 
risk of the different group of borrowers 
3.4.2 The impact of systematic risk on the net spread 
To test my hypothesis on the impact of systematic risk on the net spread, I estimate 
equation (1) with an OLS regression. Table 3.4, Panel A displays estimates robust to 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (clustered at industry level) with betas estimated 
from CAPM and FF models, respectively. In parallel to my hypothesis, the coefficient of 
interaction between systematic risk and public dummy is positive for investment grade 
debts and statistically significant at 5% level; see columns (1) and (2). The impact is also 
economically significant. Based on this model, the impact of systematic risk on the real 
cost of debt is almost 16% higher than that in private debt. 
[Table 3.4] 
The coefficients of the control variables are consistent with Graham et al. (2008). Public 
debts have lower spread. Increases in profitability and tangibility reduce the real cost of 
debt while an increase in leverage, maturity, and size increases Net spread. The 
coefficient of D-to-D (Distance to Default) is positive and surprising at first glance. 
However, as I separate the premium for default in the spread, an increase in D-to-D 
diminishes the portion of spread related to default and leaves a higher spread related to 
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the real cost of debt. 
I conduct the same test on non-investment grade debts; see columns (3) and (4). In 
parallel to my hypothesis, the coefficient of the interaction between log (Beta) and Public 
is negative and statistically significant at 1% level. The impact of systematic risk is about 
18% lower in public debts for non-investment grade debts in contrast to investment 
grade debts. 
Despite the fact that my results are robust to different measurements of yield, one could 
argue that the spreads in loans and bonds are not homogeneous as LIBOR is a floating 
rate index. To address this concern, first I highlight the issue that my tests are 
conducted on spreads at the time of issuance where both LIBOR and corporate bond 
yields are deterministic. Second, I propose an alternative methodology for calculating 
yields. In fact, if a floating rate borrower bought a swap contract with the same maturity 
of the loan, it looked like it had issued a debt with fixed coupon payments equal to the 
swap rate plus the loan spread. In addition, since the face value of the loan is the amount 
that the borrower receives from the lender, I assume that this virtual bond is issued at 
par and consequently its yield is equal to coupon payments. The issue of upfront or 
annual fees in bank loans does not weaken my assumption of issuing a loan at par, as 
the all-in-spread item in LPC DealScan includes all fees including upfront and annual 
fixed charges. In this context, I have the yields for both public and private debts, which 
enables me to generate the spread based on a single index such as yields in AAA 
corporate bonds. The credit spread paid for swap contracts is negligible for investment 
grade debt issuers, but it is considerable for firms with a low credit rating. It should be 
noted that the data for swap rates with different maturities is available for years on and 
after 2000. Therefore, the drawback of this estimate is that my results are limited to 
investment grade debts after 2000. 
Table 3.4, Panel B, reports the results based on this measurement of spreads. As 
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reported in columns (1) and (2) of the table, the calculation of spread does not alter the 
coefficient of interplay between public debts and systematic risk. For both betas estimated 
by CAPM and FF models, the sign of interaction is positive and significant at 5% and is 
not significantly different from those in previous test. Altogether, these results strongly 
support my hypothesis and highlight the different impact of systematic risk in public and 
private debt for investment grade and non-investment grade debts, separately. 
However, in doing all estimates with spreads based on Treasury and spreads based on 
corporate bonds with the same maturity, I find similar results. Moreover, I have a dummy 
variable for public debt in my model that assumes a distinct intercept for spread in public 
and private debts and control for unobservable differences in the two types of debts. 
3.4.3 Impact of systematic risk on placement structure of debt 
To test whether debt issuers identify this interaction, I infer that investment grade issuers 
with high systematic risk are less likely to issue public debt while the relation for non-
investment grade issues is the opposite. Following Denis and Mihov (2003), I implement 
the following Logit regression: 
 
where, Public is equal to one if debt issued is public and zero otherwise. Control variables 
are those used in Denis and Mihov (2003). To this baseline model, I also add the 
(logarithm of) age of the issuing firm, cash flow volatility, credit supply (quarterly GDP 
growth rate) as well as competition in choosing between public and private debts 
(Herfindahl index based on sales and two-digit SIC); see Krishnaswami, Spindt, and 
Subramaniam (1999) and Morellec et al. (2013). To proxy for information asymmetries, 
I also include the number of analysts covering the firm and idiosyncratic risk (measured 
by the standard deviation of the residual in the CAPM or FF models) in the model. In 
contrast to Denis and Mihov (2003), I conduct my test on investment and non-investment 
     1Prob 2i i i iDebt issuance Public Log Beta         ΓX
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grade issuers separately.31 
[Table 3.5] 
 
Table 3.5 reports the estimates robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation 
(clustered at industry level). Column (1) and (2) show the coefficients with betas extracted 
from CAPM and FF models, respectively. As expected, the coefficient of log of Beta 
is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. However, as reported in column 
(3) and (4), this coefficient is positive and (not) significant at 5% level for CAPM (FF) 
betas in non- investment grade debts. Investment grade debt issuers with high systematic 
risk are less (more) likely to issue a public debt. For instance, a 1% increase in 
systematic risk (CAPM) decreases the odds of issuing a public debt by 12% for 
investment grade issuers. The same increase in systematic risk would increase the odds of 
issuing public debt by 28% for speculative debts. This shows how debt issuers identify the 
distinct impact of systematic risk on the cost of public and private debts. The coefficients 
of the control variables are consistent with Denis and Mihov (2003), Krishnaswami et 
al. (1999) and Morellec et al. (2013). Information asymmetries are important factors 
in the placement structure of debt. In parallel to previous findings, the coefficient 
associated to the number of analysts (idiosyncratic risk) is positive (negative) and 
statistically significant at 1% level. Moreover, larger, older, and more profitable firms 
are more likely to issue public debts. Leverage and the proportion of debts with maturity 
longer than three years have an opposite sign for investment grade issuers compared to 
the estimates in Denis and Mihov (2003), but not so for speculative issuers. In parallel 
to Morellec et al. (2013), cash flow volatility and credit supply have a negative 
impact on issuing public debt particularly for non-speculative debts, but I do not 
                                                 
31 An alternative test is the use of dummy for speculative debts and its interaction with log (beta), conducting the test on 
whole sample. The results are consistent with those in equation (2). I report the results with this model to have 
consistency with equation (1) and propensity score matching reported in next section. 
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find any significant impact from competition on the placement structure of debt. 
In parallel to previous studies, I also conduct the tests with other variables such as 
the amount of issue instead of size (Krishnaswami et al.,1999), a dummy for bankruptcy 
(Z-score < 1.81) instead of profitability (Denis and Mihov, 2003), and the product market 
fluidity index (Hoberg, Philips, and Prabhala, 2012) instead of the Herfindahl index 
(Morellec et al., 2013). The results are qualitatively similar. 
3.5 Selection biases and simultaneity 
3.5.1 Propensity score matching 
To implement this test, I use the same control variables as in equation (2). With 
propensity scores generated by this model, I match each public debt issuer with private 
debt issuers whose propensity score is not more than 0.005 different (caliper 0.005) 
with replacement32. 
[Table 3.6] 
 
Table 3.6, Panel A and B report the results with Log of Beta extracted from the CAPM 
and FF models for investment grade debts, respectively. The mean (median) of Log of 
Beta estimated with the CAPM is 7% (5%) lower for public debt issuers compared to 
private debt issuers; this difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. The mean 
(median) of FF systematic risk of public debt issuers is 6% (4%) lower than that of private 
debt issuers and statistically significant at the 1% level. The propensity score matching 
significantly reduces the mean (median) of biases to 4.1% (3.1%) and 5.6% (6.3%) 
for CAPM and FF tests, respectively. The results for non-investment grade issues are 
reported in Panel C and D. I find that the mean (median) of Log of Beta estimated by 
CAPM model of non-investment grade public debt issuers is 25% (21%) higher than that 
                                                 
32 All of the estimates are obtained using Leuven and Sianesi (2003) psmatch2 and pstest programs for Stata. 
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of private issuers (p-value < 1%). However, this difference is only 2% (1%) for Log of 
Beta extracted from FF model and is not significant. Propensity score matching 
significantly reduces the bias in this test as well. The mean (median) of biases is 4.0% 
(3.0%) and 4.9% (4.3%) for the CAPM and FF models, respectively. 
3.5.2 Loan rating in secondary market and Diff-in-Diff estimates 
Despite the fact that the low biases in observable variables diminishes the likelihood 
of the impact of unobservable variables on the result, the concern of the selection bias 
from unobservable variables and simultaneity remains. 
To address this issue, I need to define a factor with potential influence on the “hold to 
maturity” strategy of investors in the private debt market but exogenous to the 
characteristic and investment strategies of firms with respect to public debts. In this 
context, I test the impact of this exogenous factor on the difference between the systematic 
risk of private and public debt issuers. 
To do so, I turn my attention to the introduction of loan rating in 1995 in the secondary 
loan market. This credit rating service was largely welcome in the market. For instance, 
by 2004, 30% of public firms had a loan rating while they did not have such credit 
figures in 1995; see Sufi (2009). Also, as shown in Table 3.1, there is a significant increase 
in the number of rated private debts that starts in 1996, particularly for  non-investment 
grade debts. This loan rating service increases liquidity in the secondary market. It 
facilitates investment in private loans by investors such as CDOs or specialized loan 
funds who have limited resources in monitoring these issuers. As a result, the 
introduction of loan ratings has had significant impact on the trading volume of loans, e.g., 
from $8B in 1991 to $520B in year 2007 (Figure 3.2) and consequently, on the investment 
behavior of private lenders. 
[Figure 3.2] 
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As discussed in Parlour and Plantin (2008), banks have two incentives in selling their 
loan portfolio in the market. They trade the loans with poor performance based on their 
private information, or they offer the loan in the secondary market to raise funds and exploit 
new investment opportunities. An active secondary market is an indication of low adverse 
selection risk. In liquid markets, new investment opportunities are the main incentive 
of trading loans. In this context, private credit markets migrate from relationship lending 
to the trade-oriented like bond market; see Effenberger (2003), Kiff and 
Morrow (2003) and Rule (2001). Lenders who aim to resell the loan individually (or as 
part of a structured product) in the secondary market ask for a higher systematic risk 
premium. Consequently, potential buyers allocate more weight on public information and 
market conditions in pricing loans. Altogether, I consider the introduction of loan rating 
in 1995 as a natural quasi-experiment. Hence, the difference in pricing related to 
systematic risk in private and public debt should vanish after this year. To test this 
argument, I split my sample to until and to after 1996. I assume a one year delay to assure 
the rating would be obtained by a number of borrowers and settled in the market. I also 
focus on investment grade debts to assure that the incentive of offering these loans was 
not based on the private information about the poor performance of the loan that 
minimizes the risk of adverse selection. Since the introduction of loan rating is 
exogenous to investment strategies in the public debt market, I conduct a 
difference-in-differences estimate between the systematic risk in public and private 
debts. 
As discussed, the introduction of loan rating shifted the private credit market from 
relationship lending toward a trade-oriented like bond market. As a result, the pricing 
of systematic risk in public and private debts converged after this event. Hence, the 
difference between the beta of public and private debt issuers should vanish accordingly. 
To test this prediction, I implement a propensity score matching between private and 
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public debts before and after 1996 based on firms and macroeconomic variables used in 
model (2). Then, I compare the differences between systematic risk of public and 
private debt issuers before and after this event. 
[Table 3.7] 
 
Table 3.7, Panel A, reports the results for beta extracted from CAPM model. Before the 
event, the mean (median) of Log of Beta of public debt issuers is 9% (7%) lower than 
that of private debt issuers and is statistically significant at the 1% level. This difference 
alters to 4% (6%) higher and is not significant (57% and 56% p-value for mean and 
median, respectively) after the event. The difference between the mean (median) of the 
gaps is 14% (9%) and is significant at 1% level. In parallel to my prediction, private 
lenders incline to trade the loan in secondary market after the introduction of loan rating. 
Consequently, private loans, like public debts, are also exposed to systematic risk. 
Therefore, the difference between Log of Beta of private and public debts issuers 
diminishes after 1996. As shown in Panel B, the same trend exists for Log of Beta as 
estimated with the FF model. The mean (median) of systematic risk of public debt 
issuers is 6% (6%) lower than that of private debt issuers and significant at 5% level until 
1996 while this difference is 4% (6%) higher after and is not significant (17% and 25% 
p-value for mean and median, respectively). The mean (median) difference between the 
gaps of systematic risk of private and public debt issuers before and after 1996 is 10% 
(9%) and significant at 5% level.  In parallel to results based on CAPM beta, my analysis 
shows that systematic risk of private and public debt borrowers converged after the 
introduction of loan rating in the secondary market. 
Since systematic risk is a major determinant of the real cost of debt, I expect an increase 
in the correlation between the spreads of public and private debts after the introduction of 
loan rating. This correlation is -29% (not different from 0, p-value = 52%) before and 49% 
(different from 0, p-value = 4.6%) after 1996. The correlation between annual medians is 
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-28% (p-value = 54%) before and 53% (p-value = 2.6%) after 1996. Consistent with my 
results in difference-in-differences estimates, the costs of private and public debt are more 
correlated after the introduction of loan ratings. 
3.5.3 Who benefits from loan rating in secondary market? 
My analysis reveals that the loan rating exposes private debts to systematic risk. 
Moreover, the results in Table 3.4 shows that in general the cost of public debts, 
( coefficient of Public dummy), is significantly (somehow) lower (higher) than private 
debts for investment (non-investment) grade debts. Therefore, a borrower with high credit 
quality prefers to issue public debt rather than a private debt with rating unless it 
has a high systematic risk. In this case, a borrower would issue a private debt to reduce 
the impact of systematic risk on its cost of debt. This borrower also does not like to 
trade its debt in secondary market since it increases the impact of systematic risk 
on its cost of debt. Therefore, I expect that investment grade borrowers with high 
systematic risk do not apply for loan rating. However, this interrelation does not exist 
for borrowers with low credit quality for three reasons. First, the cost of public debt 
is higher for these firms as indicated in Table 3.4. Second, loan rating reduces 
information asymmetries for these firms and reduces their cost of debt. Third, the 
premium for default risk is high for these firms. As a result, loan rating increases the 
potential of trading their debt in the market where private lenders could share the risk 
of default with other lenders and reduce the premium for default risk. As shown in Table 
3.1, loan rating is more welcome by non-investment grade borrowers. From 1995, the 
number of rated speculative debts exceeded the number of non-rated ones in contrast to 
investment grade debts. Sufi (2009) also explains that the introduction of loan rating 
was at the benefit of low credit quality borrowers who increased their level of debt and 
investment after 1995. To analyze the consistency of my results to these arguments, I 
conduct two empirical tests. First, I implement equation (2) but instead of Public dummy 
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as dependent variable, I use Private Rated, a dummy that equals one if the firm has a 
loan rating and zero otherwise. I also limit my sample to private debts.  
[Table 3.8] 
 
These results are reported in Table 3.8. As predicted, the coefficient of Log of Beta  
(CAPM or FF) is negative and statistically significant at 5% level for investment grade 
firms. It means that investment grade borrowers with high systematic risk are less likely 
to apply for loan rating. However, the coefficient of Log of Beta is not statistically 
significant for speculative debt issuers. It shows that systematic risk does not demonstrate 
any impact on applying for loan rating for non-investment grade firms. To test the 
different impact of obtaining loan rating on the cost of debt in investment and 
non-investment grade debts, I re-estimate equation (1) with two additional dummies, Loan 
Rating (equal to one if a firm applies for rating and zero otherwise) and Speculative 
(equal to one for non-investment grade debts and zero otherwise). I also add the 
interaction of these dummies to the model. The corresponding coefficient captures the 
marginal impact of applying loan rating for high yield debts. 
[Table 3.9] 
Table 3.9 reports the result. In parallel to previous findings, Loan Rating reduces the 
cost of debt but not significantly. The coefficient of Loan Rating × Speculative is 
negative and significant at 1% level. The reduction in cost of debt by obtaining a loan 
rating is about 35% higher for non-investment grade debt issuers compared to 
investment grade debts. Consequently, speculative debt issuers are more likely to apply 
for loan rating to reduce their cost of debt. 
 
3.5.4 Other robustness tests 
As a robustness test, I conduct my tests on total spread including default risk 
premium and I do not find any difference between the impact of systematic risk on total 
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spread in public and private debts. I control specific debt contracts in all tests by 
assigning a dummy variable to them. However, to make sure that the results are not 
biased with these observations, I remove specific contracts and conduct my tests. For 
instance, I remove callable bonds in private and public debts and test the models. In 
private debts, I exclude non-bank loans, line of credits, and loans with performance 
pricing. In all tests, I find results qualitatively similar to the main test. 
To have a more homogenous sample of private and public debt issuers, I exclude 
those who issued only public or only private debt during the sample period. As a result, 
I have at least one private and one public contract from the same borrower but in different 
periods. I do find consistent results with this reduced sample. Even changes in systematic 
risk of a borrower could influence its preference between private and public debts. I 
also apply difference-in-differences estimates in years 1993 and 2005 (placebo test) , far 
from the 1995 event. In all tests, I do not find any significant difference between the 
systematic risk in public and private contract before and after these years. 
3.6 Conclusion 
The literature has shown strong evidence that systematic risk is a major pricing 
factor in yield spreads, even for borrowers with low probability of default. I have argued 
that this pricing factor is less important for an investor who holds the debt security until 
its maturity. Since private investors are more likely to follow the “hold-to-maturity” 
strategy, the impact of systematic risk is lower in private debts compared to public debts. 
However, when the probability of default is high, the “hold-to-maturity” strategy is 
less likely and systematic risk increases the premium for default risk.  
Based on this argument, I have provided empirical evidence that systematic risk has 
higher impact on the real cost of debt (net of premium for default) in public debts 
compared to private debts for investment grade debts while this relation is in opposite 
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for speculative debts. I also find that investment (non-investment) grade borrowers with 
private debt agreement have higher (lower) systematic risk. Borrowers also consider the 
difference of the impact of systematic risk on the cost of debt in private and public debt 
and on the placement structure of their debts. The propensity score matching results 
reaffirm that the difference in systematic risk in public and private debt borrowers is 
not biased by firm characteristics.  
I have also presented my analysis of the impact of introducing in 1995 loan rating in 
the secondary market on the interplay between systematic risk and placement structure 
of debt. I find that the difference between systematic risk of private and public debt 
holders vanishes after the introduction of a loan rating service. The change in “hold to 
maturity” strategy of private lenders and its relation to market risk premium is the 
best explanation for this convergence of systematic risk in public and private debts. Last 
but not least, I have shown that investment grade borrowers with high systematic risk are 
less likely to obtain a loan rating. In parallel to previous findings, I have also 
demonstrated that obtaining a loan rating is more beneficial for non-investment grade 
borrowers. 
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Appendix 3.A: Sample Construction 
This table describes each stage of sample selection and the detail of observations in each step. 
 
 Deals 
 Private Public 
LPC DealScan database   
Loans in LPC from 1990 to2011 34451  
Keep borrowers publicly traded in the US capital market 6016  
Drop non-USD loans, special purpose loans, less than one year maturity, 
and financials, and firms with SIC code starts with 9 
5604  
SDC database   
Deals with valid CUSIP from 1990 to 2011 9598 
Drop 1-digi SIC equal to 6 or 9, non-USD bonds, and with less than one 
year maturity 
3695 5969 
Total 9299 5969 
Merge with CRSP-COMPUSTAT database and drop firms with missing 
share price in last 24 month before issuing debt, negative or zero asset or 
sales, with negative EBITDA larger than assets, those with available data 
for less than 3 consecutive years before issuing debt and, those issue public 
and private debt in the same month and year  
4303 4772 
Investment (Non-investment) grade classification 3323(984) 2929(1843) 
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Appendix 3.B: Data Definitions 
Variable name  Description 
COMPUSTAT 
Item 
Firm 
characteristics 
  
Asset volatility σa in calculation of distance to default.   
Assets Book value of total assets. Data6 
Age The number of years between the first year of observation in 
CRSP/COMPUSTAT database and the year of debt issuance.  
 
Beta Beta extracted from CAPM or Fama and French (1992) model using 
the trailing 2 years of monthly returns data before debt issuance.  
 
Callable dummy Equal one if bond is callable.  
Cash flow 
volatility 
Standard deviation of cash flows in last 5 years, minimum three 
consecutive years, before debt issuance. 
 
Credit rating 
dummies 
Dummy variable for each S&P credit ratings, including AAA, AA, A, 
BBB, BB, and B or worse. I have also a separate dummy for firms 
without rating. 
  
Debt > 3 year The portion of total debt with maturity longer than 3 year.  (Data93+data94)/(d
ata9+data34) 
D-to-D  Distance-to-default (Crosbie and Bohn, 2003) based on KMV-Merton 
model = (Va-D)/Vaσa  
where Va is the value of the assets, D is half of long term debt plus 
debt in current liabilities. 
 σa is the volatility of the assets. Since Va and σa are not observable, I 
approximate them by  
solving Merton’s (1974) model of pricing firm’s debt and value of the 
equity for 1-year period: 
  
Ve = VaN(d1)-e-rDN(d2) and σe = N(d1)Vaσa/Ve. 
d1 = (ln(Va/D)+r+0.5σa2) σa and d2 = d1- σa . 
EBITDA Earnings Before Interest, Taxes, Depreciation, and Amortizations. Data13 + data15 + 
data16 
HHI  Herfindahl index based on three-digit SIC level and firms’ net sales.  
Industry dummy Industry dummies are based on two-digit SIC code.  
Insider 
ownership 
Shares held by insiders divided by total number of shares.  Closely Held 
Shares item in 
DataStream. 
Leverage Long term plus debt in liabilities divided by total assets. (Data9+data34)/dat
a6 
Market to book (Market value of equity at fiscal year-end +  
total assets – book value of equity)/Total assets. 
(data199 × data25 
+ data6 – 
data60)/data6 
Profitability EBITDA/Assets. (data13 + data15 + 
data16)/data6 
Tangibility Net Properties, Plant and Equipment divided 
 by total assets. 
Data8 / data6 
Zero outstanding 
debt dummy 
One if there is no outstanding debt before issuing date of debt.  
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Appendix 3.B – continued 
Variable name  Description COMPUSTAT Item 
Debt characteristics   
Amount Amount of debt in dollars.  
Maturity Debt maturity in month. 
 
Callable dummy 
Equal one if debt is a callable bond and zero 
otherwise. 
 
Debt purpose Dummy variable for each loan purpose, 
including corporate purpose, working capital, 
debt repayment, acquisition, commercial paper 
backup, and others. 
  
Debt type Dummy variable for each type, including term 
loan, revolver, notes, and bonds. 
 
Performance dummy Equal one if the credit agreement uses 
performance pricing. 
 
Public (Private) dummy One if the debt contract is public (private) and 
zero otherwise. 
 
Seniority dummy One if debt is senior and zero if it is 
subordinated. 
 
Non-bank dummy One if debt is private but is not a bank loan 
and zero otherwise. 
 
Expected Default Loss (δ) Yield equivalent of expected default loss 
based on Cooper and Davydenko (2007). First, 
I solve for asset volatility (σ) and debt 
maturity (T) from Merton (1974) risky debt 
pricing model. 
(1-PD)=N(d1)-PDesTN(d2) and σE(1-PD)= 
σN(d1) in which PD is market leverage, s is 
spread, σE is equity volatility, N(.) is the 
cumulative normal distribution function, d1=[-
ln(PD)-(s-0.5σ2)T]/( σ√𝑇 ), and d2=d1- σ√𝑇. 
Then δ is: 
δ = -(1/T)ln[e(π-s)TN(-d1 – (rE – r)⁡√𝑇/ 
σE)/PD+N(d2+(rE – r)⁡√𝑇/ σE)]. 
 
 
Spreadloan All-in spread charged by the bank over 
LIBOR reported in DealScan database. 
  
Spreadbond Yield of the bond – average yield of AAA 
issues in the same month and year of bond 
issue. 
 
Net spread Spreadloan(bond) – δ  
Others   
Term spread  The difference between the yields of 10-year 
and 1-year Treasury bonds. 
  
GDP growth rate Real GDP quarterly growth.  
Credit spread The difference between the yields of average 
BAA and AAA corporate bonds. 
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Figure 3.1: Sensitivity (Delta) of an out of the money and at the money put option 
Stock price is $100. Strike price is $100 for at the money (ATM) and $50 for out of the money options. Risk free is 3% and dividend is 
zero. T is time to maturity in years.           
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Table 3.1: Description of Sample by Year, Investment Grade, and Placement Type 
This table provides the number of sample public and private debt contracts in each year for investment and non-investment 
grade debts, separately.  
 
 Investment Grade  Non-investment Grade 
year 
Private Debt 
Not Rated 
Private Debt 
Rated 
Public 
Debt 
Total  
Private Debt 
Not Rated 
Private 
Debt 
Rated 
Public 
Debt 
Total 
1990 198 1 79 278  26 0 7 33 
1991 194 7 172 373  11 0 24 35 
1992 155 18 136 309  7 0 55 62 
1993 158 19 151 328  3 3 49 55 
1994 164 21 102 287  6 2 25 33 
1995 180 11 156 347  4 9 30 43 
1996 201 18 148 367  5 21 37 63 
1997 196 31 181 408  37 75 18 130 
1998 196 27 245 468  29 87 21 137 
1999 196 60 143 399  16 66 22 104 
2000 133 37 101 271  24 16 12 52 
2001 147 48 119 314  21 64 20 105 
2002 175 41 144 360  16 63 30 109 
2003 159 47 132 338  4 97 36 137 
2004 75 18 75 168  2 72 29 103 
2005 33 14 71 118  1 70 15 86 
2006 34 8 82 124  1 24 33 58 
2007 29 3 105 137  1 30 24 55 
2008 22 10 125 157  0 8 25 33 
2009 21 2 178 201  0 20 87 107 
2010 40 2 134 176  2 6 142 150 
2011 151 23 150 324  12 23 118 153 
Total 2857 466 2,929 6,252  228 756 859 1,843 
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Table 3.2: Descriptive Statistic of Sample 
Panel A (B) describes sample debt (firm) characteristics for investment and non-investment grade debts, separately. 
Definition of variables is available in Appendix B. 
 
Panel A: Debt Contracts Specifications 
   Investment Grade 
 Public  Private 
 mean SD p10 p50 p90  mean SD p10 p50 p90 
Spread 69 81 10 46 141  227 152 54 213 400 
Net spread 59 70 8 40 121  188 113 50 175 335 
δ 10 28 0 1 27  42 82 0 6 141 
Amount (m$) 291 368 25 200 650  222 504 10 65 550 
Maturity  (month) 187 162 24 122 365  84 70 24 62 146 
Non-bank dummy - - - - -  0.38 0.49 0.00 0.00 1.00 
Callable dummy 0.17 0.38 0.00 0.00 1.00  0.01 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Seniority dummy 0.99 0.08 1.00 1.00 1.00  0.98 0.15 1.00 1.00 1.00 
# of Observations 1359  2889 
   Non-investment Grade 
Spread 261 161 89 232 477  260 155 97 237 455 
Net spread 173 116 39 160 322  162 122 38 140 299 
δ 82 114 0 33 234  90 124 0 39 235 
Amount (m$) 301 228 100 250 600  255 339 25 160 500 
Maturity (month) 116 67 73 121 133  98 56 48 101 122 
Non-bank dummy - - - - -  0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Callable dummy 0.72 0.45 0.00 1.00 1.00  0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Seniority dummy 0.76 0.43 0.00 1.00 1.00  0.70 0.46 0.00 1.00 1.00 
# of Observations 859  984 
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Table 3.2 - continued 
Panel B: Firm Specifications 
Investment Grade 
 Public  Private 
 mean SD p10 p50 p90  mean SD p10 p50 p90 
Assets (m$) 21362 33379 1837 10407 45027  3883 11844 53 635 9678 
Log of Beta (CAPM) -0.34 0.81 -1.27 -0.16 0.42  -0.11 0.88 -1.13 0.04 0.76 
Log of Beta (FF) -0.28 0.78 -1.20 -0.11 0.46  -0.12 0.87 -1.13 0.04 0.77 
Idiosyncratic risk (CAPM) 0.07 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.10  0.11 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.20 
Idiosyncratic risk (FF) 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.10  0.11 0.06 0.05 0.10 0.19 
Cash Flow SD. 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.04  0.05 0.14 0.01 0.03 0.10 
Profitability 0.15 0.06 0.08 0.14 0.23  0.12 0.11 0.04 0.12 0.22 
Tangibility 0.43 0.24 0.12 0.39 0.78  0.38 0.24 0.09 0.33 0.74 
Market-to-book 1.75 0.91 1.06 1.45 2.75  1.61 1.20 0.93 1.31 2.51 
Leverage 0.32 0.12 0.18 0.32 0.47  0.35 0.21 0.13 0.33 0.59 
D-to-D 14.94 5.72 8.62 14.06 22.83  9.75 4.97 4.56 8.70 16.56 
Age 36.08 15.14 13.00 39.00 54.00  18.74 14.61 3.00 15.00 42.00 
Debt Maturity > 3 years 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.10 0.29  0.16 0.31 0.00 0.09 0.41 
Zero outstanding debt 0.01 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.03 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Insider ownership 0.09 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.26  0.20 0.21 0.00 0.13 0.52 
# of Observations 2929  3323 
Non-investment Grade 
Assets (m$) 5127 7351 479 2276 11871  2652 4736 181 1129 6662 
Log of Beta (CAPM) 0.11 0.84 -0.78 0.23 0.93  -0.03 0.90 -1.10 0.09 0.90 
Log of Beta (FF) 0.03 0.80 -0.94 0.20 0.85  -0.06 0.98 -1.32 0.14 0.93 
Idiosyncratic risk (CAPM) 0.12 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.20  0.14 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.22 
Idiosyncratic risk (FF) 0.11 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.19  0.13 0.06 0.07 0.12 0.21 
Cash Flow SD. 0.05 0.07 0.01 0.03 0.12  0.06 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.11 
Profitability 0.11 0.09 0.04 0.11 0.19  0.11 0.10 0.04 0.11 0.20 
Tangibility 0.45 0.29 0.05 0.44 0.86  0.40 0.28 0.06 0.36 0.83 
Market-to-book 1.39 0.49 0.95 1.28 1.96  1.43 0.73 0.92 1.26 2.07 
Leverage 0.46 0.19 0.25 0.44 0.70  0.47 0.21 0.21 0.45 0.71 
D-to-D 8.51 3.94 4.16 7.83 13.58  7.97 3.66 4.04 7.36 12.42 
Age 19.54 15.00 4.00 15.00 42.00  14.79 12.71 3.00 10.00 34.00 
Debt Maturity > 3 years 0.20 0.22 0.00 0.13 0.51  0.17 0.24 0.00 0.08 0.49 
Zero outstanding debt 0.01 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.00  0.02 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Insider ownership 0.18 0.20 0.00 0.12 0.48  0.25 0.23 0.00 0.20 0.59 
# of Observations 859  984 
                                                                                             
 
 
Table 3.3: Debt and Firm Characteristic Comparison 
This table compares the mean and median of debt (firm) characteristics based on investment grade and placement type, separately. Definition of variables is available in Appendix B. *, ** and *** 
represents 10%, 5% and 1% significant level of the t-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum Z-test for the mean and median comparisons, respectively. 
 
  (Public) – (Private)  (Investment) – (Non-investment) 
  Investment Grade  Non-investment Grade  Public  Private 
  Diff. in mean Diff. in median  Diff. in mean Diff. in median  Diff. in mean Diff. in median  Diff. in mean Diff. in median 
D
eb
t 
C
o
n
tr
ac
ts
 
S
p
ec
if
ic
at
io
n
s Spread -158*** -166***  1 -5  -192*** -186***  -33*** -24*** 
Net spread -130*** -135***  11* 20**  -114*** -120***  26*** 35*** 
δ -33*** -6***  -8 -6  -72*** -32***  -48*** -33*** 
Amount (m$) 69.00*** 135.00***  46.00*** 90.00***  -10.00 -50.00***  -33.00* -95.00*** 
Maturity (month) 102.42*** 60***  18.18*** 20.00*  70.61*** 1.00***  -13.63*** -39.00*** 
F
ir
m
 S
p
ec
if
ic
at
io
n
s 
Assets (m$) 17479*** 9772***  2475*** 1147***  16235*** 8131***  1230** -494*** 
Log of Beta (CAPM) -0.23*** -0.20***  0.14*** 0.14***  -0.45*** -0.39***  -0.08*** -0.05*** 
Log of Beta (FF) -0.16*** -0.15***  0.09** 0.06  -0.31*** -0.31***  -0.06 -0.10** 
Idio. risk (CAPM) -0.04*** -0.04***  -0.02*** -0.01***  -0.05*** -0.05***  -0.03*** -0.02*** 
Idio. risk (FF) -0.05*** -0.04***  -0.02*** -0.02***  -0.05*** -0.04***  -0.02*** -0.02*** 
Cash Flow SD -0.03*** -0.01***  -0.01 0.00  -0.03*** -0.01***  -0.01 -0.01*** 
Profitability 0.03*** 0.02***  0.00 0.00  0.04*** 0.03***  0.01*** 0.01*** 
Tangibility 0.05*** 0.06***  0.05*** 0.07***  -0.02* -0.04***  -0.02** -0.04** 
Market-to-book 0.14*** 0.14***  -0.04 0.02  0.36*** 0.17***  0.18*** 0.05*** 
Leverage -0.03*** -0.01***  -0.01 -0.01  -0.14*** -0.12***  -0.11*** -0.12*** 
D-to-D 5.18*** 5.37***  0.55*** 0.47**  6.42*** 6.23***  1.79*** 1.33*** 
Age 17.34*** 24.00***  4.75*** 5.00***  16.54*** 24.00***  3.95*** 5.00*** 
LT debt  > 3 years -0.04*** 0.01***  0.02* 0.05***  -0.07*** -0.03**  -0.01 0.01 
Insider ownership -0.11*** -0.11***  -0.08*** -0.08***  -0.09*** -0.11***  -0.06*** -0.08*** 
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Table 3.4: Systematic Risk and Net Spread 
The dependent variable is the log of Net spread. In Panel A, column (1) and (2) reports the estimates based on equation (1) 
with Beta extracted from CAPM and Fama and French (1992) three-factor models respectively, for investment grade (IG) 
borrowers. Column (3) and (4) report the results with the same sequence for non-investment grade (NIG) issuers. In Panel B, 
for floating rate debts, LIBOR rate is replaced with SWAP rates as explained in the text and the results are reported with the 
same sequence as those in Panel A for investment grade debts. Definition of variables is available in Appendix B. t-statistics 
robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (clustered at industry level) are reported in brackets.  *, ** and *** represent 
10%, 5% and 1% significant level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: LIBOR as the Index rate 
 IG  NIG 
 
CAPM 
(1) 
FF 
(2) 
 
CAPM 
(3) 
FF 
(4) 
Public -1.625*** -1.552***  0.223 0.209 
 [8.07] [7.43]  [0.31] [0.29] 
Log of Beta 0.012 0.011  0.082* 0.102* 
 [0.50] [0.34]  [1.78] [1.76] 
Public × Log of Beta 0.165** 0.161***  -0.200*** -0.183*** 
 [2.56] [2.99]  [4.29] [3.01] 
Size -0.095*** -0.100***  -0.083** -0.089** 
 [2.97] [3.11]  [2.11] [2.08] 
Cash Flow volatility -0.041 -0.131  -0.195 -0.093 
 [0.24] [0.71]  [0.29] [0.13] 
Profitability -0.814** -1.284***  -0.860** -0.752* 
 [2.11] [5.26]  [2.19] [1.67] 
Tangibility -0.047 0.074  0.189 0.182 
 [0.34] [0.55]  [0.89] [0.73] 
Market to Book -0.031 -0.003  -0.028 -0.059 
 [1.11] [0.11]  [0.28] [0.58] 
Leverage 0.162 0.191  0.043 0.052 
 [1.08] [1.41]  [0.23] [0.28] 
D-to-D 0.014** 0.013*  0.004*** 0.004*** 
 [2.04] [1.81]  [2.68] [2.72] 
Amount 0.062** 0.076**  0.057 0.042 
 [2.10] [2.54]  [1.10] [0.74] 
Maturity 0.189*** 0.206***  -0.13 -0.114 
 [4.50] [4.35]  [1.00] [0.91] 
Credit Spread 79.499*** 80.515***  49.418*** 51.138*** 
 [14.11] [14.44]  [7.21] [7.04] 
Term Spread -6.765*** -6.468**  -13.389*** -14.180*** 
 [2.74] [2.61]  [4.11] [4.34] 
Industry FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Credit rating dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Performance pricing dummy Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Callable dummy Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Debt type dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Seniority dummy Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Debt purpose dummies Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Non-bank dummy Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
# of Observations 1936 1896  880 828 
Adjusted R2 0.48 0.48  0.31 0.29 
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Table 3.4 – Continued 
 
 IG 
 
CAPM 
(1) 
FF 
(2) 
Public -2.523*** -2.420*** 
 [10.97] [11.02] 
Log of Beta -0.095*** -0.035 
 [2.93] [1.14] 
Public × Log of Beta 0.142** 0.162** 
 [2.01] [2.16] 
Size -0.073* -0.074 
 [1.68] [1.60] 
Cash Flow volatility -0.001 -0.013 
 [0.01] [0.20] 
Profitability -1.014*** -0.886*** 
 [4.01] [3.46] 
Tangibility 0.163 0.177 
 [1.11] [1.33] 
Market to Book -0.032 -0.041 
 [0.80] [1.03] 
Leverage 0.427** 0.425** 
 [2.14] [2.11] 
D-to-D -0.035*** -0.031*** 
 [4.52] [4.17] 
Amount 0.031 0.005 
 [0.85] [0.13] 
Maturity 0.291*** 0.278*** 
 [4.60] [4.55] 
Credit Spread 71.853*** 71.393*** 
 [11.69] [10.28] 
Term Spread -13.340*** -13.780*** 
 [4.31] [4.59] 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Credit rating dummies Yes Yes 
Performance pricing dummy Yes Yes 
Callable dummy Yes Yes 
Debt type dummies Yes Yes 
Seniority dummy Yes Yes 
Debt purpose dummies Yes Yes 
Non-bank dummy Yes Yes 
# of Observations 1128 1121 
Adjusted R2 0.70 0.70 
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Table 3.5: Systematic Risk in Public versus Private Debt 
The dependent variable is a dummy equal one if debt contract is public and zero otherwise. Column (1) and (2) reports the 
estimates based on logit equation (2) with Beta extracted from CAPM and Fama and French (1992) models respectively, for 
investment grade (IG) debts. Column (3) and (4) report the results with the same sequence for non-investment grade (NIG) 
debts. Definition of variables is available in Appendix B. Z-statistics robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation 
(clustered at industry level) are reported in brackets.  *, ** and *** represent 10%, 5% and 1% significant level, respectively. 
 
 IG  NIG 
 
CAPM 
(1) 
FF 
(2) 
 
CAPM 
(3) 
FF 
(4) 
Log of Beta -0.125** -0.158**  0.248** 0.123 
 [2.19] [2.49]  [2.07] [1.25] 
Standard deviation of residuals -0.152*** -14.970***  -0.045*** -3.670*** 
 [5.74] [5.44]  [4.35] [3.21] 
Number of Analysts 0.065*** 0.065***  0.063*** 0.064*** 
 [8.42] [8.48]  [6.27] [6.13] 
Log of Age 0.378*** 0.377***  0.204** 0.185* 
 [3.86] [3.89]  [2.02] [1.73] 
Market to Book -0.210** -0.215**  -0.08 -0.083 
 [2.52] [2.46]  [0.38] [0.38] 
Cash Flow volatility -7.497*** -7.928***  0.609 0.68 
 [3.41] [3.63]  [0.57] [0.69] 
Profitability 3.695*** 3.730***  0.482 0.493 
 [2.92] [2.77]  [0.51] [0.53] 
Debt > 3 year / Total debt -0.494 -0.495  0.511** 0.597*** 
 [1.47] [1.48]  [2.51] [2.86] 
Zero outstanding debt 0.421 0.544  -0.633 -0.739 
 [1.12] [1.46]  [1.34] [1.55] 
Insider ownership 0.38 0.355  -0.532 -0.631* 
 [1.08] [0.91]  [1.57] [1.91] 
Leverage 0.535 0.412  0.079 0.059 
 [1.08] [0.82]  [0.25] [0.17] 
Tangibility 0.173 0.213  0.108 0.053 
 [0.51] [0.62]  [0.37] [0.16] 
Size 0.437*** 0.435***  0.017 0.013 
 [5.09] [4.90]  [0.29] [0.19] 
HHI 0.18 0.278  0.573 0.669 
 [0.33] [0.55]  [0.94] [1.01] 
GDP growth -13.322** -12.263**  -69.724*** -57.343*** 
 [2.22] [2.00]  [6.53] [5.63] 
# of Observations 5269 5086  1588 1522 
Pseudo R2 0.39 0.39  0.12 0.11 
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Table 3.6: Systematic Risk in Propensity Score Matched Private and Public Debts 
Public debts are matched with Private debts with maximum 0.005 difference in propensity scores (caliper 0.005) with 
replacement as explained in the text and Log of Beta of two groups is compared. Panel A and B report the results of comparison 
between systematic risks of public and private debt issuers estimated by CAPM and FF models for investment grade debts, 
respectively. Panel C and D report the results with the same sequence for non-investment grade debts. *, ** and *** represents 
10%, 5% and 1% significant level of the t-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum Z-test for the mean and median comparisons, 
respectively. 
 
Panel A: Public vs. Private – Investment grade – CAPM Beta 
 Observations  Mean  Median 
 Before 
matching 
After 
matching 
 Before 
matching 
After 
 matching 
 Before 
matching 
After 
matching 
Log of Beta (Treated) 2934 2805  -0.34 -0.34  -0.16 -0.15 
Log of Beta (Control) 2907 2435  -0.11 -0.27  0.03 -0.10 
Difference    -0.23*** -0.07***  -0.19*** -0.05*** 
Bias (absolute)    49.7% 4.1%  26.1% 3.1% 
Panel B: Public vs. Private – Investment grade – FF Beta 
Log of Beta (Treated) 2957 2832  -0.28 -0.29  -0.11 -0.12 
Log of Beta (Control) 2847 2383  -0.12 -0.23  0.04 -0.07 
Difference    -0.16*** -0.06***  -0.15*** -0.04*** 
Bias (absolute)    48.9% 5.6%  25.0% 6.3% 
Panel C: Public vs. Private – Non-investment grade – CAPM Beta 
Log of Beta (Treated) 838 772  0.11 0.11  0.23 0.23 
Log of Beta (Control) 875 794  -0.03 -.011  0.09 0.04 
Difference    0.14*** 0.22***  0.14*** 0.19*** 
Bias (absolute)    21.5% 4.0%  12.9% 3.0% 
Panel D: Public vs. Private – Non-investment grade – FF Beta 
Log of Beta (Treated) 819 751  0.03 0.02  0.20 0.19 
Log of Beta (Control) 823 748  -0.06 0.00  0.14 0.18 
Difference    0.09** 0.02  0.06* 0.01 
Bias (absolute)    20.9% 4.9%  12.3% 4.3% 
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Figure 3.2: Trading volume in Loan Secondary and Bond Markets 
 
 
Source: LPC DealScan database 
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Table 3.7: Systematic Risk and introduction of loan rating service 
This table reports the difference between the systematic risk of private and public debt issuers before and after the introduction 
of loan rating service in loan secondary market. Public debts are matched with private debts with maximum 0.005 difference 
in propensity scores (caliper 0.005) with replacement before and after 1996 as explained in the text. Panel A (B) report the 
results of comparison between systematic risks of public and private debt issuers estimated by CAPM (FF) model for 
investment grade debts. *, ** and *** represents 10%, 5% and 1% significant level of the t-test and Wilcoxon rank-sum Z-test 
for the mean and median comparisons, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Public vs. private investment grade debt before and after 1996 – CAPM Beta 
Until 1996 
 Observations  Mean  Median 
 Before 
matching 
After 
matching 
 Before 
matching 
After 
 matching 
 Before 
matching 
After 
matching 
Log of Beta (Treated) 944 848  -0.16 -0.14  -0.02 -0.01 
Log of Beta (Control) 1085 849  0.02 -0.05  0.18 0.06 
Difference     -0.18*** -0.09***  -0.20*** -0.07*** 
Bias (absolute)    45.1% 3.1%  23.7% 2.8% 
After 1996 
Log of Beta (Treated) 2015 1942  -0.36 -0.37  -0.18 -0.18 
Log of Beta (Control) 1779 1549  -0.20 -0.41  -0.04 -0.24 
Difference    -0.16*** 0.04  -0.22*** 0.06 
Bias (absolute)    52.1% 6.5%  27.0% 5.7% 
Diff-in-Diff (matched)    - 0.13***  - 0.09*** 
Panel B: Public vs. private investment grade debt before and after 1996 – FF Beta 
Until 1996 
Log of Beta (Treated) 942 874  -0.12 -0.11  0.01 0.01 
Log of Beta (Control) 1068 834  0.02 -0.05  0.16 0.07 
Difference     -0.14*** -0.06**  -0.15*** -0.06** 
Bias (absolute)    44.8% 4.0%  23.2% 2.6% 
After 1996 
Log of Beta (Treated) 2015 1942  -0.36 -0.37  -0.18 -0.18 
Log of Beta (Control) 1779 1549  -0.20 -0.41  -0.04 -0.24 
Difference    -0.16*** 0.04  -0.14*** 0.06 
Bias (absolute)    52.1% 6.5%  27.0% 5.7% 
Diff-in-Diff (matched)    - 0.10**  - 0.09** 
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Table 3.8: Systematic Risk and applying for credit rating 
The dependent variable is a dummy equal one if debt contract is a private rated loan and zero otherwise. Sample is restricted 
to private debt issuers only. Column (1) and (2) reports the estimates based on logit equation (2) with Beta extracted from 
CAPM and Fama and French (1992) models respectively, for investment grade (IG) debts. Column (3) and (4) report the results 
with the same sequence for non-investment grade (NIG) debts. Definition of variables is available in Appendix B. Z-statistics 
robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (clustered at industry level) are reported in brackets.  *, ** and *** represent 
10%, 5% and 1% significant level, respectively. 
 
 IG  NIG 
 
CAPM 
(1) 
FF 
(2) 
 
CAPM 
(3) 
FF 
(4) 
Log of Beta -0.290*** -0.244***  0.101 -0.143 
 [5.06] [3.72]  [0.90] [1.46] 
Standard deviation of residuals -0.021 -2.435  0.02 3.381 
 [1.30] [1.50]  [1.00] [1.55] 
Number of Analysts -0.054*** -0.054***  0.09 0.089 
 [4.51] [4.67]  [1.48] [1.37] 
Log of Age 0.199 0.208*  -0.222 -0.234 
 [1.63] [1.72]  [1.34] [1.28] 
Market to Book 0.241*** 0.219***  -0.277 -0.179 
 [3.77] [3.80]  [1.58] [1.04] 
Cash Flow volatility -5.429** -3.017  -0.218 -0.298 
 [2.24] [1.28]  [0.21] [0.27] 
Profitability 2.663*** 3.276***  2.981*** 2.728** 
 [3.09] [3.78]  [2.77] [2.47] 
Debt > 3 year / Total debt -0.361 -0.34  0.566 0.597 
 [0.94] [0.96]  [1.19] [1.13] 
Zero outstanding debt -1.094 -1.777  -1.460** -1.401* 
 [1.11] [1.50]  [2.07] [1.83] 
Insider ownership -0.538 -0.486  0.721 0.767 
 [1.21] [1.06]  [1.27] [1.29] 
Leverage -1.457*** -1.512***  0.154 0.064 
 [3.07] [3.26]  [0.32] [0.13] 
Tangibility 0.266 0.261  0.736 0.847 
 [1.01] [1.00]  [0.97] [1.11] 
Size 0.817*** 0.827***  0.087 0.112 
 [8.50] [8.09]  [0.30] [0.38] 
HHI 0.488 0.234  2.379** 2.672** 
 [0.87] [0.42]  [2.00] [2.10] 
GDP growth -6.075 -10.524  23.039 24.842 
 [0.77] [1.35]  [0.78] [0.83] 
Observations 2435 2383  794 729 
Pseudo R2 0.23 0.22  0.11 0.12 
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Table 3.9: Impact of loan rating on cost of debt 
The dependent variable is the log of Net spread. Loan Rating is a dummy equal one if the private debt has a rating and zero 
otherwise. Speculative is a dummy equal one (zero) if debt is non-investment (investment) grade. Column (1) and (2) report 
the estimates based on equation (1) with Beta extracted from CAPM and Fama and French (1992) three-factor models, 
respectively. Definition of variables is available in Appendix B. t-statistics robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation 
(clustered at industry level) are reported in brackets.  *, ** and *** represent 10%, 5% and 1% significant level, respectively. 
 
 
CAPM 
(1) 
 FF 
(2) 
Loan Rating -0.179  -0.178 
 [0.98]  [1.00] 
Speculative 0.06  0.087 
 [0.45]  [0.57] 
Loan Rating × Speculative -0.439***  -0.418** 
 [2.77]  [2.63] 
Public -1.595***  -1.528*** 
 [7.39]  [6.79] 
Log of Beta 0.028  0.039 
 [1.30]  [1.41] 
Size -0.093***  -0.099*** 
 [3.51]  [3.52] 
Cash Flow volatility -0.036  -0.077 
 [0.22]  [0.44] 
Profitability -0.873***  -1.209*** 
 [2.90]  [5.72] 
Tangibility -0.031  0.036 
 [0.25]  [0.28] 
Market to Book -0.044  -0.025 
 [1.59]  [0.94] 
Leverage 0.156  0.173 
 [1.29]  [1.50] 
D-to-D 0.005***  0.005*** 
 [2.74]  [2.72] 
Amount 0.081***  0.090*** 
 [3.12]  [3.28] 
Maturity 0.126***  0.140*** 
 [2.96]  [3.02] 
Credit Spread 71.752***  72.081*** 
 [15.76]  [15.16] 
Term Spread -8.213***  -7.682*** 
 [4.06]  [3.58] 
Industry FE Yes  Yes 
Credit rating dummies Yes  Yes 
Performance pricing dummy Yes  Yes 
Callable dummy Yes  Yes 
Debt type dummies Yes  Yes 
Seniority dummy Yes  Yes 
Debt purpose dummies Yes  Yes 
Non-bank dummy Yes  Yes 
# of Observations 2816  2724 
Adjusted R2 0.46  0.45 
 
